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|    comp.ai.philosophy    |    Perhaps we should ask SkyNet about this    |    59,235 messages    |
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|    Message 58,852 of 59,235    |
|    Richard Damon to olcott    |
|    Re: Proof that the halting problem is in    |
|    27 Dec 25 18:16:10    |
      [continued from previous message]              You will always eventually cycle back to a word you have already used.              >       >> as our base facts of knowledge are interrelated. The is on one root       >> fact.       >>       >       > You have a type that makes your sentence gibberish.              Yes, I have a typ*o*, as did you              There is no one root fact in our knowledge. If every fact has other       facts that it is based on, there is no root fact, and the system, since       it is finite, is cyclical.       >       >>>       >>>>>       >>>>>> It can not handle most systems with a countably infinite domain of       >>>>>> regard, so not Natural Numbers, not Finite Strings, not Turing       >>>>>> Complete Systems.       >>>>>>       >>>>>       >>>>> It can handle them at least to the same extent       >>>>> as humans minds. Algorithmic compression.       >>>>       >>>> NOPE, As if it could handle Natural Numbers, then we could create       >>>> the G for the system, and it couldn't prove it.       >>>>       >>>       >>> It is merely that diagonalization hides the semantic       >>> incoherence that reject's G.       >>       >> Nope. It seems you don't understand that G is just a statement that no       >> number statisfies a specific (complicated) Primitive Recursive       >> Relationship. A Relationship that can ALWAYS, for ANY number, be       >> evaluated in finite time.       >>       >       > "that no number satisfies a specific (complicated) Primitive       > Recursive Relationship" How is this shown?              In the meta-theory that undrstands the added meaning to the numbers.              In the base theory, the numbers do not have that meaning, but, since       this meta-theory developes a method to express as a single number ANY       statement/collection of statements that can be expressed in the theory,       and, because of the structure of these numbers, can check if a given the       given statement is a proof for another statement. And the PRR is an       embodeyment of such an algorithm to check if a statement is a proof of       the statement G.              THus *ANY* proof of G, will create a number which will satisfy that PRR,       thus making G false.              Since it is impossible for there to be a correct proof of a false       statement, there can not be a number that satisfies the PRR of G, as       that would lead to the contradiction.              This means that no number can staisfy that PRR, and thus G must be true.              This proof can only be done in the meta-system that has the knowledge of       the meaning of all the numbers, and there are an infinite number of       possible systems assigning meaning, so we can't just search them all.              The key is that the meta-system was specifically constructed so that       statements, like that G, and its PRR, that do not reference the       additional "facts" the create the meaning, will have the same truth       values in the two systems.              Thus, since G and the PRR meet that requirement, our knowledge in the       Meta-System transfers to the base system, but the proof, that uses that       knowledge does not.              >       >> There is no "diagonalization" in G. You are confusing different proof.       >>       >> The question of G is a pure mathematical question, either a number       >> does or does not satisfy it.       >>       >> In other words, your "logic" says some questions with factual answers       >> are just wrong.       >>       >> In other words, your logic is proven to be self-inconsistant, as       >> statements provably true are considered to be illogical.       >>       >       > You know that the Liar Paradox: "This sentence is not true"       > is not a truth bearer. None-the-less when we add one level       > of indirect reference       > This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"       > it becomes true.       >              Yes. So?              The statement G has a truth value, because no number does satisfy the       PRR, and thus it is true.              It can not be proven in the base system, as the only verification would       require testing EVERY finite value, of which there are an infinite       number of them, so it doesn't form a proof, but does establish its truth.              This is not true of the Liar's paradox. It just can not have a truth value.              This comes from the fundamental difference between the statements of "I       am not True" and "I am not Provable".              The first can not have a truth value, as either value creates a       contradiction.              This is not true of the second. It can not be false, as if it is false,       then it is provable, so it must be true (as we can only prove true       statements in a non-contradictory system),              It CAN be True, as there is no actual requirement of True statments       being provable, as Truth can come out of an infinite number of steps of       implication.              It also can be a non-truth-bearer if there isn't anything that makes it       true.              The key to the proof is that the statement isn't just a statement of       that form, but a statement that must have a truth value as it is a       statement is about something which follows the law of the excluded       middle, that only derives that meaning when we add additional       information from the meta-system.              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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