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|    comp.ai.philosophy    |    Perhaps we should ask SkyNet about this    |    59,235 messages    |
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|    Message 59,094 of 59,235    |
|    olcott to All    |
|    =?UTF-8?Q?G=C3=B6del=27s_G_has_never_act    |
|    17 Jan 26 15:08:22    |
      XPost: comp.theory, sci.logic, sci.math       From: polcott333@gmail.com              For nearly a century, discussions of arithmetic have quietly       relied on a fundamental conflation: the idea that       “true in arithmetic” meant “true in the standard model of ℕ.”       But PA itself has no truth predicate, no internal semantics,       and no mechanism for assigning truth values. So what was       called “true in arithmetic” was always meta-theoretic truth       about arithmetic, imported from an external model and never       grounded inside PA.              This conflation was rarely acknowledged, and it shaped the       interpretation of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, independence       results like Goodstein and Paris–Harrington, and the entire       discourse around “true but unprovable” statements.              My work begins by correcting this foundational error.              PA has no internal truth predicate, so classical claims of       “true in arithmetic” were always meta-theoretic. My system       introduces a truth predicate whose meaning is anchored       entirely in PA’s axioms and inference rules, not in external       models. Any statement whose meaning requires meta-theoretic       interpretation or non-well-founded self-reference is rejected       as outside the domain of PA. This yields a coherent, internal       notion of truth in arithmetic for the first time.              --       Copyright 2026 Olcott |
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