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|    comp.ai.philosophy    |    Perhaps we should ask SkyNet about this    |    59,235 messages    |
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|    Message 59,103 of 59,235    |
|    olcott to Mikko    |
|    =?UTF-8?Q?Re=3A_Closing_the_gap_of_G=C3=    |
|    18 Jan 26 06:53:52    |
      XPost: sci.logic, sci.math, comp.theory       From: polcott333@gmail.com              On 1/18/2026 5:18 AM, Mikko wrote:       > On 17/01/2026 17:54, olcott wrote:       >> On 1/17/2026 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:       >>> On 15/01/2026 22:37, olcott wrote:       >>>> On 1/15/2026 4:02 AM, Mikko wrote:       >>>>> On 15/01/2026 07:30, olcott wrote:       >>>>>> On 1/14/2026 9:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:       >>>>>>> On 1/14/26 4:36 PM, olcott wrote:       >>>>>>>> Interpreting incompleteness as a gap between mathematical truth       >>>>>>>> and proof depends on truth-conditional semantics; once this is       >>>>>>>> replaced by proof-theoretic semantics a framework not yet       >>>>>>>> sufficiently developed at the time of Gödel’s proof the notion       >>>>>>>> of such a gap becomes unfounded.       >>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>       >>>>>>> But that isn't what Incompleteness is about, so you are just       >>>>>>> showing your ignorance of the meaning of words.       >>>>>>>       >>>>>>> You can't just "change" the meaning of truth in a system.       >>>>>>>       >>>>>>       >>>>>> Yet that is what happens when you replace the foundational basis       >>>>>> from truth-conditional semantics to proof-theoretic semantics.       >>>>>       >>>>> Gödel constructed a sentence that is correct by the rules of first       >>>>> order Peano arithmetic       >>>>       >>>> within truth conditional semantics and non-well-founded       >>>> in proof theoretic semantics. All of PA can be fully       >>>> expressed in proof theoretic semantics. Even G can be       >>>> expressed, yet rejected as semantically non-well-founded.       >>>       >>> Gödel's sentence is a sentence of Peano arithmetic so its primary       >>> meaning is its arithmetic meaning. Peano's postulates fail to       >>> capture all of its arithmetic meaning but it is possible to add       >>> other postulates without introducing inconsistencies to make       >>> Gödel's sentence provable in a stronger theory of natural numbers.       >>       >> Plain PA has no internal notion of truth; any truth       >> talk is meta‑theoretic.       >       > Of course. Truth is a meta-theoretic concept. The corresponding concept       > about an uninterpreted theory is theorem.       >       > The statement that there is a sentence that is neither provable nor the       > negation of a provable sentence does not refer to truth.       >              For nearly a century, discussions of arithmetic have quietly       relied on a fundamental conflation: the idea that       “true in arithmetic” meant “true in the standard model of ℕ.”       But PA itself has no truth predicate, no internal semantics,       and no mechanism for assigning truth values. So what was       called “true in arithmetic” was always meta-theoretic truth       about arithmetic, imported from an external model and never       grounded inside PA.              This conflation was rarely acknowledged, and it shaped the       interpretation of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, independence       results like Goodstein and Paris–Harrington, and the entire       discourse around “true but unprovable” statements.              My work begins by correcting this foundational error with       Proof theoretic semantics and non-well-founded is construed       as not a truth bearer.              PA has no internal truth predicate, so classical claims of       “true in arithmetic” were always meta-theoretic. My system       introduces a truth predicate whose meaning is anchored       entirely in PA’s axioms and inference rules, not in external       models. Any statement whose meaning requires meta-theoretic       interpretation or non-well-founded self-reference is rejected       as outside the domain of PA. This yields a coherent, internal       notion of truth in arithmetic for the first time.                     --       Copyright 2026 Olcott |
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