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|    Message 129,274 of 131,241    |
|    Peter Flass to Lawrence D'Oliveiro    |
|    Re: VAX    |
|    05 Aug 25 20:15:11    |
      XPost: alt.folklore.computers       From: Peter@Iron-Spring.com              On 8/5/25 17:59, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:       > On Tue, 5 Aug 2025 21:01:20 -0000 (UTC), Thomas Koenig wrote:       >       >> So... a strategy could have been to establish the concept with       >> minicomputers, to make money (the VAX sold big) and then move       >> aggressively towards microprocessors, trying the disruptive move towards       >> workstations within the same company (which would be HARD).       >       > None of the companies which tried to move in that direction were       > successful. The mass micro market had much higher volumes and lower       > margins, and those accustomed to lower-volume, higher-margin operation       > simply couldn’t adapt.              The support issues alone were killers. Think about the       Orange/Grey/(Blue?) Wall of VAX documentation, and then look at the       five-page flimsy you got with a micro. The customers were willing to       accept cr*p from a small startup, but wouldn't put up with it from IBM       or DEC.              >       >> As for the PC - a scaled-down, cheap, compatible, multi-cycle per       >> instruction microprocessor could have worked for that market,       >> but it is entirely unclear to me what this would / could have done to       >> the PC market, if IBM could have been prevented from gaining such market       >> dominance.       >       > IBM had massive marketing clout in the mainframe market. I think that was       > the basis on which customers gravitated to their products. And remember,       > the IBM PC was essentially a skunkworks project that totally went against       > the entire IBM ethos. Internally, it was seen as a one-off mistake that       > they determined never to repeat. Hence the PS/2 range.       >       > DEC was bigger in the minicomputer market. If DEC could have offered an       > open-standard machine, that could have offered serious competition to IBM.       > But what OS would they have used? They were still dominated by Unix-haters       > then.              VMS was a heckuva good OS.              >       >> A bit like the /360 strategy, offering a wide range of machines (or CPUs       >> and systems) with different performance.       >       > That strategy was radical in 1964, less so by the 1970s and 1980s. DEC,       > for example, offered entire ranges of machines in each of its various       > minicomputer families.              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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