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|    comp.misc    |    General topics about computers not cover    |    21,759 messages    |
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|    Message 20,376 of 21,759    |
|    Grant Taylor to Lawrence D'Oliveiro    |
|    Re: [LINK] Calling time on DNSSEC?    |
|    04 Dec 24 20:57:47    |
      From: gtaylor@tnetconsulting.net              On 12/4/24 20:02, Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote:       > Which part of “depends on” are you having trouble with?              TLS doesn't /depend/ /on/ any domain information from the client.              It's perfectly possible to use a certificate that has nothing to do with       the domain name the client was connected to.              N.B. that's entirely independent of if the client will continue using       the connection after seeing that the name in the certificate (CN and /       or SAN) doesn't match the domain name that the client thought it was       connecting to.              But the server can use whatever certificate it wants to completely       independently of the domain name that the client uses. Hence there is       no dependency.              There is correlation and usually mutual agreement. But that's not a       requirement.              > Which cannot be sent encrypted over HTTP because HTTP encryption       > hasn’t been set up yet.              Server Name Indication is part of TLS, not HTTP. HTTP comes /after/ SNI.              > They don’t do “virtual hosting”, where multiple domains share       > the same IP address, and is an important feature of HTTP. That’s       > why there is a specific problem with that.              Link - Postfix — Multiple domain SSL certificates | by Dave Teu | Better       Coder | Medium        -       https://medium.com/better-coder/postfix-multiple-domain-ssl-cert       ficates-89c9f186ed73              Link - Dovecot SSL configuration — Dovecot documentation        -       https://doc.dovecot.org/2.3/configuration_manual/dovecot_ssl_con       iguration/#with-client-tls-sni-server-name-indication-support              > There are two rival specs for solving this: DNS-over-TLS, and       > DNS-over-HTTPS.              DoT & DoH are about encrypted communications with a DNS server. The are       completely independent of of TLS & SNI. What's more is that neither       DoT, nor DoH can do shit about ensuring that the data sent through the       DoT / DoH channel is valid. It's trivial to lie through DoT & DoH.       Unless client's use DNSSEC through DoT & DoH to catch the lie.              You can even use SNI while establishing a DoH session.              > DNS-over-TLS (DoT) is a separate protocol that can be identified       > as such by firewalls, while DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) is essentially       > indistinguishable from any other HTTPS traffic.              DoH is still subject to the SNI exposure and can be filtered that way.              It's also possible to do traffic analysis to identify & block likely DoH       traffic.              > DoH has become quite controversial.              This doesn't have anything to do with TLS / SNI, so I'm not responding       to it.                            --       Grant. . . .              --- SoupGate-DOS v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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