XPost: alt.privacy.anon-server, misc.phone.mobile.iphone   
   From: nobody@dizum.com   
      
   Onion Courier  wrote:   
   >Fritz Wuehler wrote:   
   >> Claas wrote:   
   >   
   >> > Besides the points above. Messages entering the pool are encrypted with   
   >> > 24 hrs rotating keys, in RAM, which are memguard protected. So in case   
   >> > third parties would look at the RAM pool (not a RAM disk) they would only   
   >> > see encrypted blobs with equal size.   
   >>   
   >> You're naive.  In a compromized VM they debug your processor registers   
   >> to get valid data.   
   >   
   >Give us an example of how it compares to YAMN or Mixmaster, with their   
   >open pools, and my implementation, so I and others can learn from it.   
   >(and do not forget People can run their Onion Courier Mixnets from home!)   
   >   
   >IIRC correcly, when I ran myself Mixmaster and YAMN remailers, I could   
   >look into the pool and see messages and there destinations, along their   
   >padded encrypted payload. I had never ran logs, but I know from postix   
   >how they work.   
   >   
   >So, do a comparison and let us know the results. If my implementation   
   >is flawed I will correct it and ask for better memguard advise for the   
   >rotating keys at the right places.   
      
   To be honest, you're a gullible person as there's not much of a   
   difference.  A hypervisor can easily be enabled to have unlimited   
   access to the guest system including all its processor registers   
   without being noticed.  That means customers are completely and   
   utterly at the mercy of their hosters, which themselves may have   
   to follow strictly law enforcement instructions.   
      
   That's why anonymous remailer networks have to be networks of   
   DIStrust resisting a certain amount of compromized servers.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)