XPost: alt.privacy.anon-server, misc.phone.mobile.iphone   
   From: nobody@dizum.com   
      
   Anonymous User wrote:   
   >The Claas sock puppet Bob aka fascist Juri wrote:   
   >>Yamn Remailer wrote:   
   >>   
   >>> You're mad! He did a comparison including a score for each of the items.   
   >>>   
   >>> The most severe problems seem to be   
   >>>   
   >>> | >> So tell us some facts about the superiority of your system compared   
   >>> | >> with the Mixmaster / YAMN design, where for example we have   
   >>> | >>   
   >>> | >> - a uniform packet design irrespective of message size   
   >>> | >   
   >>> | >The Onion Courier Mixnet uses with it's client random adaptive padding   
   >>> | >when sending messages, so that third parties do not know what is send,   
   >>> | >compared to fixed padding payloads. Once the messages enters the pool   
   >>> | >padding will be removed and then fixed size padding at each hop will   
   >>> | >be applied.   
   >>> |   
   >>> | Worse - That's a devastating flaw of your not so modern Type 1 system,   
   >>> | as padding only increases size and a larger message is doomed to stick   
   >>> | out like a sore thumb, whereas with Type 2 remailers all packets are of   
   >>> | equal size of 4 kB (Mixmaster) or 20 kB (YAMN) with larger messages   
   >>> | being split and reassembled at the exit remailer. That's the main   
   >>> | reason why Type 1 remailing is obsolete and was abandoned years ago in   
   >>> | favour of Type 2 Mixmaster / YAMN!   
   >>>   
   >>> and   
   >>>   
   >>> | >> - message routing through multiple chains to increase reliability   
   >>> | >   
   >>> | >The Onion Courier Mixnet, compared to the Mixmaster and YAMN Mixnet,   
   >>> | >is totally decentralized and anonymous mix nodes can communicate with   
   >>> | >public Tor Hidden Service mix nodes to form different chains.   
   >>> |   
   >>> | Worse - Correct me if I'm wrong, but AFAICS each message is sent through   
   >>> | just one single chain of nodes, which means it gets lost if one of these   
   >>> | nodes is down.   
   >>>   
   >>> To me those are knockout criteria.   
   >>>   
   >>> So a simple question: Is he right?   
   >>   
   >>We should ask ourselves the following questions for a) and b).   
   >   
   >No, no, no. You try to fool us once again. The key question above, which   
   >you're blinking, is clear and fair. And your avoidance speaks volumes.   
   >   
   >>   
   >>a) What can ISPs see when examining tor cells, each 514 bytes in size? Can   
   they   
   >>count that you always send equal in size remailer packets when using YAMN   
   and know then that you use a remailer service? I would say yes. With adaptive   
   padding they have a much harder time to guess, no?   
   >>   
   >>b) Don't you loose remailer packets, if you use copies=n with the same chain   
   when one node is down or when selecting random yamn chains and a node is down?   
   >   
   >IOW he's absolutely right and your oh so modern innovative system is   
   >nothing more than utter rubbish. Claas, you're simply an ugly POS!   
      
   Even the story Claas told us about once having been in contact   
   with our cypherpunk heroes now looks like just another lie, as   
   he pisses at Lance Cottrell, Len Sassaman, Peter Palfrader and   
   Steven Crook, the inventors and maintainers of secure Type II   
   remailing applications. He really is a miserable creature.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)   
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