XPost: alt.folklore.computers
From: tnp@invalid.invalid
On 30/12/2025 18:46, Waldek Hebisch wrote:
> In alt.folklore.computers c186282 wrote:
>> On 12/29/25 12:28, The Natural Philosopher wrote:
>>> On 29/12/2025 14:31, Peter Flass wrote:
>>>> On 12/29/25 03:42, Richard Kettlewell wrote:
>>>>> Bobbie Sellers writes:
>>>>>> On 12/28/25 22:40, rbowman wrote:
>>>>>>> On Mon, 29 Dec 2025 01:17:50 -0500, c186282 wrote:
>>>>>>>> For most 'office' uses you do NOT need AES-256 encryption for yer
>>>>>>>> damned payroll or budget files. Nobody, not even Vlad or Xi, CARES.
>>>>>>> We were dealing with NPS sites like Yellowstone and Rocky
>>>>>>> Mountain. The Dept. of Interior certainly cares.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Any employer who has a payroll has the Social Security numbers
>>>>>> of the employees. This certainly deserves the best encryption that
>>>>>> can be set up.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The encryption schemes are all breakable with enough power
>>>>>> brought to bear.
>>>>>
>>>>> At this point you should take a moment to work out how much ‘enough’
is.
>>>>>
>>>>> Let’s assume that:
>>>>> - you have a circuit design that can do a single AES-128 key
>>>>> schedule and decrypt operation in one cycle
>>>>> - you can fit a million copies of this design onto one chip
>>>>> - you can run the chip at 10GHz
>>>>> - you can manufacture a trillion instances of the chip
>>>>> (and put enough of a computer around them to do something useful)
>>>>> - you can somehow power and cool this unrealistically large
>>>>> supercomputer.
>>>>>
>>>>> This lets you test 10^6 * 10^10 * 10^12 = 10^28 keys per second. There
>>>>> are 2^128 possible AES-128 keys so it will take you a little over one
>>>>> thousand years to break AES-128. Your SSN will no longer be relevant by
>>>>> this point.
>>>>
>>>> Right now, but people who work with this stuff are worried about what
>>>> quantum computers can do with it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Enigma codes were also 'unbreakable'
>>
>> Well ... kinda true.
>>
>> The Brits did develop early computer tech to
>> help them - but the main breakthroughs came
>> when NAZI operators screwed up and repeated
>> the exact same message using different keys.
>
> Actually, Enigma was broken by Polish cryptographers (M. Rejewski,
> J. Różycki, H. Zygalski). British were relatively late to the game
> and received information from Poland. That included internal
> connections of the machine and methods to recover keys.
>
> Polish method were mainly based on the following property: up
> to IIRC 1943 German operators were supposed to start from
> pre-assigned position (changing with time), choose their
> own position, encrypt it using the pre-assigned position,
> send it and than change to the new position to encrypt main
> message. Imporant part is that operators were instructed to
> repeat initial position twice. That is position was encoded
> using 3 letters, they doubled this to 6 letter string and
> encrypted those letters. This procedure left a lot of
> redundancy in the first 6 letters of encrypted message.
>
Yes. The Poles got a long way into Enigma, but not the whole way.
They knew how the machines worked, at least.
> Actually, we are still quite far from ability to brute force
> 108.39 bits keys (effective length of Enigma key), and internal
> connections of Enigma are worth about 400 bits (and more with
> additional rotors). But we know that "know plaintext" attack
> can be quite effective at recovering keys. And there are new
> statistical approaches, likely to break any cipher designed without
> knowledge of such an attack.
>
Precisely.
--
“Progress is precisely that which rules and regulations did not foresee,”
– Ludwig von Mises
--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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