home bbs files messages ]

Forums before death by AOL, social media and spammers... "We can't have nice things"

   comp.protocols.tcp-ip      TCP and IP network protocols.      14,669 messages   

[   << oldest   |   < older   |   list   |   newer >   |   newest >>   ]

   Message 13,315 of 14,669   
   Archimedes' Lever to PeterD   
   Re: OT: The Truth About Predator Drones   
   18 Dec 09 19:44:21   
   
   XPost: comp.dsp, sci.crypt, sci.electronics.design   
   From: OneBigLever@InfiniteSeries.Org   
      
   On Fri, 18 Dec 2009 09:36:52 -0500, PeterD  wrote:   
      
   >On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 17:44:12 -0800 (PST), Mark    
   >wrote:   
   >   
   >>   
   >>>   
   >>> Passing encrypted video over a satellite network built for unencrypted   
   >>> analog video is not a trivial challenge. As far as I know, there   
   >>> exists no scheme to do this that has not been broken already. The   
   >>> problem is that encryption works partly by diffusing information so   
   >>> that no part of the output looks like any part of the input. The   
   >>> satellite link is filled with errors and distortion that have to be   
   >>> contained to retain adequate video quality.   
   >>>   
   >>> DS   
   >>   
   >>um,, is that why General Instrument was able to do it did it 15 years   
   >>ago for HBO?   
   >>   
   >>Mark   
   >>   
   >   
   >They didn't do the video, just the audio. Video was a very simple   
   >inversion technique, that was trivial to break. The audio was DES (so   
   >they said) encrypted, but there were several holes in the system that   
   >rendered it a bit less secure.   
      
      
     You absolutely have no clue what was done or how or why.   GI encrypted   
   the entire 6MHz wide video signal, you dope.  Maybe you are thinking of   
   "OnTV".  That was in-band gated synch scrambling and the audio was not   
   digitized OR encrypted...  it was simply shifted and not processed by the   
   tuner unless the gate is shifted back where it belongs.   
      
    Here...   ALL of these were around and failed as well.   
      
   Older television encryption systems   
      
       * Oak Industries   
      
   Oak Orion was originally used for analog satellite television pay channel   
   access in Canada. Was innovative for its time as it used digital audio.   
   It has been completely replaced by digital encryption technologies. Was   
   used by Sky Channel in Europe between the years 1982 and 1987. Oak   
   developed related encryption systems for cable TV and broadcast pay TV   
   services such as ON TV. The Oak systems used a sine wave added to the   
   video signal to interfere with the video sync and relocated audio to a   
   sub-carrier.   
      
       * Leitch Technology   
      
   Leitch Viewguard is an analog encryption standard used primarily by   
   broadcast TV networks in the North America. Its method of scrambling is   
   by re-ordering the lines of video (Line Shuffle), but leaves the audio   
   intact and listenable. Terrestrial broadcast CATV systems in Northern   
   Canada used this conditional access system for many years. It is only   
   occasionally used today on some satellite circuits because of its   
   similarity to D2-MAC and B-MAC.   
      
       * B-MAC   
      
   B-MAC has not been used for DTH applications since Primestar switched to   
   an all-digital delivery system in the mid-1990s.   
      
       * VideoCrypt   
      
   Analogue cut and rotate scrambling system with smartcard based   
   conditional access system, used in 1990s by several European satellite   
   broadcasters, mainly British Sky Broadcasting. Was also used by Sky New   
   Zealand (Sky-NZ). One version of Videocrypt (VideoCrypt-S) had the   
   capability of scrambling sound. A soft encryption option was also   
   possible where the encrypted video could be transmitted with a fixed key   
   and any VideoCrypt decoder could decode it.   
      
       * RITC Discret 1   
      
   System based on horizontal line delay and audio scrambling. Each line of   
   video was pseudorandomly delayed by either 0 nS, 902 nS or 1804 nS. (Line   
   Delay) First used in 1984 by French channel Canal Plus, it was widely   
   compromised after the December 1984 issue of "Radio Plans" magazine   
   printed decoder plans.   
      
       * SATPAC   
      
   Used by European channel FilmNet the SATPAC system interfered with the   
   horizontal and vertical synchronization signals and transmitted a signal   
   containing synchronization and authorization data on a separate   
   subcarrier. The system was first used in September 1986 and saw many   
   upgrades as it was easily compromised by pirates. By September 1992,   
   FilmNet changed to D2-MAC EuroCrypt.   
      
       * Telease MAAST / Sat-Tel SAVE   
      
   Added an interfering sine wave of a frequency (circa 93.750 kHz) to the   
   video signal. This interfering signal was approximately six times the   
   frequency of the horizontal refresh. It had an optional sound scrambling   
   using Spectrum Inversion. Used in the UK by BBC for its world service   
   broadcasts and by the now defunct UK movie channel "Premiere".   
      
       * Payview III   
      
   Used by German/Swiss channel Teleclub in the early 1990s, this system   
   employed various methods such as video inversion, modification of   
   synchronization signals and a pseudo line delay effect.   
      
       * D2-MAC EuroCrypt   
      
   Conditional Access system using the D2-MAC standard. Developed mainly by   
   France Telecom, the system was smartcard based. The encryption algorithm   
   in the smartcard was based on DES. It was one of the first smart card   
   based systems to be compromised.   
      
       * Nagravision analog system   
      
   An older Nagravision system for scrambling analog satellite and   
   terrestrial television programs was used in the 1990s, for example by the   
   German pay-TV broadcaster Premiere. In this line-shuffling system, 32   
   lines of the PAL TV signal are temporarily stored in both the encoder and   
   decoder, and read out in permuted order under the control of a   
   pseudorandom number generator. A smartcard security microcontroller (in a   
   key-shaped package) decrypts data that is transmitted during the blanking   
   intervals of the TV signal and extracts the random seed value needed for   
   controlling the random number generation. The system also permitted the   
   audio signal to be scrambled by inverting its spectrum at 12.5 kHz using   
   a frequency mixer.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)   

[   << oldest   |   < older   |   list   |   newer >   |   newest >>   ]


(c) 1994,  bbs@darkrealms.ca