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|    Message 119,404 of 120,746    |
|    Marian to All    |
|    Re: What does it really mean when an ent    |
|    22 Dec 25 11:14:55    |
      XPost: misc.phone.mobile.iphone       From: marianjones@helpfulpeople.com              >> It's obvious why.       >> There isn't a professional security researcher on the planet who says that.       >       > Only Isreali army intelligence. Who know a thing or two.              Chris, you're clearly being confused by two very different things.        a. platform selection,        b. and comparative security claims.              When an organization standardizes on iOS or Android, that decision is       almost never a blanket endorsement of one platform being "way more secure."              At a technical level, platform choice reflects a combination of:              Ecosystem control and supply-chain assurance        Some entities prefer Apple's vertically integrated hardware/software        stack. Others prefer Android because it allows custom ROMs, hardware        diversity, or integration with existing secure supply chains.              Device management and policy enforcement        MDM/EMM capabilities differ between platforms. Some organizations        need Apple's supervised-mode restrictions; others need Android        Enterprise's work-profile isolation or OEMConfig extensibility.              Customization and hardening requirements        High-security environments often deploy hardened Android builds        (e.g., AOSP-based, GrapheneOS-style, or vendor-hardened enterprise        variants) because Android's architecture allows deeper modification        than iOS. That flexibility is a feature, not a security flaw.              Operational constraints        Procurement pipelines, existing tooling, developer ecosystems,        and mission-specific apps all influence platform choice.        None of these equate to "this OS is more secure."              That's why your IDF example doesn't support your claim.        The IDF did not assert that iOS is "way more secure."              They made a platform decision based on their operational and architectural       needs. Meanwhile, many other militaries, intelligence agencies, and       critical-infrastructure organizations choose Android-based hardened devices       for equally valid security reasons.              If you want to argue that iOS is categorically more secure than Android,       that's a separate technical debate, which is one that involves sandbox       models, update cadence, exploit markets, kernel attack surfaces, and OEM       fragmentation.              But it's not something you can infer from a single organization's       procurement choice.       --       I converse civilly with anyone who remains civil, no matter who they are.              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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