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 Message 1899 
 Wilfred van Velzen to August Abolins 
 Re: eTransfer msg section, pretty lame 
 17 Nov 21 09:28:36 
 
TID: FMail-lnx64 2.1.0.18-B20170815
RFC-X-No-Archive: Yes
TZUTC: 0100
CHRS: UTF-8 2
PID: GED+LNX 1.1.5-b20161221
MSGID: 2:280/464 6194bf67
REPLY: 2:221/1.58@fidonet f679aae1
Hi August,

On 2021-11-16 18:52:00, you wrote to All:

 AA> An eTransfer typically allows for entering a short message of
 AA> up to 400 chars.  For a recent eTransfer, I found it important
 AA> to enter something to reference the billing statement that I am
 AA> paying for.  My typical message was something like this:

 AA>     This payment is for the "60-90 days" portion of the
 AA>     statement dated 11/15/21.

 AA> But that triggered an error message:

 AA> "There appears to be an error! All errors must be corrected
 AA> before continuing."

 AA>     Please enter a valid message. It must not exceed 400
 AA>     characters and contain only letters, numbers, and the
 AA>     characters . ! @ / ; : , ' = $ ^ ? * ( ). It must not
 AA>     contain the words http:, https:, www., javascript,
 AA>     function, return.

 AA> In this case it seemed that the quote char and the dash was not
 AA> on the allowed list.  Now, I'm just wondering WHY would a quote
 AA> or dash char need to be treated differently and excluded from a
 AA> valid set?

 AA> Likewise, why would even a simple word like function or return
 AA> be a problem for a message block?   When the system dedicates a
 AA> 400 char block for a message, why can't the system simply treat
 AA> that content as a benign group of chars and ignore any
 AA> "functionality" implied with http: https: or www, etc?

I suspect it's a standard the banks involved agreed about for this message.
It's handled by all kinds of systems at multiple banks, probably all over the
world. So it's probably a "better safe then sorry" messure, because there
isn't 1 authority that checks and oversees the development of all these
systems. That's handled by the IT departments of the individual banks.

 AA> Could there be hacking vectors that haven't been solved in the
 AA> eTransfer system?

With so many systems involved you never know if somewhere there is an
undiscovered bug lurking in one of them. It's probably wise to assume there
are more then one... So it's also wise to prevent them from being triggered by
having a strict "front gate".

Bye, Wilfred.

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