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|  Message 1899  |
|  Wilfred van Velzen to August Abolins  |
|  Re: eTransfer msg section, pretty lame  |
|  17 Nov 21 09:28:36  |
 TID: FMail-lnx64 2.1.0.18-B20170815 RFC-X-No-Archive: Yes TZUTC: 0100 CHRS: UTF-8 2 PID: GED+LNX 1.1.5-b20161221 MSGID: 2:280/464 6194bf67 REPLY: 2:221/1.58@fidonet f679aae1 Hi August, On 2021-11-16 18:52:00, you wrote to All: AA> An eTransfer typically allows for entering a short message of AA> up to 400 chars. For a recent eTransfer, I found it important AA> to enter something to reference the billing statement that I am AA> paying for. My typical message was something like this: AA> This payment is for the "60-90 days" portion of the AA> statement dated 11/15/21. AA> But that triggered an error message: AA> "There appears to be an error! All errors must be corrected AA> before continuing." AA> Please enter a valid message. It must not exceed 400 AA> characters and contain only letters, numbers, and the AA> characters . ! @ / ; : , ' = $ ^ ? * ( ). It must not AA> contain the words http:, https:, www., javascript, AA> function, return. AA> In this case it seemed that the quote char and the dash was not AA> on the allowed list. Now, I'm just wondering WHY would a quote AA> or dash char need to be treated differently and excluded from a AA> valid set? AA> Likewise, why would even a simple word like function or return AA> be a problem for a message block? When the system dedicates a AA> 400 char block for a message, why can't the system simply treat AA> that content as a benign group of chars and ignore any AA> "functionality" implied with http: https: or www, etc? I suspect it's a standard the banks involved agreed about for this message. It's handled by all kinds of systems at multiple banks, probably all over the world. So it's probably a "better safe then sorry" messure, because there isn't 1 authority that checks and oversees the development of all these systems. That's handled by the IT departments of the individual banks. AA> Could there be hacking vectors that haven't been solved in the AA> eTransfer system? With so many systems involved you never know if somewhere there is an undiscovered bug lurking in one of them. It's probably wise to assume there are more then one... So it's also wise to prevent them from being triggered by having a strict "front gate". Bye, Wilfred. --- FMail-lnx64 2.1.0.18-B20170815 * Origin: FMail development HQ (2:280/464) SEEN-BY: 1/123 14/0 90/1 103/705 105/81 120/340 123/131 124/5016 129/305 SEEN-BY: 153/757 154/10 203/0 221/0 226/30 227/114 702 229/424 426 SEEN-BY: 229/428 452 550 664 700 240/5138 5411 5824 5832 5853 249/206 SEEN-BY: 249/317 400 280/464 5003 282/1038 292/854 8125 301/1 310/31 SEEN-BY: 317/3 320/219 322/757 341/234 342/200 396/45 423/120 633/280 SEEN-BY: 712/848 770/1 2432/390 2452/250 2454/119 PATH: 280/464 240/5832 229/426 |
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