home bbs files messages ]

Forums before death by AOL, social media and spammers... "We can't have nice things"

   linux.debian.bugs.dist      Ohh some weird Debian bug report thing      28,835 messages   

[   << oldest   |   < older   |   list   |   newer >   |   newest >>   ]

   Message 28,330 of 28,835   
   Bastian Germann to All   
   Bug#1128511: trixie-pu: package xfsprogs   
   20 Feb 26 18:20:01   
   
   XPost: linux.debian.devel.release   
   From: bage@debian.org   
      
   This is a multi-part MIME message sent by reportbug.   
      
      
   Package: release.debian.org   
   Severity: normal   
   Tags: trixie   
   X-Debbugs-Cc: xfsprogs@packages.debian.org   
   Control: affects -1 + src:xfsprogs   
   User: release.debian.org@packages.debian.org   
   Usertags: pu   
      
   [ Reason ]   
   xfs_scrub_fail email reporting fails, which is documented as #1116595.   
   This is specific to a mail setup that I do not use.   
      
   [ Impact ]   
   "Permission denied" entries spam the system logs:   
   postfix/postdrop[37291]: warning: mail_queue_enter: create file    
   aildrop/480926.37291: Permission denied   
      
   This is due to systemd sandboxing features in xfs_scrub_all_fail.service   
   not aligning with the sendmail setup.   
      
   [ Tests ]   
   Check the xfs_scrub_all_fail.service to run properly.   
   I do not have the time to replicate the bug-described setup. Sorry.   
      
   [ Risks ]   
   This is taking away sandboxing features that are too strict for this   
   type of service.   
      
   [ Checklist ]   
     [x] *all* changes are documented in the d/changelog   
     [x] I reviewed all changes and I approve them   
     [x] attach debdiff against the package in stable   
     [x] the issue is verified as fixed in unstable   
      
   [ Changes ]   
   New patch changes one file and comes from upstream.   
   This removes systemd sandboxing features that are too strict,   
   especially CapabilityBoundingSet= and NoNewPrivileges=true.   
      
   [ Other info ]   
   The service can just be disabled (the feature does not work with trixie   
   anyway) but people really want a stable update.   
      
   diff -Nru xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/changelog xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/changelog   
   --- xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/changelog	2025-02-23 15:32:04.000000000 +0100   
   +++ xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/changelog	2026-02-20 17:32:00.000000000 +0100   
   @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@   
   +xfsprogs (6.13.0-2+deb13u1) trixie; urgency=medium   
   +   
   +  * xfs_scrub_fail: reduce security lockdowns to avoid postfix problems   
   +    (Closes: #1116595)   
   +   
   + -- Bastian Germann   Fri, 20 Feb 2026 17:32:00 +0100   
   +   
    xfsprogs (6.13.0-2) unstable; urgency=medium   
      
      * Patch: mkfs: Correct filesize declaration   
   diff -Nru xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/patches/series xfsprogs-6.13.0/   
   ebian/patches/series   
   --- xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/patches/series	2025-02-23 15:20:24.000000000 +0100   
   +++ xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/patches/series	2026-02-20 17:29:24.000000000 +0100   
   @@ -1 +1,2 @@   
    mkfs-Correct-filesize-declaration.patch   
   +xfs_scrub_fail-reduce-security-lockdowns.patch   
   diff -Nru xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/patches/xfs_scrub_fail-reduce-s   
   curity-lockdowns.patch xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/patches/xfs_scrub_   
   ail-reduce-security-lockdowns.patch   
   --- xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/patches/xfs_scrub_fail-reduce-securit   
   -lockdowns.patch	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100   
   +++ xfsprogs-6.13.0/debian/patches/xfs_scrub_fail-reduce-securit   
   -lockdowns.patch	2026-02-20 17:27:35.000000000 +0100   
   @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@   
   +From 15fd6fc686d5ce7640e46d44f6fa018413ce1b64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001   
   +From: "Darrick J. Wong"    
   +Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 16:34:24 -0700   
   +Subject: [PATCH] xfs_scrub_fail: reduce security lockdowns to avoid postfix   
   + problems   
   +   
   +Iustin Pop reports that the xfs_scrub_fail service fails to email   
   +problem reports on Debian when postfix is installed.  This is apparently   
   +due to several factors:   
   +   
   +1. postfix's sendmail wrapper calling postdrop directly,   
   +2. postdrop requiring the ability to write to the postdrop group,   
   +3. lockdown preventing the xfs_scrub_fail@ service to have postdrop in   
   +   the supplemental group list or the ability to run setgid programs   
   +   
   +Item (3) could be solved by adding the whole service to the postdrop   
   +group via SupplementalGroups=, but that will fail if postfix is not   
   +installed and hence there is no postdrop group.   
   +   
   +It could also be solved by forcing msmtp to be installed, bind mounting   
   +msmtp into the service container, and injecting a config file that   
   +instructs msmtp to connect to port 25, but that in turn isn't compatible   
   +with systems not configured to allow an smtp server to listen on ::1.   
   +   
   +So we'll go with the less restrictive approach that e2scrub_fail@ does,   
   +which is to say that we just turn off all the sandboxing. :( :(   
   +   
   +Reported-by: iustin@debian.org   
   +Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org # v6.10.0   
   +Fixes: 9042fcc08eed6a ("xfs_scrub_fail: tighten up the security on the   
   background systemd service")   
   +Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong    
   +Reviewed-by: Andrey Albershteyn    
   +---   
   + scrub/xfs_scrub_fail@.service.in | 57 ++------------------------------   
   + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)   
   +   
   +diff --git a/scrub/xfs_scrub_fail@.service.in b/scrub/xfs_scrub   
   fail@.service.in   
   +index 16077888..1e205768 100644   
   +--- a/scrub/xfs_scrub_fail@.service.in   
   ++++ b/scrub/xfs_scrub_fail@.service.in   
   +@@ -19,57 +19,6 @@ SupplementaryGroups=systemd-journal   
   + # can control resource usage.   
   + Slice=system-xfs_scrub.slice   
   +   
   +-# No realtime scheduling   
   +-RestrictRealtime=true   
   +-   
   +-# Make the entire filesystem readonly and /home inaccessible.   
   +-ProtectSystem=full   
   +-ProtectHome=yes   
   +-PrivateTmp=true   
   +-RestrictSUIDSGID=true   
   +-   
   +-# Emailing reports requires network access, but not the ability to change the   
   +-# hostname.   
   +-ProtectHostname=true   
   +-   
   +-# Don't let the program mess with the kernel configuration at all   
   +-ProtectKernelLogs=true   
   +-ProtectKernelModules=true   
   +-ProtectKernelTunables=true   
   +-ProtectControlGroups=true   
   +-ProtectProc=invisible   
   +-RestrictNamespaces=true   
   +-   
   +-# Can't hide /proc because journalctl needs it to find various pieces of log   
   +-# information   
   +-#ProcSubset=pid   
   +-   
   +-# Only allow the default personality Linux   
   +-LockPersonality=true   
   +-   
   +-# No writable memory pages   
   +-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true   
   +-   
   +-# Don't let our mounts leak out to the host   
   +-PrivateMounts=true   
   +-   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)   

[   << oldest   |   < older   |   list   |   newer >   |   newest >>   ]


(c) 1994,  bbs@darkrealms.ca