XPost: ba.politics, dc.media, soc.penpals   
   XPost: alt.burningman   
   From: jariush@nbc.com   
      
   Pilots of a United Parcel Service UPS +1.23%  Inc. cargo jet   
   repeatedly deviated from mandatory company safety rules and   
   approach procedures just before their plane plowed into a   
   hillside last August near the Birmingham, Ala., airport, federal   
   investigators revealed Thursday.   
      
   The cockpit crew exceeded the maximum vertical descent rate for   
   a stabilized approach, failed to verbalize critical altitude   
   changes and violated basic safeguards by continuing the final   
   phase of a descent using limited navigation aids even though the   
   runway lights weren't visible, according to the National   
   Transportation Safety Board.   
      
   But in delving more deeply into the causes of the Airbus A300   
   crash, which killed both pilots, NTSB staffers uncovered that   
   the commander had what industry and government experts consider   
   a history of training lapses and proficiency challenges   
   stretching back more than a decade. The documents point to   
   several mistakes in simulator sessions, but no accidents or   
   enforcement actions. More broadly, that spotty record raises   
   questions about the effectiveness of UPS pilot-training   
   programs, especially when visual approaches replace automated   
   descents, according to aviation-industry officials.   
      
   In 2000 and 2002, Cerea Beal, then a UPS first officer flying   
   Boeing BA -0.11%  Co. 727 jets, voluntarily withdrew from   
   training for promotion to captain, a highly unusual move. The   
   NTSB didn't give a reason for the withdrawal, but government,   
   industry and pilot union sources said that such moves,   
   especially within two years of each other, typically avoid an   
   outright failure. According to the NTSB, UPS told investigators   
   it didn't retain those training records.   
      
   After working as a co-pilot from October 1990 to the spring of   
   2009—an unusually long stint by most aviator standards—the   
   former military helicopter pilot became an A300 captain in June   
   of that year, according to information released by the NTSB.   
   About a year later, Capt. Beal was in command of a plane that   
   veered off a taxiway after landing at Charlotte Douglas   
   International Airport in North Carolina, the board disclosed at   
   a hearing Thursday. NTSB documents didn't give any additional   
   examples of incidents.   
      
   Reports, interview transcripts and other data released by the   
   board also detail that in the days and hours leading up to the   
   fiery accident, Capt. Beal complained about chronic fatigue. He   
   told one fellow pilot the string of late-night and early-morning   
   shifts was "killing" him.   
      
   During an early portion of the accident flight, the cockpit   
   voice recorder captured co-pilot Shanda Fanning telling the   
   captain that "when my alarm went off" following a rest break   
   during the duty period, she was upset. "I mean, I'm thinking,   
   'I'm so tired,'" she recalled according to the transcript.   
      
   In one of the text messages retrieved by investigators, the day   
   before the crash Ms. Fanning complained that she "fell asleep on   
   every damn leg" of her various flights the previous night. But   
   some of the fatigue may have been outside the company's purview.   
   Before starting night duty that extended to almost 5 a.m. the   
   morning of the crash, according to an NTSB analysis, Ms. Fanning   
   opted to spend most of her free time outside her hotel room.   
      
   UPS has said Capt. Beal was experienced and fully qualified,   
   adding that whatever training issues cropped up were   
   "appropriately dealt with at the time." On Thursday, the Atlanta   
   package carrier reiterated that its schedules are "well within   
   FAA limits," noting that the Birmingham crew spent less than   
   three hours of its final eight-hour duty period in the air.   
      
   The cargo airline also said its fatigue-prevention measures,   
   including special sleep rooms and joint pilot-management reviews   
   of schedules, are intended to ensure adequate rest.   
      
   The fatigue issue is bound to spark more debate about whether   
   cargo pilots should have been covered by more-stringent fatigue   
   rules recently implemented for pilots flying passengers. Some   
   House and Senate members are pushing for such legislation. UPS,   
   however, said the Birmingham crew's schedule complied with the   
   latest requirements for U.S. passenger airlines.   
      
   Within hours of the hearing, the nation's largest pilots union   
   stepped up calls for legislation to make cargo haulers comply   
   with the same scheduling rules as passenger carriers.   
      
   "Pilots who operate in the same skies, take off from the same   
   airports, and fly over the same terrain must be given the same   
   opportunities for full rest, regardless of what is in the back   
   of the plane," said Lee Moak, president of the Air Line Pilots   
   Association.   
      
   The hearing underscored lax discipline and apparent confusion in   
   the cockpit during roughly the final two minutes of the flight.   
   Safety experts from UPS and Airbus testified that the crew   
   improperly used the flight-management computer to try to set up   
   a safe approach path. When that didn't work, they said, Capt.   
   Beal violated UPS rules by abruptly switching to a different   
   type of approach and then commanding the autopilot to maintain   
   an excessively steep descent.   
      
   UPS officials testified that both of those events should have   
   prompted pilots to initiate a go-around, or immediate climb away   
   from the airport. Instead, the crew continued the approach below   
   the safe altitude for making such a decision.   
      
   In addition to lapses by the crew, Thursday's hearing   
   highlighted the limitations of outdated collision-avoidance   
   technology aboard the aging A300. Barely seven seconds before   
   impact, the ground-proximity warning system alerted the pilots   
   that they were descending too rapidly.   
      
   Due to the way the system was configured, however, the NTSB said   
   an explicit warning about the impending crash and a command to   
   immediately pull up didn't come until a second after the initial   
   sound of impact was captured by the cockpit recorder.   
      
   An updated warning system, recommended years ago by officials at   
   supplier Honeywell International HON +0.66%  Inc., would have   
   provided at least several precious seconds of additional   
   warning. But it isn't clear whether that would have been enough   
   to save the crew and the plane. "Maybe, maybe not," Federal   
   Aviation Administration official Tom Chidester testified.   
      
   NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman focused on whether average pilots   
   understood that because of design limitations and older   
   technology, "certain [safety] systems will be inhibited" or   
   operate differently close to the ground.   
      
   As part of its continuing investigation, the NTSB determined   
   that the plane's engines, flight controls and other onboard   
   systems, including collision-warning technology, operated   
   normally before impact.   
      
   In one email released by the board, an FAA official indicated   
   three months after the crash that the visual navigation aids   
   installed on the Birmingham runway weren't designed to handle   
   planes as large as the Airbus A300.   
      
   http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ntsb-details-pilot-errors-   
      
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