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> >Washington, and Boston are home to the three busiest subway systems in the 
> >nation, and all three currently need billions of dollars to make crucial 
> >repairs and meet rising demand. Ten of the nation's largest public transit 
> >agencies face a collective repair backlog of $102 billion, according to 
> >the Regional Plan Association. That means that nearly one-fifth of the US 
> >population is standing on crumbling train platforms, waiting for out-of-
> >date buses, or coping with more frequent delays due to mechanical 
> >problems.
> >
> >The Canarsie Tunnel between Manhattan and Brooklyn serves 225,000 
> >passengers a day. But thanks to Hurricane Sandy, the tunnel will need to 
> >shut down for 18 months for repairs. And the MTA’s first major expansion 
> >in decades, the Second Avenue Subway, is mired in cost overruns and 
> >delays. Meanwhile, in an unprecedented move last March, the entire DC 
> >Metro shut down for a whole day to address safety concerns. Gridlock, 
> >austerity, an allergy to tax increases and debt — all make for a toxic 
> >stew in which our urban transit systems are sinking.
> >
> >New projects to replace the old, falling apart systems run into a 
> >different kind of problem: self-sabotage. Baltimore’s Red Line is a 
> >perfect example. A 14-mile light-rail line to connect the city’s 
> >impoverished west side to its more affluent east side, the project was 
> >weeks away from breaking ground in 2015 when Maryland’s Republican 
> >governor dubbed it a "boondoggle" and pulled the plug. The same thing 
> >happened to the Access to the Region’s Core (ARC) tunnel, recently 
> >described by President Obama as the most important infrastructure project 
> >in the country. It became the pawn in a political pissing contest, and 
> >eventually bit the dust.
> >
> >"These rail services are expensive, quite frankly," Robert Puentes, 
> >president and CEO of the 95-year-old Eno Center for Transportation, told 
> >me. "They're expensive to build, they're expensive to operate, and when 
> >you do them right, they can have enormously positive implications on 
> >regional economies. And if you do them wrong, they can be a big white 
> >elephant."
> >
> >In 2002, Cincinnati’s voters had a chance to resurrect their incomplete 
> >subway, to transform it from a graveyard of embarrassment to a linchpin in 
> >a multi-billion dollar transit plan. The Southwest Ohio Regional Transit 
> >Authority proposed a ballot referendum called Metro Moves, which would 
> >have created an extensive light-rail system incorporating the three 
> >remaining 1920s-era subway stations at Liberty, Brighton, and Hopple 
> >streets.
> >
> >In many ways, Metro Moves was more ambitious than the original Rapid 
> >Transit Loop. It included seven light-rail lines and 72 stations, at a 
> >total cost of $2.7 billion. While the federal government would have 
> >covered the bulk, Hamilton County (which encompasses Cincinnati) residents 
> >were asked to approve a half-cent sales tax levy to cover their portion. 
> >Just like they had a century ago, local businesses endorsed the plan, as 
> >well as environmentalists and good government groups. Supporters blanketed 
> >the airwaves with positive ads in favor of Metro Moves, and dominated 
> >opponents during numerous public debates.
> >
> >Metro Moves was the result of a decade-long effort to bring light rail to 
> >Cincinnati. Moreover, it was the city’s chance to erase the stain left 
> >behind by their unfinished subway project. But Hamilton County residents 
> >rejected Metro Moves in a 2-to-1 vote, with over 68 percent voting against 
> >the project.
> >
> >Wedged between the Fort Washington freeway trench and the Ohio River, a 
> >stone’s throw from the city’s baseball park and football stadium, sits
the 
> >Riverfront Transit Center, a two-story tall, half-mile long underground 
> >concrete tube opened in 2003. That makes it one of the largest transit 
> >stations in the world. It is also another failed Cincinnati public 
> >transportation project: most of the time it sits completely empty.
> >
> >When it was envisioned, planners thought that the transit center would be 
> >a hub where light-rail lines — if Cincinnati ever got around to building 
> >them — could converge. In the meantime, the massive underground transit 
> >station would serve as a pick-up and drop-off location for public and 
> >private buses, as well as special shuttles during game days. Today, the 
> >above-ground portals are locked and the driveway leading up to the main 
> >entrance is closed for 275 days out of the year. Though I’m told the 
> >center is lined with subway tiles and mosaic art, I wasn’t allowed inside.
> >
> >"It is an orphaned station," a Channel 9 reporter mused in a 2011 
> >investigative piece on the station’s underutilization. No rail lines 
> >currently run to the Riverfront Transit Center, and it’s only open during 
> >during major events. Public metro buses are left to do their pick-ups and 
> >drop-offs at street level.
> >
> >With a $48 million price tag, the transit center has been enough of a 
> >money pit to turn once ardent supporters into foes. Former Cincinnati 
> >mayor Charlie Luken, who helped cut the ribbon on the Riverfront Transit 
> >Center in 2003, now calls it the biggest waste of money he’s ever seen. 
> >"The only reason there's not more outrage about it," Luken told Channel 9, 
> >"is because people don't know it's there."
> >
> >When I ask him about the Riverfront Transit Center, Dan Hurley, a local 
> >historian and civic leader, almost chokes on his water. "Underutilized is 
> >such a kind word," he says. "Boondoggle is the one I hear more often."
> >
> >What is it about Cincinnati that it served as the setting for not one, but 
> >two multi-million transportation fiascos? Most of the Cincinnatians I 
> >spoke to shrug off the question, insisting that the forces that gave rise 
> >to both the subway and the transit center have nothing in common. The 
> >subway was never finished, while the transit center is complete, if 
> >underutilized.
> >
> >In September, the city will cut the ribbon on its new streetcar system. 
> >Many Cincinnatians are excited for their fancy new streetcars. Others 
> >remain opposed, including Cincinnati mayor John Cranley, who calls it a 
> >waste of money and "a mistake." In 2013, Cranley tried to stop the 
> >streetcar, but the city council, perhaps realizing the horrible irony 
> >involved in canceling another half-complete transportation project, 
> >overruled him.
> >
> >Recently, the city realized it was losing money by keeping its empty 
> >spaces like the Riverfront Transit Center empty for most of the year. In 
> >October, the station will be unlocked and the gates flung open for Ubahn, 
> >a two-day hip-hop and EDM musicfest. (The German word "U-bahn" translates 
> >as an underground rapid transit or metro.) The organizers are billing it 
> >as the "the first underground music festival in Cincinnati."
> >
> >New York City transformed an abandoned elevated train track into a world-
> >class park. It’s now doing the same for an empty trolley terminal in 
> >Manhattan. The High Line begat the Lowline. If the Ubahn is successful, 
> >could the Cincinnati subway be far behind?
> >
> >Moore says no. "We’ve had people approach us about using the tunnel for 
> >everything from grain malting, to a water bottling operation, to 
> >nightclubs — you name it." None of these ideas will work, though.
There’s 
> >no way the subway can accommodate thousands of sweaty club kids. The floor 
> >is uneven, there are pillars, and the water main, which was installed in 
> >the 1950s, leaks constantly.
> >
> >Which is not to say the tunnels aren’t in good condition. In 2008, the 
> >city was faced with a choice: spend $100.5 million to revive the tunnels 
> >for modern subway use, $19 million to fill the tunnels with dirt, or $2.6 
> >million to simply maintain them as an abandoned space. After two years of 
> >debate, the city went with the cheapest option. The subway houses a water 
> >main, as well as fiber optic cables. And with Central Parkway running 
> >directly above, the tunnels needed to be refortified to keep the street 
> >safe.
> >
> >Today, most people don’t know why the subway was never finished. Even 
> >Murray Seasongood, the posh city manager who was most responsible for its 
> >demise, didn’t seem to understand his own role in the boondoggle. When he 
> >was researching his book, Mecklenborg stumbled across an old interview 
> >from the 1960s with Seasongood, who was in his 80s at the time. The 
> >interviewer, a college student from the University of Cincinnati, asked 
> >him if he regretted killing the subway. "He was very jovial, very 
> >enthusiastic," the student said of Seasongood. "But as for the details of 
> >the subway system, he could not recall them."
> >
> >Back at Hopple Street, Mecklenborg and I emerge from the labyrinth, a 
> >little dirtier than when we entered but otherwise unharmed. Despite 
> >everything that he and his city have been through, he’s surprisingly 
> >indifferent to the decision to seal off the subway from the public 
> >forever. He thought that the tours were okay, but prone to misinformation. 
> >Maybe it’s better this way. "You can go on a tour of the subway, you can 
> >physically see it," he says, "but you still wouldn’t understand it."

Oh, and Prohibition was another Fundie attempt to control private behavior.
The Fundie dry dream managed to create the East Coast Mafia and contributed to
the current drug wars on city streets.

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