From: nilknocgeo@earthlink.net

"Adam H. Kerman"  wrote in message
news:lt3ap3$tkg$1@news.albasani.net...
> The disaster in Lac Magentic was caused by train MMA-002, operated by an
> engineer without conductor, on Montreal, Maine, & Atlantic Railway running
> away after being left unattended in Nantes. The train consist was 72 tank
> cars and a buffer car (which protects the engine crew from disaster caused
> by dangerous goods). There were five locomotives in the engine consist,
> with a VB car (special-purpose caboose) behind the lead locomotive with
> equipment for locomotive remote control. The engineer applied hand brakes
> on 7 cars in total and shut down trailing locomotives, including 2
> equipped
> with auto-start that are not required to be shut down for fuel
> conservation
> purposes as they shut off on their own eventually. The hand brake test was
> performed without releasing the independent brakes (parking brakes) on the
> locomotives, but this was a downgrade and it's not entirely clear if this
> was a rules violation. Nonetheless, with independent brakes applied, it
> didn't produce an adequate test of hand brakes.
>
> Point 16, if I'm understanding it correctly, indicates why the engineer
> thought the hand brakes were holding the consist after he performed the
> roll test. It's clear that despite the engineer's long experience, he
> was never trained adequately in calculating the number of hand brakes to
> set nor what constitutes an adequate test of hand brakes. On page 127,
> the point is made that MM&A's use of single person train operation
> implementation didn't include training in adequate train securement. The
> engineer must perform the conductor's duties as well as his own, and
> apparently securing the train falls more heavily on the conductor portion
> of this job. There was no mention if he first hired on at CP as a
> conductor.
>
> A few points of interest from the Lac Magentic report:
>
> 1) The fire department shut down of the locomotive was done under railroad
> direction, a fact I'm very glad to hear. Never read that in any of the
> local or foreign stories I read of the disaster. Both the fuel line
> valve was closed, to stop the fire, and the electrical breakers were
> opened, to prevent a spark from igniting fuel. Unfortunately, MMA sent
> a track foreman who wouldn't have a locomotive operating background and
> didn't tell him to start another locomotive to keep the compressor going
> to maintain air pressure in the air brake system. Normally, a penalty
> brake application (dumping the air in all brake cylinders in the entire
> train) would have occurred, except that the reset safety control (RSC)
> was improperly wired so that this would not happen.
>
> 2) The engineer was rules qualified and not violating hours of service.
> Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway is ex-CP trackage; MM&A is the
> second short line to own it. The engineer had hired on to CP in 1980,
> so he had plenty of experience.
>
> 3) Railroad industry assumes train crews are capable of exerting 125 lbs
> of force on the brake wheel, but tests reveal that 80 to 100 lbs of force
> is more typical.
>
> 4) Applying hand brakes on the locomotive is not assumed to be capable
> of holding in place any additional cars. A new FRA standard applicable to
> locomotives placed in service after January 4, 2004, requires the hand
> brake to be capable of holding the locomotive in place on a 3% grade, a
> net braking ratio of 10%. Generally, locomotive hand brakes met this
> standard anyway prior to the effective date.
>
> 5) Applying the locomotive's hand brakes doesn't typically apply all
> brake shoes. 2 of 12 brake shoes is typical, the way this model GE
> locomotive
> was designed.
>
> 6) MM&A, as former CP territory, continued to use CP's General Operating
> Instructions. It also refers to MM&A's General Special Instructions (GSIs)
> and Safety Rules, without clarifying that these are additional documents
> to those taken from CP.
>
> 7) Applicable number of handbrakes to apply uses a 10% of the number of
> cars in the consist (72 in this case) plus 2. Setting hand brakes on the
> locomotives counts toward the minimum. Hand brakes are required to be set
> on the locomotive. Under this formula, 9 were to be set.
>
> 8) The grade at Nantes, where the train was parked, is .92%. From the
> summary of rules given, assuming the consist holds for the hand brake
> test,
> it doesn't appear that there was a requirement to set more than 9.
> However,
> with 13 PSI automatic brake application to stop the train, 15 to 20
> hand brakes should have been set, and without any air brakes, 18 to 26
> air brakes should have been set. Interestingly, because of the wear on
> the brake shoes on the locomotives' brakes, the engineer would have needed
> to set between 12 and 18 brakes if just done on the cars.
>
> 9) Emergency brakes are applied with a complete dump of air. However, when
> the air bleeds off slowly, and gets below 40 PSI, an emergency brake
> application is no longer possible.
>
> 10) It took about an hour before the brake pressure fell to the point at
> which
> the independent brakes (parking brakes) in the locomotive no longer held.
>
> 11) The sense and braking unit (SBU), a device connected to the rear of
> the train attached to the brake line that can apply emergency brakes,
> wasn't sufficient to apply emergency brakes in trains longer than 5
> cars. By the time the device noted that the train had started to move,
> brake pressure had dropped to 29 PSI.
>
> 12) In a test train with engine shut off, it took 1 hr 35 minutes before
> air pressure dropped to 27 PSI, which is the pressure at which the train
> started to roll. But the train's locomotive took 1 hr 6 minutes to drop
> pressure to 27 PSI. Not ideal but not outrageous given the age of the
> parts.
>
> 13) The quick release brake (QRB) valve on the second locomotive in the
> four locomotive engine consist failed. Typically, on a locomotive so
> equipped, it opens to dump the air in the cylinder when the hand brake
> is tightened when opened with the brake chain. The valve was worn and
> damaged and, er, repaired in a non- standard manner (not explained).
> Unless
> the air in the cylinder is dumped, the shoe isn't applied with the hand
> brake. MM&A issued an instruction specific to these locomotives that the
> crew member must listen for the air to be exhausted, otherwise the valve
> must be operated manually, but the engineer wasn't aware of the memo.
>
> 14) Brake shoe testing of the locomotives indicated that some were worn to
> through the lining to the backing plate. They can tell from wheel blueing
> and lining wear that the independent brakes (parking brakes) had been
> applying most of the braking force for the train. Finally, not all the
> wheels showed full tread blueing nor brake shoe lining wear, indicating
> that the hand brakes had not been, or could not be, applied securely.
>
> 15) 146,700 pounds retarding brake force was required to keep the
> consist parked. The calculations are on page 27 if you care to read them.
>
> 16) Hand brakes are to be applied after full release of air brakes,
> except that it's not possible to fully release air brakes when the train
> is stopped on a grade. So the 13 PSI automatic brake application at
> Nantes (where the consist was parked) resulted in hand brake forces
> 40% higher than without air brakes. Page 38
>
> 17) Reset safety controls (RSCs) are features of locomotives manufactured
> since 1986. The 3 pre-1986 GE locomotives were retrofitted with them
> by a previous owner. RSCs incorporate the dead man's switch feature,
> but also apply a penalty brake application in the event of opening the
> breaker or shutting off the main electrical power. There's no requirement
> that the penalty brake application function work with power loss, so
> it's not required that this be tested for in the shop. Wiring of this
> device was inconsistent among the three locomotives and the penalty brake
> application didn't necessarily occur as it was supposed to. In fact, 5
> other GE locomotives owned by MM&A had inconsistent wiring problems. In
> one of the locomotives in the engine consist, RSC was wired directly to
> the battery and therefore remained powered even though the main electrical
> power was shut off.
>
> Now, penalty brake application dumps the air in the cylinder, but I don't
> understand how long the brake shoe is held in place. It's not an
> indefinite application of brake force like a properly set hand brake,
> right?
>
> 18) Pages 29-31 and 113 discuss the serious problems with the lead
> locomotive and temporary and improper maintenance peformed on it. The
> temporary repairs were explained by MM&A having no spare locomotives and
> an increase in traffic due to oil trains. Gee, you'd think they could
> have rented one so they'd have had time to perform proper maintenance. The
> locomotive remained in service despite problems being reported. The most
> serious maintenance issue was the shop "repairing" an oil leak at a cam
> bearing bore by overtightening the mounting bolt. After the disaster,
> testing revealed that the bearing had fractured.

Would CP  have abandoned this line had the oil business it now has?  I doubt
it.  Further, this shows the problems of running a railroad with a series of
cut-rate owners who pay not much attention to safety.  Short lines handling
dangerous cargo result in some real issues.

--- SoupGate/W32 v1.03
 * Origin: LiveWire BBS -=*=- UseNet FTN Gateway (1:2320/1)