[continued from previous message]   
      
   and local ordinances never run afoul of that objective, since "states, which   
   are in charge of militias, should be allowed to decide when civilians can   
   possess military-grade firearms." Ibid. But that ignores Heller's   
   fundamental premise: The right to keep and bear arms is an independent,   
   individual right. Its scope is defined not by what the militia needs, but by   
   what private citizens commonly possess. 554 U. S., at 592, 627-629.   
   Moreover, the Seventh Circuit endorsed the view of the militia that Heller   
   rejected. We explained that "Congress retains plenary authority to organize   
   the militia," not States. Id., at 600 (emphasis added). Because the Second   
   Amendment confers rights upon individual citizens--not state governments--it   
   was doubly wrong for the Seventh Circuit to delegate to States and   
   localities the power to decide which firearms people may possess.   
      
   Lastly, the Seventh Circuit considered "whether law-abiding citizens retain   
   adequate means of self-defense," and reasoned that the City's ban was   
   permissible because "[i]f criminals can find substitutes for banned assault   
   weapons, then so can law-abiding homeowners." 784 F. 3d, at 410, 411.   
   Although the court recognized that "Heller held that the availability of   
   long guns does not save a ban on handgun ownership," it thought that "Heller   
   did not foreclose the possibility that allowing the use of most long guns   
   plus pistols and revolvers . . . gives householders adequate means of   
   defense." Id., at 411.   
      
   That analysis misreads Heller. The question under Heller is not whether   
   citizens have adequate alternatives available for self-defense. Rather,   
   Heller asks whether the law bans types of firearms commonly used for a   
   lawful purpose--regardless of whether alternatives exist. 554 U. S., at   
   627-629. And Heller draws a distinction between such firearms and weapons   
   specially adapted to unlawful uses and not in common use, such as sawed-off   
   shotguns. Id., at 624-625. The City's ban is thus highly suspect because it   
   broadly prohibits common semiautomatic firearms used for lawful purposes.   
   Roughly five million Americans own AR-style semiautomatic rifles. See 784 F.   
   3d, at 415, n. 3. The overwhelming majority of citizens who own and use such   
   rifles do so for lawful purposes, including self-defense and target   
   shooting. See ibid. Under our precedents, that is all that is needed for   
   citizens to have a right under the Second Amendment to keep such weapons.   
   See McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767-768; Heller, supra, at 628-629.   
      
   The Seventh Circuit ultimately upheld a ban on many common semiautomatic   
   firearms based on speculation about the law's potential policy benefits. See   
   784 F. 3d, at 411-412. The court conceded that handguns--not "assault   
   weapons"--"are responsible for the vast majority of gun violence in the   
   United States." Id., at 409. Still, the court concluded, the ordinance "may   
   increase the public's sense of safety," which alone is "a substantial   
   benefit." Id.,at 412. Heller, however, forbids subjecting the Second   
   Amendment's "core protection . . . to a freestanding 'interest-balancing'   
   approach." Heller, supra, at 634. This case illustrates why. If a broad ban   
   on firearms can be upheld based on conjecture that the public might feel   
   safer (while being no safer at all), then the Second Amendment guarantees   
   nothing.   
      
   III   
      
   The Court's refusal to review a decision that flouts two of our Second   
   Amendment precedents stands in marked contrast to the Court's willingness to   
   summarily reverse courts that disregard our other constitutional decisions.   
   E.g., Maryland v. Kulbicki, ante, at 1 (per curiam) (summarily reversing   
   because the court below applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668   
   (1984), "in name only"); Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U. S. ___ (2015) (per   
   curiam) (summarily reversing a judgment inconsistent with this Court's   
   recent Fourth Amendment precedents); Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U. S. ___,   
   ___ (2014) (per curiam) (slip op., at 10) (summarily reversing judgment that   
   rested on an "understandable" double jeopardy holding that nonetheless   
   "r[an] directly counter to our precedents").   
      
   There is no basis for a different result when our Second Amendment   
   precedents are at stake. I would grant certiorari to prevent the Seventh   
   Circuit from relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right.   
      
   https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-133   
      
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