From: daellis94@gmail.com   
      
   Not sure what you mean about my opinion.  Was that in reference to the bit   
   about it being the most survivable arm of the nuclear triad?     
      
   If that's what you mean, then dont take it as simply my view.  Take it as the   
   view of US strategic doctrine since the 1980s at least.  Note that the vast   
   majority of the US strategic nuclear arsenal--at least in terms of striking   
   power--is deployed in    
   the form of W-76, W-87, and W-88 warheads mounted in UGM-133s aboard   
   Ohio-class SSBNs.  Well over 1 000 strategic warheads are held by the Navy in   
   this capacity.  Meanwhile, the Air Force holds only 450 ready warheads in 450   
   Minuteman III missiles at    
   ICBM fields in Wyoming, with each missile carrying one warhead and the AIRS   
   inertial navigation system developed for the LGM-118 Peacekeeper.  The rest of   
   the warheads controlled by the USAF, at least in terms of those ready for   
   service and not in    
   reserve storage, are in the B-61 and B-83 unguided bomb and the ALCM, and off   
   the top of my head I can't if ALCM is still in service.     
      
   In any case, the reliance on Trident IIs over Peacekeepers, of which only 50   
   were ever built and all of which were withdrawn from service by 2005 despite   
   having a greater throw weight than the sub-launched Tridents, is because SLBMs   
   had become accurate    
   enough to strike targets with enough precision to serve in a counter-force   
   role (that is, hitting strategic military targets like hardened ICBM silos and   
   launch command bunkers) while being able to launch from much closer to a   
   target, drastically    
   reducing transit time, all while being deployed from a platform that was (and   
   still is) harder to intercept due to its uncertain location.     
      
   As for command posts surviving direct nuclear strikes, that's not necessarily   
   so likely.  I mentioned command centers for ICBM units before because they ARE   
   likely targets for counter-force strikes, and they will not survive a direct   
   hit on the surface.     
   When the LGM-118 was under development in the MX Program, several concepts   
   were proposed to maximize survivability for the new weapon, which was hoped to   
   be deployed in such a way that the resulting MX fleet could ride out a nuclear   
   first strike scenario.   
     Those concepts included building silo fields on the southern slopes of   
   mountains (Soviet missiles would be following trajectories over the North   
   Pole, remember), super-hardened silo facilities, and even silos with   
   mechanical equipment to enable them to    
   dig themselves out after a strike.     
      
   As a general matter, the problem remained that trying to design a facility to   
   survive a direct nuclear blast will almost always be far more expensive than   
   the weapon you're trying to design against, and the cost of another warhead,   
   or one more powerful    
   one, would be far less than the cost of fortifying that facility even   
   further.     
      
   The accepted solution, then, was to be mobility:  there were suggestions for   
   an ICBM to be launched from the rear of a cargo plane, and those for   
   truck-launched ICBMs.  Ultimately, the plan was to deploy the LGM-118 from   
   rail cars.  In times of high    
   alert, unmarked trains would simply roam the nation's rail networks with some   
   silo cars in tow.  This plan was never put into action, but you can look up   
   photographs of Peacekeeper silo cars.  In practice, the Peacekeeper was only   
   ever deployed in    
   regular silos converted from previous missiles due to budget constraints.     
      
   Bottom line, even underground facilities cant necessarily be counted on.     
      
   Some particular bunkers might be expected to withstand a nuclear strike,   
   possibly.  Cheyenne Mountain comes to mind, but it's also worth mentioning   
   that one reason the Soviets kept a variant of the R-36M missile in service   
   with a single 25 megaton    
   warhead is theorized to have been for knocking out especially well-hardened   
   targets like Cheyenne Mountain.     
      
   Keep in mind that, even assuming the underground component remains completely   
   unharmed, surface elements of a facility will receive severe damage, including   
   any radio communications equipment that you would be using for command   
   purposes.     
      
   I suppose a benefit of a land facility would be that it might be better able   
   to handle a high volume of command post traffic and administrative functions,   
   but it would be more vulnerable to attack.  An aircraft, mind you, won't be   
   vulnerable to ballistic    
   missiles while airborne.  A downside might be the lack of radio traffic it   
   might be able to handle, but you've still got a command center that can ride   
   out the storm.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)