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   sci.electronics.design      Electronic circuit design      143,102 messages   

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   Message 142,581 of 143,102   
   Waldek Hebisch to Jeroen Belleman   
   Re: Real world impact of Taiwan-China "f   
   07 Feb 26 01:26:07   
   
   From: antispam@fricas.org   
      
   Jeroen Belleman  wrote:   
   > On 2/6/26 14:21, Bill Sloman wrote:   
   >> On 6/02/2026 8:26 pm, Liz Tuddenham wrote:   
   >>> Bill Sloman  wrote:   
   >>>   
   >>>> On 6/02/2026 1:52 am, Liz Tuddenham wrote:   
   >>>>> Don Y  wrote:   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>>> I fully expect this to happen during Trump's administration.   
   >>>>>> He probably realizes he won't be able to do anything about it,   
   >>>>>> especially after his designs on other foreign countries and   
   >>>>>> alienation of his main allies.   
   >>>>>>   
   >>>>>> ["No, you haven't been ATTACKED by China so Article 5 doesn't   
   >>>>>> require us to come to your aid..."]   
   >>>>>>   
   >>>>>> Of course, more and more manufacturing is TRYING to be on-shored.   
   >>>>>> But, I suspect that is nowhere near enough to address the   
   >>>>>> potential of Taiwan going off-line -- even briefly.   
   >>>>>>   
   >>>>>> I'm thinking back to how screwed up the supply chain got during   
   >>>>>> COVID and wonder what manufacturers and investors will do when   
   >>>>>> the future is far less certain than a "pandemic".   
   >>>>>>   
   >>>>>> Opinions?   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> We have sleepwalked into this and the few who have raised the alarm   
   >>>>> have   
   >>>>> been (and still are being) ignored and ridiculed.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> There is a wider problem: we have become 'travel junkies' and rely too   
   >>>>> much on transport.  "I can get it cheaper from..." doesn't take into   
   >>>>> account the hidden costs such as liability to supply disruption,   
   >>>>> loss of   
   >>>>> control over the design and the fundamental need to teach underlying   
   >>>>> principles and train people in making things themselves.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> We haven't got the factories.   
   >>>>> We haven't got the machines.   
   >>>>> We haven't got the people who know how to operste the machines.   
   >>>>> We haven't got the machines to make the machines.   
   >>>>> We haven't got the people who know how to make the machines   
   >>>>> We haven't got the material.   
   >>>>> We haven't got the undustry to make the materials.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> In the thrall of Greenwash we have simply exported the 'dirty' jobs to   
   >>>>> other countries and then added to the pollution by shipping the goods   
   >>>>> back.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> If Russia could do to the UK what it is doing to Ukraine, the country   
   >>>>> would have to surrender within a week.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> If the UK ignored the fact that it has it's own nuclear weapons and the   
   >>>> means to deliver them.   
   >>>   
   >>> Has it?  I thought they were dependent on the U.S. for delivery.   
   >>   
   >> The ballistic missiles were manufactured in the US, but they do seem to   
   >> be under UK control. The proposition that the US engineered in secret   
   >> backdoors to let them disable the weapons if they were pointed at a   
   >> target that the US hadn't approved is one that every conspiracy theory   
   >> nut would bring forward, but UK military security is even deeper into   
   >> daft conspiracy theories than internet lunatics.   
   >   
   > Everything is software-controlled these days. If you thought that   
   > thoroughly checking the source code for backdoors will protect you,   
   > you should read this:   
   > "Reflections on trusting trust", by Ken thompson   
   >    
   >   
   > You'll never trust a compiler again.   
      
   Actually, the story as I heard it shows the opposite: it is very   
   hard to plant a backdoor in a compiler so that nobody notices   
   it and the backdoor survives.  In case of Ken Thompson the   
   backdoor that he planted was quickly removed by releases people.   
   They did not realise that there was a backdoor, but it caused   
   trouble and they got rid of it by recompiling using clean   
   sources and older, non-backdoored compiler.   
      
   There are may ways to plant a backdor, backdooring a compiler looks   
   like one of hardest ways.   
      
   --   
                                 Waldek Hebisch   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)   

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