From: skelton.peter@gmail.com   
      
   On Monday, 30 October 2023 at 18:25:11 UTC-4, a425couple wrote:   
   > Andrew Tanner    
   > History enthusias tOct 11    
   >    
   > What’s an unpopular opinion about Nazi Germany you hold that others   
   don’t?    
   > That the Prime Minister of the UK in 1938, Neville Chamberlain, was    
   > probably right to sign the Munich Agreement with Germany.    
   >    
   >    
   > This act, which led directly to the conquest of Czechoslovakia, is    
   > generally derided as an extremely short-sighted act of appeasement.    
   > Churchill in particular singled Chamberlain out for scathing criticism    
   > over this decision in his auto-biography.    
   >    
   > Nazi Germany was not ready for war, Czechoslovakia had quite a strong    
   > position, and it is entirely possible that drawing the line here might    
   > have prevented WWII.    
   >    
   > However, this wasn’t nearly so obvious at the time.    
   >    
   > Chamberlain was not a military man. He had no experience or expertise on    
   > the subject. When Hitler began making demands of Czechoslovakia and    
   > threatening war, Chamberlain consulted with the leadership of Britain’s    
   > military arms and their intelligence apparatus.    
   >    
   > The advice Chamberlain received was that the UK and France - the two    
   > major powers in Western Europe - were in no way ready to confront    
   > Germany. Should war break out in 1938, Germany would have a decisive    
   > advantage.    
   >    
   > (As an aside, this advice was classified until the late 1960s. It was,    
   > however, known to Churchill.)    
   >    
   > We now know that this advice was completely inaccurate but it was,    
   > nonetheless, the advice to the Prime Minister of the UK by the experts    
   > of the day. I think that, given what he knew at the time, Chamberlain    
   > made the only choice he could - sacrificing Czechoslovakia for time to    
   > continue re-arming.    
   >    
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   > 1 of 3 answers    
   > 54 comments from    
   > Chris Thomas    
   > and more    
   >    
   >    
   >    
   > Profile photo for Chris Thomas    
   > Chris Thomas    
   > · Thu    
   > The problem with that theory is, if you read Shirer, chamberlain didn’t    
   > just go along with Munich, hee gave away things that weren’t his. And,    
   > even if you think it’s your only way out, you don’t take the god damn    
   > document out onto the balcony and proclaim peace in our time.    
   > Chamberlain had no idea what he was doing.    
   >    
   > Profile photo for Andrew Tanner    
   > Andrew Tanner    
   > · Fri    
   > Shirer is an excellent source, but he was writing at a time when the    
   > advice received by Chamberlain was still classified.    
   >    
   > That is one of the interesting issues with the history of this period.    
   > The earlier scholarship benefits from direct access to eye-witnesses    
   > (and often being written by eye-witnesses, as in the case of Shirer) but    
   > later scholarship has access to secrets that were not known at the time.    
   >    
   > Profile photo for Chris Thomas    
   > Chris Thomas    
   > · Fri    
   > No, but it has all been released by the time Manchester write the second    
   > volume off of his biography of Churchill. It doesn’t matter what advice    
   > he wasn’t given. He didn’t care about any international agreements, he    
   > wanted peace no matter who he sacrificed. Even Halifax didn’t agree.    
   > Again, you don’t stand on the balcony and proclaim peace in our time if    
   > you’re just holding in order to rearm. He did - after repeated    
   > condemnation in parliament - finally come to his senses in early ‘39,    
   > and come to a mutual defense agreement with Poland (another country that    
   > benefited from his betrayal of Checkoslovakia), but he had alienated the    
   > Soviet Union by then enough that they signed a non aggression pact with    
   > Hitler.    
   >    
   > The attempted resurrection of Chamberlain, suggesting he has a clue of    
   > how to deal with Germany, doesn’t hold water. He thought he was smarter    
   > than everyone else, including his own foreign minister.    
   >    
   >    
   > Profile photo for Andrew Tanner    
   > Andrew Tanner    
   > · Fri    
   > Chamberlain made the decision that his military advisors urged him to    
   > make. They said any other decision would be disastrous.    
   >    
   > It was the wrong decision, but I can't see how Chamberlain can be    
   > reasonably expected to have known that.    
   >    
   > That's all I'm arguing here.    
   >    
   > I won't tell you Chamberlain didn't act like a fool when he waved the    
   > Munich Agreement around like that and proclaimed “peace in our time”. It    
   > is a classic example for a reason.    
   >    
   > I will disagree with you about rearmament though. It was already well    
   > under way in the UK before Hitler started talking about Czechoslovakia.    
   >    
   > In fact, British rearmament began in 1933 - though it was initially    
   > about arming for a war with Japan. Germany became the main cause of    
   > British rearmament by 1936 at the latest.    
   >    
   >    
   > Profile photo for Chris Thomas    
   > Chris Thomas    
   > · Fri    
   > Chamberlain proactively aided Germany in the dismemberment of    
   > Chekoslovakia; he put up no resistance in any form, otherwise he would    
   > have tried to string the negotiations along more than three days, and    
   > would have tried to limit what the nazis took, which he did neither.    
   > Neither the British nor the French were in measurably better shape nine    
   > months later, when they finally took a stand for the far less honorable    
   > Poland. By that time, Chamberlain, having faced withering criticism in    
   > the Commons, must have uttered Alec Guinness’ last words in Bridge on    
   > the River Kwai, “What have I done?”    
   >    
   > Chamberlain felt that the Rhineland, the Sudatenland, and the rest of    
   > Bohemia, were not a British concern.    
   >    
   > Profile photo for Andrew Tanner    
   > Andrew Tanner    
   > · Fri    
   > In terms of realpolitik, Chamberlain decided that betraying    
   > Czechoslovakia was better than dying beside them. It was a brutal call,    
   > but that’s how realpolitik works.    
   >    
   > I suspect he also held out hope that Hitler really would stop with the    
   > Sudetenland, but that’s honestly beside my point.    
   >    
   > As for the state of military readiness… I am no expert on that of    
   > France, but Britain’s military readiness in late 1939 was streets ahead    
   > of what it had been in 1938.    
   >    
   > If nothing else, the RAF in 1938 had been relying on biplanes that were    
   > too slow to intercept Nazi bombers and had not yet completed the fighter    
   > intercept system that it would use to win the Battle of Britain (it was    
   > completed in August of 1939).    
   >    
      
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