XPost: comp.theory, sci.math
From: polcott333@gmail.com
On 11/28/2025 8:58 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> In Message ID , Peter
>>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and that
>>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>>> analysis.
>>>
>>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere
else.
>>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then what I
>>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>>>
>>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
>>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>>
>> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*
>
> Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
> if I can help it. Only by accident.
>
Yet you define the correctness box by conformity to
the preconceived notions of others.
> The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
> and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
> problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
> I avoid magical/wishful thinking.
>
Yet only within the conventional analytical framework,
viewing alternative ways of looking at the same things
as inherently erroneous.
If there was such a thing as philosophy of computation
I would be welcomed there for reframing the foundations
of the theory of computation to get rid of the inherent
incoherence that no one else bothers to notice.
>> Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, named after mathematicians Ernst Zermelo
>> and Abraham Fraenkel
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory
>>
>> Could think outside the box, otherwise Russell's Paradox
>> would still prove undecidability.
>
> 1. Meaningless appeal to authority.
>
No it is an isomorphism. Russell's Paradox specified
the same incoherence of self-reference.
Let R be the set of all sets that are not members of themselves.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_paradox
I figured out the best isomorphism for that years ago.
A can of soup that so totally contains itself such that
it has no outside surface.
Let LP be the set of all sentences that are true
when they are false and false when they are true.
> 2. While we are appealing to authorities, you are not worth a pimple
> on the ass of these gentlemen. What it means for you to think outside
> the box is qualitatively different from how they thought outside of
> the box.
>
>>> PO: The whole diagonalization thing is gibberish to me unless it only shows
>
> Great, quote yourself being an idiot some years ago! Yay!
>
>> Welcome to SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4)
>> SWI-Prolog comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY. This is free software.
>> Please run ?- license. for legal details.
>>
>> % This sentence is not true.
>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
>
> Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
> a diagonal argument.
>
It does one and for all prove that the Liar Paradox
is not a proposition. This has never been done before.
> Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
> a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.
>
The Liar Paradox constructed with diagonalization L ⊣⊢ ¬Tr(┌L┐)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
> So, indeed, yes, the "whole diagonalization thing is gibberish" to you.
>
> Or should we say, it is outside of your tiny box.
>
By gibberish I mean provably semantically unsound, not
that I don't understand it more deeply than most everyone.
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.
This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.
--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)
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