XPost: comp.theory, sci.math
From: polcott333@gmail.com
On 11/28/2025 10:17 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/28/2025 8:58 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>> In Message ID , Peter
>>>>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and
that
>>>>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>>>>> analysis.
>>>>>
>>>>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere
else.
>>>>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then
what I
>>>>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
>>>>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>>>>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>>>>
>>>> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*
>>>
>>> Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
>>> if I can help it. Only by accident.
>>>
>>
>> Yet you define the correctness box by conformity to
>> the preconceived notions of others.
>
> You're one of the others from where I'm standing.
>
> You're one of those others who just say, "don't critically
> examine what I say, just accept it".
>
> So, no, I don't take preconceived notions from /such/ others, sorry;
> I'm picky about my others.
>
> Sometimes others put together a coherent set of assumptions.
> Then within those assumptions they work out a result.
>
> No, I can't refute their /reasoning/ by choosing other assumptions.
>
> Your modus operandi is to reject (or, more usually, fundamentally
> misunderstand) the assumptions and then call the reasoning wrong since
> it doesn't follow from your distorted or replaced version of the
> assumptions.
>
>>> The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
>>> and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
>>> problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
>>> I avoid magical/wishful thinking.
>>>
>>
>> Yet only within the conventional analytical framework,
>> viewing alternative ways of looking at the same things
>> as inherently erroneous.
>
> Using the same same name for two different entities, in the same
> argument, while pretending they are one entity, is not a "usefully
> unconventional" mode of operating. So no, I cannot adopt that from you.
>
>> If there was such a thing as philosophy of computation
>> I would be welcomed there for reframing the foundations
>> of the theory of computation to get rid of the inherent
>> incoherence that no one else bothers to notice.
>
> Even if that somehow were achieved, you would only be choosing
> different assumptions from which to work, and not challenging
> any results based on their respective assumptions.
>
I have shown that the original assumptions are
incoherent just like
the set of all sets that are not members of themselves
is isomorphic to a can of soup that contains itself
so completely that it has no outside surface.
> (And at that leve, you would /know/ this and refrain from
> insisting that results in a framework of different assumptions
> were wrongly reasoned because you like some other assumptions.)
>
>
>>> Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
>>> a diagonal argument.
>>>
>>
>> It does one and for all prove that the Liar Paradox
>> is not a proposition. This has never been done before.
>>
>>> Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
>>> a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.
>>>
>>
>> The Liar Paradox constructed with diagonalization L ⊣⊢ ¬Tr(┌L┐)
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
>
> Category inversion problem. Diagonalization may construct a Liar
> paradox, but that doesn't mean everything made with diagonalization
> is a Liar Paradox.
>
No it can make all kinds a semantically unsound expressions
that no one can understand are semantically unsound because
thy refuse to pay attention to key details.
> The ordinary Liar Paradox sentence is not constructed of
> two parts; it deosn't use quoting where it turns out that
> the quoted part it is talking about is identical to itself.
>
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
My Prolog version is the best it resolves to
not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))))
Just like the Clocksin & Mellish says.
> The paper you reference makes it clear that this is a required
> ingredient. You can't just use the pronoun "this sentence"; that's a
> self-reference, but not acheived via diagonalization.
>
Whut ???
In formal languages, self-reference is also very
easy to come by. Any language capable of expressing
some basic syntax can generate self-referential
sentences via so-called diagonalization
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
> ...
>
> Oops, there I go, doing all the work again, while you can't fire
> two brain cells together beyond formulating something casually
> dismissive.
>
--
Copyright 2025 Olcott
My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.
This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.
--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)
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