XPost: comp.theory, sci.math
From: polcott333@gmail.com
On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/28/2025 10:17 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 11/28/2025 8:58 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>>> In Message ID , Peter
>>>>>>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and
that
>>>>>>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>>>>>>> analysis.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere
else.
>>>>>>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then
what I
>>>>>>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into
every
>>>>>>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>>>>>>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*
>>>>>
>>>>> Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
>>>>> if I can help it. Only by accident.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yet you define the correctness box by conformity to
>>>> the preconceived notions of others.
>>>
>>> You're one of the others from where I'm standing.
>>>
>>> You're one of those others who just say, "don't critically
>>> examine what I say, just accept it".
>>>
>>> So, no, I don't take preconceived notions from /such/ others, sorry;
>>> I'm picky about my others.
>>>
>>> Sometimes others put together a coherent set of assumptions.
>>> Then within those assumptions they work out a result.
>>>
>>> No, I can't refute their /reasoning/ by choosing other assumptions.
>>>
>>> Your modus operandi is to reject (or, more usually, fundamentally
>>> misunderstand) the assumptions and then call the reasoning wrong since
>>> it doesn't follow from your distorted or replaced version of the
>>> assumptions.
>>>
>>>>> The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
>>>>> and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
>>>>> problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
>>>>> I avoid magical/wishful thinking.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yet only within the conventional analytical framework,
>>>> viewing alternative ways of looking at the same things
>>>> as inherently erroneous.
>>>
>>> Using the same same name for two different entities, in the same
>>> argument, while pretending they are one entity, is not a "usefully
>>> unconventional" mode of operating. So no, I cannot adopt that from you.
>>>
>>>> If there was such a thing as philosophy of computation
>>>> I would be welcomed there for reframing the foundations
>>>> of the theory of computation to get rid of the inherent
>>>> incoherence that no one else bothers to notice.
>>>
>>> Even if that somehow were achieved, you would only be choosing
>>> different assumptions from which to work, and not challenging
>>> any results based on their respective assumptions.
>>>
>>
>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>> incoherent just like
>
> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>
The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
"This sentence is not true."
If its true that makes it untrue and if its untrue that makes it true.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Prolog detects an infinite cycle.
not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))
The halting problem instance is even screwier.
I won't get into that until after you prove
that you understand the Liar Paradox
>> the set of all sets that are not members of themselves
>> is isomorphic to a can of soup that contains itself
>> so completely that it has no outside surface.
>
> Unrelated to halting.
>
It it is all incoherence of self-reference.
I won't get into that until after you prove
that you understand how the Liar Paradox is
incorrect. I have no patience for people
playing perpetual head games.
>>> (And at that leve, you would /know/ this and refrain from
>>> insisting that results in a framework of different assumptions
>>> were wrongly reasoned because you like some other assumptions.)
>>>
>>>
>>>>> Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
>>>>> a diagonal argument.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It does one and for all prove that the Liar Paradox
>>>> is not a proposition. This has never been done before.
>>>>
>>>>> Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
>>>>> a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Liar Paradox constructed with diagonalization L ⊣⊢ ¬Tr(┌L┐)
>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
>>>
>>> Category inversion problem. Diagonalization may construct a Liar
>>> paradox, but that doesn't mean everything made with diagonalization
>>> is a Liar Paradox.
>>>
>>
>> No it can make all kinds a semantically unsound expressions
>> that no one can understand are semantically unsound because
>> thy refuse to pay attention to key details.
>
> Nonsense. It's just a general technique involving a two-dimensional
> table in which something interesting develops involving the
> diagonal trace.
>
The diagonal trace cheats because it hides the incoherence
of the underlying semantic inference steps. If you leap to
a conclusion without showing your work people might guess
that you are correct never seeing the mistake.
>>> The paper you reference makes it clear that this is a required
>>> ingredient. You can't just use the pronoun "this sentence"; that's a
>>> self-reference, but not acheived via diagonalization.
>>>
>>
>> Whut ???
>>
>> In formal languages, self-reference is also very
>> easy to come by. Any language capable of expressing
>> some basic syntax can generate self-referential
>> sentences via so-called diagonalization
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
>
> For all the accusations that others are not "paying attention",
> apparently you do not see the tiny superscripts that indicate
> foonotes:
>
> "The situation with formal languages is actually somewhat subtler than
> our brief discussion indicates. In most cases, corner quotes really
> indicate formal terms for Gödel numbers of sentences, and are not
[continued in next message]
--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)
|
