XPost: comp.theory, sci.math, comp.ai.philosophy   
   From: polcott333@gmail.com   
      
   On 12/2/2025 5:26 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:   
   > On 26/11/2025 20:04, olcott wrote:   
   >> On 11/26/2025 1:43 PM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:   
   >>> On 26/11/2025 15:54, olcott wrote:   
   >>>> (General_Knowledge ⊨ x)  means True(x)   
   >>>> (General_Knowledge ⊨ ~x) means False(x)   
   >>>> ~True(x) & ~False(x) means x is not an element of General_Knowledge   
   >>>   
   >>> Eh? You made it sound like General_Knowledge was the system, rather than   
   >>> a model, but there you have it as a model.   
   >>>   
   >>   
   >> There is no model.   
   >>   
   >> It is all Rudolf Carnap Meaning Postulates   
   >> that have every single nuance of 100% of their   
   >> semantic meaning directly encoding in this formal   
   >> language arranged in a knowledge ontology   
   >> inheritance hierarchy.   
   >   
   >   
   > And this is the system you said of which that there has never been   
   > anything like it?   
   >   
      
   I discussed it with several LLM systems.   
   They don't have any egos to defend so   
   they simply understood how the ideas that   
   I presented them with fit together.   
      
   They agree that a system such as this cannot   
   have incompleteness in the Gödel sense or   
   Tarski Undefinability. I am going to do a   
   much better job of writing it all up to   
   present of for publication.   
      
   There have never been anything quite like this.   
   This seem to be as close as anyone has gotten:   
      
   That the theory of simple types suffices for   
   avoiding also the epistemological paradoxes   
   is shown by a closer analysis of these.   
   (Cf. Ramsey 1926a and Tarski 1935b: 399.)   
   https://lawrencecpaulson.github.io/papers/Russells-mathematical-logic.pdf   
      
   Ludwig Wittgenstein had the same problems   
   that I am having here. Logicians and Mathematicians   
   just can't seem to think outside of the box.   
   https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf   
      
   Thus, it can be shown, even inside F, that GF is   
   true if and only if it is not provable in F.   
      
   https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2025/entries/goedel-inco   
   pleteness/#FirIncTheCom   
      
   There is a whole field of philosophy that seems   
   to question the results of Gödel Incompleteness   
   called Truthmaker Maximalism.   
      
   Truthmaker Maximalism defended   
   GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA   
   https://philarchive.org/archive/RODTMD   
      
      
   --   
   Copyright 2025 Olcott   
      
   My 28 year goal has been to make   
   "true on the basis of meaning" computable.   
      
   This required establishing a new foundation   
   for correct reasoning.   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)