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|    sci.logic    |    Logic -- math, philosophy & computationa    |    262,912 messages    |
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|    Message 261,697 of 262,912    |
|    olcott to Python    |
|    Re: New formal foundation for correct re    |
|    05 Dec 25 17:03:10    |
      XPost: sci.math, comp.theory       From: polcott333@gmail.com              On 11/25/2025 8:36 PM, Python wrote:       > Le 26/11/2025 à 03:34, olcott a écrit :       >> On 11/25/2025 8:09 PM, Python wrote:       >>> Le 26/11/2025 à 03:03, olcott a écrit :       >>>> On 11/25/2025 7:45 PM, Python wrote:       >>>>> Le 26/11/2025 à 02:43, olcott a écrit :       >>>>>>       >>>>>> Montague Grammar is the syntax of English semantics       >>>>>> that is why he called it Montague Grammar. This is       >>>>>> all anchored in Rudolf Carnap meaning postulates       >>>>>       >>>>> Peter, Montague Grammar does not make truth = provability.       >>>>> It maps English into logic — it does not turn logic into a magic       >>>>> incompleteness-proof shredder.       >>>>>       >>>>       >>>> The predicate Bachelor(x) is stipulated to mean ~Married(x)       >>>> where the predicate Married(x) is defined in terms of billions       >>>> of other things such as all of the details of Human(x).       >>>>       >>>> Two Dogmas of Empiricism by Willard Van Orman had no idea       >>>> how we know that Bachelors are unmarried. Basically we       >>>> just look it up in the type hierarchy, that is the simple       >>>> proof of its truth.       >>>>       >>>>> If your claim were right, every linguist using Montague’s system       >>>>> would have accidentally solved Godel’s theorem in the 1970s.       >>>>> They didn’t.       >>>>       >>>> I spoke with many people very interested in linguistics       >>>> on sci.lang for many years. Even ordinary semantics       >>>> freaks them out.       >>>>       >>>> None of them ever had the slightest clue about Montague       >>>> Grammar. Except for one they all had very severe math       >>>> phobia. Formal semantics got them very aggravated.       >>>>       >>>>> Because encoding semantics as syntax does not erase diagonalization       >>>>> — it just gives it nicer types.       >>>>>       >>>>       >>>> G ↔ ¬Prov(⌜G⌝)       >>>> Directed Graph of evaluation sequence       >>>> 00 ↔ 01 02       >>>> 01 G       >>>> 02 ¬ 03       >>>> 03 Prov 04       >>>> 04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle       >>>>       >>>> Proves that the evaluation of the above G is stuck       >>>> in an infinite loop whether you understand this or not.       >>>>       >>>>> Montague built a translation function.       >>>>> You’re treating it like a trapdoor that makes unprovable truths       >>>>> disappear.       >>>>> It doesn’t.       >>>>> Only your theory does that.       >>>>       >>>> When True(L,x) is exactly one and the same thing as       >>>> Provable(L,x) then if you are honest you will admit       >>>> that they cannot possibly diverge thus within this       >>>> system Gödel incompleteness cannot possibly exist.       >>>>       >>>> Seeing how this makes perfect sense and is absolutely       >>>> not any sort of ruse may take much more dialogue.       >>>       >>> Réponse proposée (courte, mordante, ASCII-safe)       >>>       >>> Peter, you keep repeating the same pattern:       >>>       >>       >> Because you utterly refuse to pay enough attention.       >>       >>> Take a normal semantic fact (like bachelor = unmarried).       >>>       >>> Declare that because some meanings can be defined, all meaning       >>> reduces to proof.       >>>       >>       >> All *objects of thought* can be defined in terms of other       >> *objects of thought*       >>       >> Kurt Gödel in his 1944 Russell's mathematical logic gave the following       >> definition of the "theory of simple types" in a footnote:       >>       >> By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the       >> objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic       >> expressions) are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties       >> of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such       >> relations, etc.       >>       >>> Then insist that since in your system True = Provable by definition,       >>> Godel “cannot possibly exist.”       >>>       >>> But that is not a refutation — that is simply renaming the problem       >>> out of existence.       >>>       >>> Your “directed graph infinite loop” does not show an error in Godel;       >>> it shows that Prolog refuses cyclic terms.       >>> Mathematics does not.       >>>       >>       >> That you fail to understand that it conclusively       >> proves that the expression is semantically       >> unsound is your ignorance on not my mistake.       >       > Peter, your entire argument now rests on one mistake:       >       > You think that a self-referential fixed point is “semantically unsound”       > because Prolog refuses to unify a cyclic term.       >       > But Prolog’s occurs-check does not detect “semantic unsoundness.”       > It detects infinite data structures in Prolog.       >       > Mathematics is not Prolog.       >       > Lambda calculus allows fixed points.       > Type theory allows fixed points.       > Arithmetic allows fixed points.       > Diagonalization is a fixed point.       >       > G <-> not Prov(F,G)       > cycle -> therefore invalid       >       > My calculator overflows on 10^100       > therefore big integers are semantically unsound.       >       > My calculator overflows on 10^100       > therefore big integers are semantically unsound.       >       > No, Peter.       > It is your implementation that cannot handle the structure, not the       > mathematics.       >       > As for “objects of thought are typed,” yes — and typed systems also       have       > Godel-style incompleteness theorems.       > HOL, type theory, Montague-style semantics, all of them.       >       > Typing does not prevent diagonalization.       > It just prevents nonsense terms like phi(phi).       > Godel’s construction never uses those.       >       > You are not proving G is “semantically unsound.”       > You are proving that your framework cannot express diagonalization.       > But any framework that cannot express diagonalization also cannot       > express arithmetic — and therefore cannot be “the entire body of objects       > of thought.”       >       > In short:       >       > You didn’t refute Godel.       > You refuted your own system’s ability to model arithmetic.       >              You have proven that you have some technical competence       by even knowing those words.              --       Copyright 2025 Olcott              My 28 year goal has been to make       "true on the basis of meaning" computable.              This required establishing a new foundation       for correct reasoning.              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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