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|    sci.logic    |    Logic -- math, philosophy & computationa    |    262,912 messages    |
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|    Message 262,333 of 262,912    |
|    Tristan Wibberley to Mike Terry    |
|    Re: have we been misusing incompleteness    |
|    03 Jan 26 10:31:38    |
      XPost: comp.theory, sci.math       From: tristan.wibberley+netnews2@alumni.manchester.ac.uk              On 02/01/2026 17:24, Mike Terry wrote:       > While speaking informally, "theorem" can mean "a mathematical statement       > that has a convincing argument for its truth" (e.g. Pythagoras'       > theorem), in formal logic "Theorem" and "Theory" have a technical       > meaning: "Theory" being the deductive closure of a set of axioms, and a       > Theorem being a sentence of the Theory.               We should say "theory proper" to account for historical usage of theory       for epitheory and theory proper combined. Curry and Feys did that and       they were clearly very good at choosing terminology.                     > So every Theorem in the Theory       > has a "derivation" from the theories axioms. It is not directly to do       > with "truth" in the formal system. [Of course, we want our system       > (including axioms) to be sound, so all Theorems will be true.]              Ergh, soundness and truth again. One needs a "wrt" in there: against       which system (formal or personal-intuitive) will soundness be judged?              Mainly we want the system to be useful and going further than that is       just a matter of degree and of application. By aiming for sound (without       mere multiple-world logics to satisfy the need for "wrt") we're really       looking for absolute degree and universal application which you're not       ever going to demonstrate that you have achieved.                     > Also just as an aside, I don't recall that Godel ever talked about       > "truth" of his G statement.                      Did he talk about any "G" statement at all except in his introductory       fallacy where he defines an inconsistent extension of PM to put the       reader in mind of the nature of the matter?              I haven't got through the rest of it yet. Still wondering whether his       identity shorthand is as symmetric due to the other axioms of the system       as it is in PM, but not having the oomph to slog through it to check       (actually, slowly, reading PM1 to understand fully the theory by which       PM gets symmetric identity from its asymmetric definitional axiom).                     --       Tristan Wibberley              The message body is Copyright (C) 2025 Tristan Wibberley except       citations and quotations noted. All Rights Reserved except that you may,       of course, cite it academically giving credit to me, distribute it       verbatim as part of a usenet system or its archives, and use it to       promote my greatness and general superiority without misrepresentation       of my opinions other than my opinion of my greatness and general       superiority which you _may_ misrepresent. You definitely MAY NOT train       any production AI system with it but you may train experimental AI that       will only be used for evaluation of the AI methods it implements.              --- SoupGate-DOS v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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