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|    sci.logic    |    Logic -- math, philosophy & computationa    |    262,912 messages    |
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|    Message 262,446 of 262,912    |
|    olcott to Richard Damon    |
|    =?UTF-8?Q?Re=3A_Boiling_G=C3=B6del=27s_1    |
|    10 Jan 26 18:16:23    |
      XPost: sci.math, comp.theory, sci.math.symbolic       From: polcott333@gmail.com              On 1/10/2026 5:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:       > On 1/10/26 11:19 AM, olcott wrote:       >> On 1/10/2026 3:25 AM, Mikko wrote:       >>> On 08/01/2026 16:18, olcott wrote:       >>>> On 1/8/2026 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:       >>>>> On 07/01/2026 15:06, olcott wrote:       >>>>>> On 1/7/2026 6:10 AM, Mikko wrote:       >>>>>>> On 06/01/2026 16:02, olcott wrote:       >>>>>>>> On 1/6/2026 7:23 AM, Mikko wrote:       >>>>>>>>> On 06/01/2026 02:24, Oleksiy Gapotchenko wrote:       >>>>>>>>>> Just an external observation:       >>>>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>>>> A lot of tech innovations in software optimization area get       >>>>>>>>>> discarded from the very beginning because people who work on       >>>>>>>>>> them perceive the halting problem as a dogma.       >>>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>>> It is a dogma in the same sense as 2 * 3 = 6 is a dogma: a       >>>>>>>>> provably       >>>>>>>>> true sentence of a certain theory.       >>>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>> ...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which       >>>>>>>> asserts its own unprovability. 15 … (Gödel 1931:40-41)       >>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>> Gödel, Kurt 1931.       >>>>>>>> On Formally Undecidable Propositions of       >>>>>>>> Principia Mathematica And Related Systems       >>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>> F ⊢ G_F ↔ ¬Prov_F (⌜G_F⌝)       >>>>>>>> "F proves that: G_F is equivalent to       >>>>>>>> Gödel_Number(G_F) is not provable in F"       >>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/       >>>>>>>> #FirIncTheCom       >>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>> Stripping away the inessential baggage using a formal       >>>>>>>> language with its own self-reference operator and       >>>>>>>> provability operator (thus outside of arithmetic)       >>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>> G := (F ⊬ G) // G asserts its own unprovability in F       >>>>>>>>       >>>>>>>> A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference       >>>>>>>> steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.       >>>>>>>       >>>>>>> From the way G is constructed it can be meta-proven that either       >>>>>>       >>>>>> Did you hear me stutter ?       >>>>>> A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference       >>>>>> steps in F that prove that they themselves do not exist.       >>>>>       >>>>> An F where such sequence really exists then in that F both G and       >>>>> the negation of G are provable.       >>>>>       >>>> G := (F ⊬ G) // G asserts its own unprovability in F       >>>>       >>>> A proof of G in F would be a sequence of inference       >>>> steps in F that prove that they themselves do not nexist.       >>>> Does not exist because is contradicts itself.       >>>       >>> That conclusion needs the additional assumption that F is consistent,       >>> which requires that the first order Peano arithmetic is consistent.       >>       >> It remains true for any proof system that does not       >> contradict itself.       >>       >>> If F is not consistent then both G and its negation are provable in F.       >>> The first order Peano arithmetic is believed to be sonsistent but its       >>> consistency is not proven.       >>>       >>       >> The point is that after all these years no one ever       >> bothered to notice WHY G is unprovable in F. When       >> we do that then Gödel Incompleteness falls apart.       >>       >> *G is unprovable in F because its proof would contradict itself*       >> *G is unprovable in F because its proof would contradict itself*       >> *G is unprovable in F because its proof would contradict itself*       >>       >>       >       > Right. so you can only have two of the following, and not all three:       >       > 1) Consistent.       > 2) Complete       > 3) Capable of supporting the Natural Numbers.       >       > It seems the logic you can handle can't do the last, so yo are fine with       > your limited, but Complete and Consistant system.              Not at all. Gödel incorrectly conflates true in meta-math       with true in math. Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects this.       Proof Conditional Semantics is misguided.              --       Copyright 2026 Olcott |
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