XPost: comp.theory, sci.math   
   From: polcott333@gmail.com   
      
   On 2/12/2026 11:23 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:   
   > On 11/02/2026 21:53, Alan Mackenzie wrote:   
   >> Mathematicians have proven that many decision problems can not be   
   >> answered, all the nonsense about "idiosyncrasies of self-referential   
   >> logic" notwithstanding.   
   >   
   >   
   > It's not at all clear to me that those unanswerables are properly   
   > classified as "decision problem" unless one uses an auto-explication (my   
   > term for when a term is both an explicatum and explicandum of an   
   > explication). Carnap's definition of explication excludes such an act   
   > (though I don't know if he'd picked up the bad habit of using "decision   
   > problem" as an explicatum).   
   >   
   > I think Carnap would have admitted "L-decision problem" as an explicatum   
   > of the explicandum "decision problem". The nonsense act of calling   
   > pathologically self-referential problems as "L-decision problems" would   
   > be obvious because one does not have a problem of choosing between only   
   > classifications "true" and "false" when one has merely been fooled into   
   > thinking those are candidates without a whole heap of others beside.   
   >   
   > I hereby indulge myself with some old-timey assertive logistic   
   > philosophy, you might call it a strawman, something to ponder and burn down:   
   >   
   > We can understand the fallacy by making explicit the implicit false   
   > assumption: "the sentence after the conjunctive connector following can   
   > be assigned no valuation but 'true' or 'false' AND blah-blah". That is   
   > the cultural synergy covertly induced in the ponderer by a poetic form   
   > of expression ("proposition" the explicatum, not the explicandum, it's   
   > another auto-explication) but it's not /well/ formalised in that it's a   
   > mess of massive description and wonderment. I think usage of AND gives   
   > us falsity for pathologically self-referential 'blah-blah' if we have   
   > the right type-system but other connectives give us other, non-truth,   
   > classifications. A connective that means the implication of neither   
   > truth nor falsity is also available. Of course, the ponderer has the   
   > inducement in the form of a volition to be disobedient and choose to   
   > react in a variety of unassertive ways.   
   >   
   >   
   >> A proof is a proof.   
   >   
   > Tautology.   
   >   
      
   *My pair of axioms is confirmed by peer reviewed papers*   
   ∀x (Provable(T, x) ⇔ Meaningful(T, x)) --- (Schroeder-Heister 2024)   
   ∀x (Provable(x) ⇒ True(x)) --- Anchored in (Prawitz, 2012)   
      
   What is the appropriate notion of truth for sentences whose meanings are   
   understood in epistemic terms such as proof or ground for an assertion?   
   It seems that the truth of such sentences has to be identified with the   
   existence of proofs or grounds...   
   Prawitz, D. (2012). Truth as an Epistemic Notion. Topoi, 31(1), 9–16   
   https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6   
      
   1.2 Inferentialism, intuitionism, anti-realism   
   Proof-theoretic semantics is inherently inferential, as it is   
   inferential activity which manifests itself in proofs. It thus belongs   
   to inferentialism (a term coined by Brandom, see his 1994; 2000)   
   according to which inferences and the rules of inference establish the   
   meaning of expressions...   
   Schroeder-Heister, Peter, 2024 "Proof-Theoretic Semantics"   
   https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/#InfeIntuAntiReal   
      
      
   --   
   Copyright 2026 Olcott

   
      
   My 28 year goal has been to make 
   
   "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language"
   
   reliably computable for the entire body of knowledge.

   
      
   This required establishing a new foundation
   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)