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|    seattle.politics    |    Whats happening in the land of Nirvana    |    102,158 messages    |
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|    Message 101,755 of 102,158    |
|    Person Familiar With the Matter to Webbster    |
|    Re: Portland Is Toxic to Real Estate Inv    |
|    18 Dec 25 14:08:57    |
      [continued from previous message]              For a good comparison, in 17th century England, historians estimate that       beer and ale could account for as much as 10-25% of a laborer’s cash       outlays. This wasn’t because England was populated by inveterate drunks       or fantastically irresponsible people, but because there was no point in       saving the marginal unit of money in a rigid, hierarchical system in       which the barriers to true social advancement were too high. DoorDash       culture is the digital version of that.              If this sounds a bit like feudalism, it is because that is exactly what       it is. Or more precisely, it’s a hybrid of feudalism and the type of       pre-Weimar detachment that arises when wages don’t match prices, the       currency is being debauched, and the future is profoundly uncertain and       ominous.              To take the analysis a step further, think of the US economy as not just       a post-middle-class economy but a post-growth economy. Let’s run a       simple comparison of two different eras.              The 1960s were a time of growth driven by manufacturing, industrial       innovation, infrastructure, and rising productivity; GDP gains largely       reflected the expansion of real-world economic activity; markets       functioned without hand-holding by central banks; debt levels were       manageable; high interest rates rewarded saving. Housing was affordable       for working families.              The 2020s are a time of growth driven primarily by financial services,       asset inflation, and debt-fueled consumption, with government spending       and central bank liquidity the primary engines rather than real       productivity gains; central banks engage in all manner of gimmicks to       prop up a system that no longer self-corrects. Asset prices are       inflated; housing is unaffordable, while real wages are declining.              These days, there just isn’t much growth, and whatever there is has to       be squeezed with great exertion as if out of an empty toothpaste tube.       And it takes a whole lot of debt to even attempt the squeeze. The US       economy managed to expand at a clip of 2.4% in 2024 – hardly an       impressive figure – but it did so with deficit spending reaching a       staggering $1.8 trillion and by vastly understating systemic inflation.              It also bears keeping in mind that the 2.4% figure is already distorted       because GDP makes no distinction between organic growth and the growth       created by debt-fueled consumption.              This brings us back to the notion of feudalism. This is the type of       system that coalesces in one form or another when an economy exits a       growth phase and enters zero-sum mode. Periods of economic expansion are       dynamic and tend to reshuffle the cards. Avenues appear for upward       mobility, new elites are created, and savings can be deployed to       productive endeavors. In the post-growth world, by contrast, the main       mechanism defining economic relations becomes rent rather than production.              The period from about 950 to 1250 in Europe was very economically       dynamic. The heavy plow became widespread, which allowed northern       Europe’s heavy soils to be brought under cultivation. The three-field       system replaced the two-field system, which increased yields. The horse       collar, horseshoes, and windmills all appeared or spread widely during       this period. These were incremental but transformative innovations.       Deforestation and reclamation advanced. Lots of forest and swamp were       converted into farmland across France, Germany, England, and Poland.       Europe’s population roughly doubled between the years 1000 and 1300.              The great cathedral-building boom of the 12th and 13th centuries was a       direct expression of this surplus. The Reconquista in Spain, German       eastward expansion, and the Crusades all represented outlets for surplus       population and ambition.              By the late 13th century, however, the limits of this expansion were       being reached. Virtually all arable land had been brought under       cultivation. Marginal lands were being farmed, temporarily increasing       output but with falling yields. Population growth began to outstrip food       supply.              It was this world of economic stagnation after a long period of       expansion that produced the feudalism of the High Middle Ages.       Hierarchies hardened and social structures rigidified as mobility and       opportunity shrank. The feudal pyramid “froze”: a static hierarchy of       rent-seeking landed elites presided over a peasantry with declining       freedom. Cities and noble courts were often fiscally overextended and       clung tenaciously to existing structures because change felt dangerous.              We are exactly at that point, except the feudalism of today isn’t       recognizable to us. But how different are things, really? In the       rearview mirror are the dynamic post-war decades. Now, meanwhile, we've       settled into a system where the elites own the scarce assets while       everyone else pays ever more in participation costs while securing less       ownership. Perpetually rising asset values are a perfect defense against       those rising participation costs – if, that is, you’re fortunate enough       to be part of the asset-owning class. What’s 8% inflation and 15% higher       childcare costs if your stock portfolio is up 25% and your home is now       worth nearly $2 million?              Asset prices are always rising because the system is designed to       prioritize preserving balance-sheet stability. Markets are always too       big to fail and a disorderly decline in asset prices is treated as a       systemic emergency requiring intervention. But this means that losses       are socialized on the downside whereas gains remain private. The result:       asset prices trend upward over time almost by definition.              Like everything else, protests in the US are a business       Read more Like everything else, protests in the US are a business       To put it bluntly, central banks and governments guarantee that asset       prices stay ahead of inflation – an updated form of the old noble       privileges dished out by medieval kings.              We can extend the analogy. Power is tied to control finite resources,       not so much land but financial claims and, maybe even more importantly,       access to credit. Whereas average people who need funding pay 25% on       credit card debt, too-big-to-fail banks get to post underwater bonds as       collateral at full face value – not to mention a full bailout if things       go awry. This becomes even more perverse when you realize that this       abundant and essentially free credit provided to certain institutions is       being used to bid up asset prices even more.              Elites, meanwhile, protect their assets via political capture, while the       rest of society pays rents rather than shares in growth. In medieval       feudalism, power was decentralized: nobles had their own justice       systems, militias, and taxes. Today, corporations and asset-holders       function like mini-sovereigns. Hedge funds and private equity control       housing and employment structures. The list goes on.              However, this is not the feudalism of the Arthurian legends that can       exist in a state of bucolic stasis for centuries. This version is       perched precariously on a highly financialized economy that itself is       kept afloat by unsustainable debt levels. It is a system that is both       highly unstable and quite rigid at the same time, however paradoxical       that sounds. And Generation Z senses both sides of that equation. This       is where feudalism meets Weimar Germany.              The US is nowhere near hyperinflation. But DoorDash culture points to       the psychological pre-conditions of a world that can quickly turn very              [continued in next message]              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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