XPost: soc.history, alt.history, talk.politics.misc   
   XPost: alt.politics.misc   
   From: hayesstw@telkomsa.net   
      
   Checkmate in Ukraine   
   January 30, 2022   
      
   Seen in retrospect, Russia’s demand for a written response was a trap,   
   one neither the U.S. nor NATO yet recognizes, writes Scott Ritter.   
      
   By Scott Ritter   
   Energy Intelligence   
      
   Back in December, Russia sent the U.S. and NATO two draft treaty   
   documents spelling out its demands for security guarantees related to   
   NATO’s posture in Eastern Europe. These demands came in a climate of   
   tension fueled by both a Russian military buildup bordering Ukraine,   
    and U.S. and NATO hysteria over what they deemed an imminent Russian   
   military incursion into Ukraine.   
      
   The written replies that arrived on Jan. 22 failed — as expected — to   
   address any of Russia’s concerns, including the red line of continued   
   NATO expansion. Rather, the U.S. and NATO listed alternative pathways   
   to diplomatic engagement, including arms control and limits on   
   military exercises, and they now couch the ongoing crisis as a choice   
   between accepting the diplomatic offramp they dictated, or war.   
      
   Russia, however, is far too sophisticated to allow itself to be boxed   
   into such a corner. In the weeks and months ahead, Russia will be the   
   one dictating the outcome of this crisis — which will be a resounding   
   Russian victory.   
      
   The Russian buildup in its western and southern military districts, as   
   well as in Belarus, has two purposes. The secondary goal is to   
   demonstrate Russia’s ability, at a time and place of its choosing, to   
   project sufficient military power into Ukraine to overwhelming defeat   
   the Ukrainian armed forces and bring down its government.   
      
   To be clear, Russia has threatened neither of these outcomes. It   
   maintains that the military buildup is simply an exercise designed to   
   ensure it can respond to NATO’s aggressive expansion of forces along   
   its western flank. It traces the confrontation to NATO’s “original   
   sin” of expansion.   
      
   Historical fact supports the Russian interpretation: The Russian   
   mantra of “not one inch eastward” is derived from an oral promise made   
   by former Secretary of State James Baker to Soviet President Mikhail   
   Gorbachev at the time of German reunification. But Russia’s goal is   
   not to score debating points, but rather to reverse NATO policy and   
   posturing it deems harmful to its national security.   
      
   To this end, the primary purpose of Russia’s military buildup is to   
   expose the political, military and economic impotence of the U.S./NATO   
   partnership by a range of crises — independent of any military   
   incursion into Ukraine — for which the U.S. and NATO have no viable   
   response other than to give in to most, if not all, of Russia’s   
   demands for security guarantees.   
      
   Crying ‘Wolf’   
      
   The stage for the current crisis was set back in the spring of 2021,   
   when Russia mobilized around 100,000 troops along the lines seen   
   today. The U.S. and NATO immediately began a rhetoric-based war of   
   perception management, using mainstream media and think tanks to paint   
   a picture of Russian malfeasance and Western resolve.   
      
   A face-to-face meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and   
   U.S. President Joe Biden resulted, and Russia eventually drew down its   
   forces — but not before making several salient points: It demanded   
   that the West hold Ukraine’s feet to the fire regarding fulfillment of   
   its obligations under the 2015 Minsk agreement. And after a “freedom   
   of navigation” exercise which brought a British destroyer into   
   contested waters off Crimea, it declared red lines Russia was prepared   
   to defend, with force if necessary.   
      
   Russia took away two lessons from this. First, that neither the U.S.   
   nor NATO had a viable military response. Russian military superiority   
   in any future conflict with Ukraine was all but assured. Second, that   
   the only response either the U.S. or NATO could come up with would   
   center on economic sanctions. This stress test exposed several   
   critical weaknesses Russia could exploit.   
      
   Armed with these important insights, Russia waited until last fall to   
   repeat the stress test, again mobilizing more than 100,000 troops near   
   Ukraine and deploying tens of thousands of elite shock troops — the   
   First Guards Tank Army — into Belarus. Again, Russia issued no   
   threats, stating repeatedly that it was simply conducting routine   
   military exercises.   
      
   The U.S. and NATO, in contrast, immediately cast the Russian buildup   
   as proof positive of its intent to invade Ukraine. In drawing this   
   conclusion — despite Russian denials and Ukraine’s rejection of the   
   inevitability of such an outcome — both the U.S. and NATO effectively   
   founded their position on the principle of the inviolability of NATO’s   
   “open-door” policy, which says that any nation qualified for NATO   
   membership should have the opportunity to join.   
      
   For its part, Russia noted that NATO’s eastward expansion has created   
   an unacceptable national security risk. It claims a right to exert a   
   sphere of influence around its borders, implying that any accession to   
   NATO by the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine or Georgia is viewed as   
   an existential threat that would require a “military-technical”   
   response. Russia said as much in the two draft treaties it submitted   
   in December. Furthermore, Russia demanded that both NATO and the U.S.   
   respond in writing.   
      
   Seen in retrospect, Russia’s demand for a written response was a trap,   
   one neither the U.S. nor NATO yet recognizes. By rejecting Russian   
   demands for security guarantees, the U.S. and NATO have married   
   themselves to a posture defined by the “open-door” policy on NATO   
   membership. Moreover, when Russia refused to cease its mobilization in   
   the face of sanctions threats, the U.S. and NATO had no choice but to   
   shift gears and create the perception of a military response designed   
   to put pressure on Russia’s eastern flank — even though Washington has   
   pointedly said it would not defend Ukraine from a Russian assault.   
      
   What emerged was, first, that neither the U.S. nor NATO is able to   
   project meaningful military power even within NATO’s own borders.   
   Putting 8,500 U.S. troops on alert for potential deployment to Europe   
   is like bringing a garden hose to a three-alarm fire.   
      
   Moreover, threatening to activate NATO’s rapid response force for a   
   non-NATO issue created fractures in the unity of NATO. Germany has   
   been hesitant. The Czech Republic and Bulgaria have forbade their   
   troops to be involved in any such adventure. Turkey views the entire   
   Ukraine crisis as a U.S./NATO conspiracy to contain Turkish regional   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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