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|    soc.culture.russian    |    More than just vodka and shirtless Putin    |    98,335 messages    |
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|    Message 96,947 of 98,335    |
|    Steve Hayes to All    |
|    Right-wing switchback: "National conserv    |
|    16 Apr 22 08:44:40    |
      XPost: alt.christnet.rightwing.loonies, alt.politics.religion, a       t.christnet.religion       XPost: alt.religion.christian.east-orthodox, alt.religion.christianity       From: hayesstw@telkomsa.net              Right-wing switchback: "National conservatives" dump Putin, want to       claim Ukraine              At global gathering of right-wing nationalists, a startling pivot:       Putin's toast — and wow, do they love Ukraine              By KATHRYN JOYCE       PUBLISHED APRIL 13, 2022 6:30AM (EDT)              From the first day of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, conservatives on       both sides of the Atlantic have been placed in an uneasy position. For       more than two decades, right-wing activists and politicians have       praised Russia as the unlikely wellspring of renewed traditionalism,       as Vladimir Putin intertwined church and state in an effort to bolster       Russian nationalism and, more quietly, his aspirations to reconstruct       the Soviet empire.              When the launch of Putin's war coincided with the first day of the       Conservative Political Action conference in late February, a dizzying       ideological switchback began. Speakers who had declared just days or       hours earlier that they didn't care about the fate of Ukraine were       rapidly forced to recalibrate. Fox News' Tucker Carlson, who in 2019       declared he was "root[ing] for Russia" in its conflict with Ukraine,       was compelled to recant, at least temporarily. In Europe, Hungarian       Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who had celebrated his long and fond       relationship with Putin in Moscow just weeks before Russia invaded,       issued a tepid condemnation. (Hungary is a member state of both the EU       and NATO, though its relationship with both is tense.)              At least initially, on the broader, more ideological level, there was       a sense that Russia's aggression — and Putin's claims that he was       fighting not just Ukraine but the whole of the "degenerate" West —       would engender a rebuke of the "illiberal" populist movements that       have swept far-right leaders into power around the world.              As the Washington Post editorial board put it this week, Putin had       launched two wars, the second being a war of ideas over the       international illiberal agenda Russia has helped lead. Or as columnist       Brad Littlejohn wrote at The American Conservative, "behind the       battles being waged on the plains of Ukraine was a deeper battle over       the narrative that would frame Russia's invasion, the lessons the West       must learn from it, and the vision for a future Europe that ought to       emerge on the other side of this crisis."              One contingent on the right that might have seemed particularly       vulnerable to this reordering of the political arena are the National       Conservatives: a relatively new international right-wing coalition       that seeks to rehabilitate the idea of nationalism as a virtue and to       oppose the emphasis on individual freedom and pluralism in classical       liberalism — meaning the libertarian, small-L liberalism that       "mainstream" conservatives used to embrace — as incompatible with       traditional values.              For the last several years, the "NatCons," who held a high-profile       meeting in Orlando last November that drew numerous conservative       intellectuals and politicians, have labored to combine right-wing       social mores, public religiosity and newly interventionist economic       policies into a movement better positioned for a populist age. In that       effort, they've frequently looked to Orbán as inspiration, especially       for the way he has wielded authoritarian measures toward       traditionalist ends, even as Orbán has clearly been looking to Russia.              At their recent conference, the NatCons pivoted to the mind-bending       claim that Ukraine's struggle embodies right-wing nationalism, not       "Western liberal values."              Yet when the NatCons gathered several weeks ago in Brussels, for their       fifth international conference, the dominant message of the speakers       was not reassessment or remorse, but vindication. Not because of any       overt or coded sympathy for Russian aggression — the speakers were so       uniformly vitriolic in condemning the invasion that conservative       writer Rod Dreher, another presenter, noted it was "almost impossible       to dissent from anti-Russian maximalism" — but rather because of their       ambitious and perhaps mind-bending claim that Ukraine's struggle       against an invading army embodied their values, not those of the       democratic center or left.              One former European Parliament member from the U.K., Brigadier       Geoffrey Charles van Orden, claimed, citing an unnamed observer in       Ukraine, that there were no evident "Western liberal values behind the       noble Ukrainian struggle," which was rooted in centuries of Ukrainian       nationalist patriotism instead. Another speaker, former Hungarian       diplomat Attila Demkó, suggested that a woke Western fixation on       "micro-aggressions" had left Europe too soft to anticipate a       macro-aggressor like Putin.              Chris DeMuth, former president of the American Enterprise Institute       and chair of the 2021 National Conservatism conference, opened the       gathering (in a speech later adapted for a Wall Street Journal op-ed),       by arguing that "the free world has fallen prey to certain soft       conceits which Putin and his ilk are right to see as weaknesses."       While "experts claimed that nation states and borders were barbaric       vestiges and global bureaucracies could usher in peace and harmony,"       he continued, "it turned out that we had actual barbarians in the here       and now, and that nations with borders were essential to peace and       harmony."              All told, reflected conference organizer Yoram Hazony, it was "not a       bad moment" for nationalism. Hazony, an Israeli political theorist and       chair of the Edmund Burke Foundation, is not just the chief organizer       of the NatCon conference series, but one of the main architects of the       movement, as author of the 2018 book "The Virtue of Nationalism." For       years, Hazony said, critics of his movement had argued there was       little difference between nationalism and imperialism. But the Ukraine       war, he said, had demolished that argument.              Nationalists, he said, looked at Russia's invasion and recognized it       as unjust, proclaiming "that a people has a right, if it's capable of       asserting that right, to be able to chart its own course." By       contrast, "imperialists" — a category Hazony defines in his own terms       — viewed the idea of independent nations dismissively, asking, "What       difference do the borders really make? And why should everybody have       their own laws when we know what the right laws are?"              You may guess where this is going. As Hazony continued: "There are              [continued in next message]              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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