XPost: alt.philosophy, alt.atheism, talk.atheism
From: ralph@eddlewood.demon.co.uk
In message , Immortalist
writes
>
>"Joseph H" wrote in message
>news:1142535744.239403.100460@v46g2000cwv.googlegroups.com...
>
>Immortalist wrote:
>> "ralph" wrote in message
>> news:AY2fG0BxBGGEFwai@eddlewood.demon.co.uk...
>> > In message , Immortalist
>> > writes
>> >
>
>--Unbelieveable! How do you know so much?
>--Read it, folks, and weep - and
>--cheer - that one small head can know so much!
>
>Thank you, but bookworms just know shit, good habit thats all. Nothing
>special.
>
Well, I must first congratulate Joseph on coaxing out a coherent
response which I signally failed to achieve.
>Do you think that the examples show a range of activities that would be
>short and long of the brownian motion example and could be used to tighten
>the definitions we are seeking?
Do these follow? I am always keen to know the subject of a discussion.
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>INFORMATION AND LIFE
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>(1)
>A universal computer is indeed
>universal and can emulate any process.
It is also, at least at present, no more than a hypothesis.
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>(2)
>The essence of life is a process.
The essence of life is its ability to reproduce itself.
I must digress here to admit that I have not read "Autopoiesis and
Cognition". I was, however, at school with the late lamented Stafford
Beer, who wrote the preface to it. He told me that he had read it
several times, and still did not understand it. I took that as a hint.
Stafford was interested in the concept of the autopoietic society - that
is to say, humans as the smallest entities. You wrote:
They interact with the environment through a continual exchange of
energy and matter. But this interaction does not determine their
organization -- they are self organizing.
An autopoietic network is not a set of relations among static components
(like for example the pattern of organization of a crystal), but a set
of relations among processes of production of components. If these
processes stop, so does the entire organization. In other words,
autopoietic networks must continually regenerate themselves to maintain
their organization."
So far, so good. But you continue:
"In the emerging theory of living systems the process of life -- the
continual embodiment of an autopoietic pattern of organization in a
dissipative structure -- is identified with cognition, the process of
knowing. This implies a radically new concept of mind, which is perhaps
the most revolutionary and most exciting aspect of this theory, as it
promises finally to overcome the Cartesian division between mind and
matter."
Now, this was all a long time ago - I'm not sure how long? I have heard
no mention of it since: has their been any fulfillment of this promise?
"According to the theory of living systems, mind is not a thing but a
process -- the very process of life. In other words, the organizing
activity of living systems, at all levels of life, is mental activity.
The interactions of a living organism -- plant, animal, or human -o with
its environment are cognitive, or mental interactions. Thus life and
cognition become inseparably connected. Mind -- or, more accurately,
mental process -- is immanent in matter at all levels of life."
This is clearly the most contentious of your (or M&V's) assertions.
Cognition, and mental interactions, need something in which to take
place. We call this something "neurons", and would assert that no
neurons, no mental activity.
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>(3)
>There exist criteria by which we
>are able to distinguish living
>from non-living things.
So far, most people would consider the difference to be the ability to
reproduce.
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>Interlude A:
>Accepting (1), (2), and (3) implies
>the possibility of life in a computer.
>
But (1) is circular. If you can develop a computer which can emulate a
human being, then you have the possibility of human life in a computer.
This does not depend on (2) or I3), but neither does it take the
argument further.
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>LIFE AND REALITY
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>(4)
>If somebody manages to develop life in
>a computer environment, which satisfies (3),
>it follows from (2) that these life-forms
>are just as much alive as you and I.
By definition - but still no advance.
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>(5)
>Such an artificial organism must perceive a
>reality (R2), which for itself is just as real
>as our "real" reality (R1) is for us.
Might, not must. Perception comes a long way after life - it took us
around 4 billion years (depending where you start).
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>(6)
>From (5) we conclude that (R1) and (R2) has the
>same ontological status. Although (R2) in a material
>way is embedded in (R1), (R2) is independent of (R1).
>
What do you mean by R2 being embedded in R1?
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>REALITY AND PHYSICS
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>(7)
>If (R1) and (R2) have the same ontological status
>it might be possible to learn something about the
>fundamental properties of realities in general, and
>of (R1) in particular, by studying the details of
>different (R2's). An example of such a property is
>the physics of reality.
This seems a very long-winded way of improving our knowledge of physics.
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
--
ralph
--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)
|
