XPost: alt.philosophy.taoism, alt.buddha.short.fat.guy, alt.philosophy.zen   
   From: wudao@wuji.net   
      
   Tang wrote:   
      
   >On 11/19/2016 11:08 AM, brian mitchell wrote:   
   >   
   >> Are you assuming that a pure reason exists independently of the mind   
   >> that apprehends or intuits it? Or that philosophical ideas exist   
   >> independently of the minds that conceive them?   
   >>   
   >> If there is a meta-structure informing and uniting all philosophies,   
   >> must that not at least entail the primary structure of thought,   
   >> without which there are no ideas or abstractions?   
   >>   
   >> I have often said that I see the concept of Truth as an Ur-concept,   
   >> one so basic and necessary that thinking cannot get off the ground   
   >> without it. True/ false is the prime ordering structure of thought,   
   >> and therefore of all branches of philosophy, East or West. There are   
   >> probably other overarching concepts to be identified.   
   >>   
   >> Truth is also the cornerstone of all religious doctrine, so I suppose   
   >> you must include religion in your research material.   
   >>   
   >> As to being refuted, I notice that all the philosophers you mention   
   >> are essentially transcendental in outlook and intent, even if not   
   >> actual Transcendentalists proper. It seems from this that you have   
   >> rejected Empiricism, and its position that there is nothing innate or   
   >> a-priori in human experience or thought, which all derive from sensory   
   >> input. How have you gotten past Empiricism?   
   >   
   >If there is a meta-structure informing and uniting all   
   >philosophies, must that not at least entail the primary   
   >structure of thought, without which there are no ideas   
   >or abstractions? Yes, but it is a part of the structure of   
   >thought that is separate from and independent of   
   >experience, which is what a priori means. This   
   >independence from experience bars empiricism right   
   >off from consideration. The quote from Michael   
   >Friedman of Standford says in part:   
   >   
   ><more narrowly scientific works, makes particularly good   
   >sense, I believe, within our present,   
   >post-logical-empiricist and post-Kuhnian situation in   
   >philosophy of science and scientific epistemology.>>   
   >   
   >Whether pure reason exists independently of the mind   
   >that apprehends or intuits it, or that philosophical ideas   
   >exist independently of the minds that conceive them,   
   >are metaphysical questions, and I limit myself to the   
   >explanation of philosophy, which is like in science, as   
   >Russell says: “Whatever we infer from perceptions it is   
   >only structure that we can validly infer; and structure is   
   >what can be expressed by mathematical logic,” and   
   >“The only legitimate attitude about the physical world   
   >seems to be one of complete agnosticism as regards all   
   >but its mathematical properties.” In science, if you can   
   >explain how some phenomena work, that's all you need   
   >to do, the matter which underlies it being immaterial in   
   >the explanation. Likewise, you can argue whether the   
   >laws of physics and the theorems of math are inherent   
   >in nature and need only be discovered, or they are   
   >invented by the human mind, but that belongs to   
   >metaphysics, not to science, which only tries to explain   
   >the phenomena by equations free of content.   
   >   
   >It is true that the concept of Truth is an Ur-concept, one   
   >so basic and necessary that thinking cannot get off the   
   >ground without it, and that true/ false is the prime   
   >ordering structure of thought, and therefore of all   
   >branches of philosophy, East or West, and that there are   
   >probably other overarching concepts to be identified.   
   >However, you have assumed too much, in that all such   
   >concepts, however primitive to thought, are at most   
   >inherent in thought, but you forget (or do not know) that   
   >there are systems of thought that relegate all such   
   >concepts, and all concepts, to a level lower than the   
   >highest level, as in Neoplatonism. You should read up on   
   >Neoplatonic hypostases, the first of which being the One   
   >beyond being, therefore also before truth and all   
   >concepts and judgments of whatever kind. So concept,   
   >including those named by you, are (perhaps) valid once   
   >thought is kicked up, but not before. Being and non-being,   
   >yes and no, right and wrong, true and untrue, good and   
   >evil fall off in the One, just as they fall off in the non-doing   
   >of Buddhism and Daoism. In Chan, it is called the original   
   >face. Madame Guyon and Fénelon talk volubly of such a   
   >state. In it, there is no thought, therefore no reason, pure   
   >and impure. Thought and reason enters only in the   
   >justification of it.   
   >   
   >As to your assertion, that Truth is also the cornerstone of   
   >all religious doctrine, you forget that the Buddha says:   
   >What and what they think it, it is otherwise, and LZ and ZZ   
   >make fun of truth the whole time, laughing their face off   
   >of it.   
      
   It seems as if you already have what you want   
   in that it already exists. Why write a book about it?   
      
   Apparently others already have, in terms of the One.   
   Why reinvent that wheel again?   
      
   If all forms complete with their contents are forms of the One   
   Form that is beyond all forms, is there a point to be made?   
      
   A score to compose that is new music   
   for the ages? To settle the mud?   
      
   Prehaps you continue to stir up your own tribbles?   
      
   Without thinking, a priori.   
      
   ...   
      
   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)