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|    Message 23,894 of 25,589    |
|    JC to All    |
|    THE WARREN REPORT: 'LIQUIDATE THE BANKS     |
|    26 Jun 11 23:22:35    |
      From: jesus475073@webtv.net              THE WARREN REPORT: 'LIQUIDATE       THE BANKS & FIRE THE EXECUTIVES'       By Mike Whitney       Online Journal Contributing Writer       Apr 14, 2009               Last Tuesday, a congressional panel headed by ex-Harvard law       professor Elizabeth Warren released a report on Treasury Secretary       Timothy Geithner's handling of the Troubled Assets Relief Program       (TARP). Warren was appointed to lead the five-member Congressional       Oversight Panel (COP) in November by Senate majority leader Harry Reid.       From the opening paragraph on, the Warren report makes clear that       Congress is frustrated with Geithner's so-called "Financial Rescue Plan"       and doesn't have the foggiest idea of what he is trying to do.               Here are the first few lines of "Assessing Treasury's Strategy:       Six Months of TARP": "With this report, the Congressional Oversight       Panel examines Treasury's current strategy and evaluates the progress it       has achieved thus far. This report returns the Panel's inquiry to a       central question raised in its first report: What is Treasury's       strategy?" Six months and $1 trillion later, and Congress still cannot       figure out what Geithner is up to. It's a wonder the Treasury secretary       hasn't been fired already.<<<<<               From the report: "In addition to drawing on the $700 billion       allocated to Treasury under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act       (EESA), economic stabilization efforts have depended heavily on the use       of the Federal Reserve Board's balance sheet. This approach has       permitted Treasury to leverage TARP funds well beyond the funds       appropriated by Congress. Thus, while Treasury has spent or committed       $590.4 billion of TARP funds, according to Panel estimates, the Federal       Reserve Board has expanded its balance sheet by more than $1.5 trillion       in loans and purchases of government-sponsored enterprise (GSE)       securities.               The total value of all direct spending, loans and guarantees       provided to date in conjunction with the federal government's financial       stability efforts (including those of the Federal Deposit Insurance       Corporation (FDIC) as well as Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board)       now exceeds $4 trillion."               So, while Congress approved a mere $700 billion in emergency       funding for the TARP, Geithner and Bernanke deftly sidestepped the       public opposition to more bailouts and shoveled another $3.3 trillion       through the back door via loans and leverage for crappy mortgage paper       that will never regain its value. Additionally, the Fed has made a deal       with Treasury that when the financial crisis finally subsides, Treasury       will assume the Fed's obligations vis-a-vis the "lending facilities,"       which means the taxpayer will then be responsible for unknown trillions       in withering investments.               From the report: "To deal with a troubled financial system, three       fundamentally different policy alternatives are possible: liquidation,       receivership, or subsidization.       To place these alternatives in context, the report evaluates historical       and contemporary efforts to confront financial crises and their relative       success.        The Panel focused on six historical experiences:        (1) the U.S. Depression of the 1930s;               (2) the bank run on and subsequent government seizure of       Continental Illinois in 1984;               (3) the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and       establishment of the Resolution Trust Corporation;               (4) the recapitalization of the FDIC bank insurance fund in 1991;               (5) Sweden's financial crisis of the early 1990s;               and (6) what has become known as Japan's "Lost Decade" of the       1990s. The report also surveys the approaches currently employed by       Iceland, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and other European countries."               This statement shows that the congressional committee understands       that Geithner's lunatic plan has no historic precedent and no prospect       of succeeding.       Geithner's circuitous Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) -- which       is designed to remove toxic assets from bank balance sheets -- is an       end-run around "tried-and-true" methods for fixing the banking system.       In the most restrained and diplomatic language, Warren is telling       Geithner that she knows that he's up to no good.               From the report: "Liquidation avoids the uncertainty and       open-ended commitment that accompany subsidization. It can restore       market confidence in the surviving banks, and it can potentially       accelerate recovery by offering decisive and clear statements about the       government's evaluation of financial conditions and institutions." The       committee agrees with the vast majority of reputable economists who       think the banks should be taken over (liquidated) and the bad assets put       up for auction.               This is the committee's number one recommendation. The committee       also explores the pros and cons of conservatorship (which entails a       reorganization in which bad assets are removed, failed managers are       replaced, and parts of the business are spun off) and government       subsidization, which involves capital infusions or the purchasing of       troubled assets.               Subsidization, however, carries the risk of distorting the market       (by keeping assets artificially high) and creating a constant drain on       government resources. Subsidization tends to create hobbled banks that       continue to languish as wards of the state. Liquidation, conservatorship       and government subsidization; these are the three ways to fix the       banking system.       There is no fourth way. Geithner's plan is not a plan at all; it's       mumbo-jumbo dignified with an acronym, PPIP.               The Treasury secretary is being as opaque as possible to stall for       time while he diverts trillions in public revenue to his scamster       friends at the big banks through capital injections and nutty-sounding       money laundering programs like the PPIP.        From the report: "Treasury's approach fails to acknowledge the       depth of the current downturn and the degree to which the low valuation       of troubled assets accurately reflects their worth. The actions       undertaken by Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC are       unprecedented. But if the economic crisis is deeper than anticipated, it       is possible that Treasury will need to take very different actions in       order to restore financial stability."               This is a crucial point; the toxic assets are not going to regain       their value because their current market price -- 30 cents on the dollar       for AAA mortgage-backed securities -- accurately reflects the amount of       risk they bear. The market is right and Geithner is wrong; it's that       simple. Many of these securities are comprised of loans that were issued       to people without sufficient income to make the payments.               These "liar's loans" were bundled together with good loans into       mortgage-backed securities. No one can say with any certainty what they       are really worth. Naturally, there is a premium for uncertainty, which       is why the assets are fetching a mere 30 cents on the dollar. This won't              [continued in next message]              --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05        * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)    |
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