XPost: soc.culture.greek, soc.culture.turkish   
   From: smyrna@isgreek.org   
      
   Kara@remailer.metacolo.com wrote:   
   > Ethnic Turks have resided in Thrace since at least the fourteenth   
   > century, and they are Greek citizens. In 1923, under the Treaty of   
   > Lausanne, the Turkish minority of Thrace was granted a wide array of   
   > rights to ensure protection of their religion, language, culture, and   
   > equality before the law.1 In addition, as Greek citizens, ethnic Turks   
   > also enjoy the protection of Greek law, as well as of the European   
   > Convention of Human Rights.   
   >   
   > Despite such protections, however, ethnic Turks suffer a host of human   
   > rights violations. The Greek state has for the most part been unable to   
   > accept the fact that one can be a loyal Greek citizen and, at the same   
   > time, an ethnic Turk proud of his or her culture and religion. Turks are   
   > viewed by the state with suspicion, the strength of which largely   
   > reflects the state of Turkish-Greek relations.   
      
   Half of the "ethnic Turks " are Bulgarian Muslims.   
   >   
   > Greece’s attitude toward the ethnic Turkish minority is nowhere more   
   > evident then in its continued official denial of the Turkish identity of   
   > the community. Greece only accepts the existence of a “Muslim” minority   
   > in Thrace and aggressively prosecutes and bans organizations and   
   > individuals who seek to call themselves “Turkish.” While it is indeed   
   > true that much of the minority is of mixed ethnic origins, it   
   > overwhelmingly claims an ethnic Turkish identity and wants to be   
   > referred to as such. The Greek government points to the Treaty of   
   > Lausanne which, it is true, speaks only of a “Muslim minority.” Past   
   > state policy, however, negates such a justification. In the early 1950s,   
   > during a period of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, the Greek   
   > government itself ordered the use of “Turk” and “Turkish” to refer to   
   > the minority, rather than “Muslim.”   
   >   
   > A number of discriminatory measures have been enacted either to force   
   > ethnic Turks to migrate to Turkey or to disrupt community life and   
   > weaken its cultural basis. The most egregious example was Article 19 of   
   > the Citizenship Law, which, until it was abolished in 1998, allowed the   
   > state to revoke the citizenship of non-ethnic Greeks unilaterally and   
   > arbitrarily. Between 1955 and 1998, approximately 60,000 lost their   
   > citizenship under the article. As a result of Article 19 and other   
   > discriminatory measures, the ethnic Turkish minority today numbers   
   > approximately 80-120,000.2 In 1951, forty-seven years ago, the official   
   > census reported 112,665. Given an annual 2 percent growth rate, not high   
   > for a poorly-educated and rural community, the Turkish minority, using   
   > 1951 as a base, would have been expected to number closer to 300,000 today.3   
   >   
   > Religion has been another battleground. A 1990 law granted the state   
   > wide-ranging powers in appointing the mufti, the community’s religious   
   > leader who also serves as an Islamic judge in civil matters. The   
   > previous law, in contrast, had allowed the community to elect the   
   > muftis. In defiance of the 1990 law, which violates the intent of the   
   > Treaty of Lausanne to allow the minority to manage its own religious   
   > affairs, the community has continued to elect its religious leaders, who   
   > have been prosecuted and imprisoned by Greek authorities. In addition,   
   > the repair of mosques is sometimes blocked by state authorities, and   
   > those involved in the repair are prosecuted.   
   >   
   > The state has also struck at private charitable foundations, known as   
   > Vak1flar, that support education and religious institutions. A law   
   > passed in 1980 and a presidential decree issued in 1990 effectively   
   > transferred management of the Vak1flar from elected committees—a right   
   > assured under the Treaty of Lausanne and preceding Greek legislation—to   
   > state officials, who were granted an iron hand over budgetary matters.   
   > More ominously, the 1980 law struck directly at the financial holdings   
   > of the foundations by ordering that any property for which an official   
   > deed could not be presented would be confiscated by the state. While   
   > innocuous-sounding, the regulation presented insurmountable challenges   
   > to foundations that had holdings as old as 500 years.   
   >   
   > Human rights violations in the education field affect the largest number   
   > of individuals and have done the most to foster the Turkish minority’s   
   > relative underdevelopment. Schools are overcrowded and poorly funded   
   > compared to those attended by ethnic Greeks. The quality of teachers is   
   > low. Ethnic Turks educated in Turkish universities, which the minority   
   > believes are the best qualified to teach, have not been hired for a   
   > number of years. On the other hand, graduates of the Thessaloniki   
   > Pedagogical Academy (EPATH)—the job candidates preferred by the Greek   
   > state—are poorly educated and have a weak command of Turkish.   
   > Furthermore, community members claim, not without some justification,   
   > that the EPATH-trained teachers act as “ideological overseers.”   
   > Textbooks are decades out of date because Greece and Turkey have been   
   > unable to implement a 1968 protocol that would have allowed each country   
   > to supply textbooks to their respective minority.   
   The main reason for the 75 percent "no" vote among Greek Cypriots in the   
   referendum was their perception that the Annan Plan was unbalanced and   
   excessively pro-Turkish, and that it would not safeguard Greek Cypriot   
   rights in the north.[citation needed]   
      
   Political leaders in both controlled areas of Republic of Cyprus and   
   Greece also influenced the Greek Cypriot vote by strongly opposing the   
   plan. Tassos Papadopoulos, president of the Republic of Cyprus, spoke   
   out against the plan in an emotional speech broadcast live on   
   television. Two days before the referendums, Cyprus's biggest party,   
   AKEL, decided to reject the Annan Plan because of its perceived bias.   
   Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis decided to maintain a "neutral"   
   position over the plan, but the Greek opposition leader George   
   Papandreou (of the PASOK party) urged Cypriots to vote in favour, also   
   because the plan had been promoted by his political party while it was   
   still on power and Mr. Papandreou himself was the foreign minister of   
   Greece during the last PASOK term. Mr. Papandreou even stated that the   
   plan was laid out during his term and that both parts were ready for "a   
      
   [continued in next message]   
      
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