https://livinginamadhouse.wordpress.com/2015/07/16/greece-and-th   
   -eurozone-holding-tight-to-nurse-for-fear-of-something-worse/   
      
   Greece and the Eurozone : holding tight to nurse for fear of something worse   
      
   Robert Henderson   
      
   The   Greek referendum on the terms for a further  financial bailout was   
   potentially  a clever move by  Alexis Tsipras and Syriza. If the result of the   
   referendum   had been  YES to the terms put forward to deal with the Greek   
   debt , Tsipras and his    
   government were off the hook for reneging on their election promises. If there   
   was  a NO to the conditions, Tsipras could  play the democracy card and   
   challenge the Eurozone to go against the democratic will of the Greek people   
   or simply walk away from    
   the mess and  pass the poisoned chalice to his political opponents.   
      
   Having asked for a rejection of  the terms offered  by the Eurozone in the   
   referendum and  got an emphatic  61% vote  for rejection,  Syriza   could    
   have  called the Euro elite's bluff from a position of strength.   Regrettably   
   for Greece's hope of    
   recovery they have not had the courage to do so.  Instead  they have    
   humiliatingly capitulated by signing up to an even more severe  austerity deal   
   than  they could have concluded with the movers and shakers  in the Eurozone a   
   fortnight ago. The stark    
   realpolitik of the situation was epitomised by the Greek prime minister    
   Alexis Tsipras appealing to the Greek Parliament to accept the deal with the   
   words   "We don't believe in it, but we are forced to adopt it," The   
   Parliament  accepted by  his plea    
   by voting 229 for and 64 against, but it required support from the opposition   
   because over 30 Syriza MPs either voted against or abstained. From provisional   
   acceptance by the Greek government  to acceptance by Parliament took three   
   days.   Shotgun    
   marriages often take longer to arrange.   
      
   Greece is no longer in control of its economy or its political system.  It is   
   having forced upon it huge changes to pensions and public sector salaries,   
   large privatisations,  and perhaps most humiliating, to sell off EURO 50bn of   
   Greek assets , the    
   proceeds of which will be partially used to guarantee repayments on debts owed   
   to the EU and the IMF. The detailed new requirements are:   
      
   "To unlock a fresh EURO 82bn to EURO 86bn bail-out, Greece has until Wednesday   
   to pass laws that:   
      
   implement VAT hikes   
   cut pensions   
   take steps to ensure the independence of Greece's statistics office is   
   maintained   
   put measures in place to automatically slash spending if Greece fails to meet   
   its targets on primary surpluses (revenue minus expenditure excluding debt   
   servicing costs)   
   It has until July 22 (an extra week compared with a draft statement) to:   
      
   overhaul its civil justice system   
   implement the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to bring bank   
   resolution laws in line with the rest of the EU   
   Greek MPs will also have to stomach a move to sell off EURO 50bn of Greek   
   assets."   
      
   This is not the end of the matter. At best the Greek problem and the problems   
   of the Eurozone generally have been simply been kicked down the road. The   
   madness  at the heart of this settlement is that Greece is being further   
   burdened  by a huge amount of    
   extra  debt when the general consensus amongst economists is that the   
   existing  debt was more than Greece could ever hope to repay.  Disobligingly   
   for the Europhile elite,  the IMF  has made it clear since the agreement   
   between Syriza and the Eurozone     
   that Greece requires a great deal of debt relief and that unless this is   
   forthcoming  the IMF will not take part in the overseeing of the agreement.      
   But the agreement makes no provision for overt debt relief, although fiddling   
   with the period of    
   repayment and interest rates payable may reduce the real value overall debt   
   (principal and interest)  somewhat.  Nor is this position likely to change,   
   because some Eurozone countries, most notably Germany,  are determined to   
   continue to resist overt     
   debt relief if Greece is to continue within the Eurozone.  At the same time   
   Germany have made it clear that they want the  IMF involved in the realisation   
   of the agreement. In addition to these obstacles all the other Eurozone   
   countries have got to sign    
   up to the agreement  and this will require some countries, including Germany,    
   to get parliamentary approval to the terms.  Germany's finance minister   
   Wolfgang Schäuble has even suggested that Greece leave the Euro for five years.   
      
   But even if the Eurozone votes collectively to accept the deal and the IMF    
   difficulty is overcome,  there is no guarantee it will be realised  for two   
   reasons. The Greek people may be driven by  desperation to  resort to serious   
   violence after they    
   realise that voting changes nothing in Greece and the severe austerity   
   programme takes effect , effects which are aggravated by the fact that     
   Greece has no real Welfare State.  This could drive the Greek political class   
   to hold further elections with    
   the result that a government is elected which will not implement the deal.   
      
   More mundanely,    Greece's  politics and  public services are severely   
   tainted by cronyism and corruption.  The country  may simply  lack the   
   bureaucratic  structures and expertise to  implement the  complicated and far   
   reaching reforms  which are being    
   sought by the Eurozone.   
      
   The sad  truth is that Greece is a second world country which has been   
   masquerading as a first world country.  Before joining the Euro it got by   
   because it had its own currency and  received very large dollops of money from   
   the richer members of the EU.     
   In those  circumstances its lending was circumscribed by the fact that its   
   debt attracted a high rate of interest because it was seen as a bad risk.    
   Once Greece had smuggled itself into the Euro by falsifying its accounts,   it   
   was treated as safe a bet    
   as Germany  for creditors who rashly  reasoned that the rest of the Eurozone   
   would ensure Greece did not default.   
      
   How difficult would it to be for Greece to re-establish the Drachma? The   
   Czechoslovakian split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 provides a   
   reassuring  example of how it might be done.  Initially the two new countries   
   were going to share a    
   currency but within a matter of weeks they came to the conclusion that this   
   was unworkable and decided that each country should launch its own currency.   
   This was accomplished with very little trouble:   
      
      
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    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)