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   EVIDENCE, GAINING INSIGHT; I-CHING: H13 - FELLOWSHIP, COMPANIONSHIP,   
   CONCORDING PEOPLE, FELLOWSHIP WITH MEN, GATHERING MEN; TETRA: 53 -   
   ETERNITY (YUNG) AS MARGIN IDEA #343 = #207 - rèn (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* +   
   #136 - zhāo (昭): *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S* *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first   
   (mathematical) class of antinomy, the falsity of the presupposition   
   consisted in the following: that something self-contradictory (namely,   
   appearance as a thing in itself) (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE   
   / [#60, #76] | #207 - qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65,   
   #66]) would be represented as being unifiable in a concept. But   
   regarding the second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the   
   falsity of the presupposition consists in this: that something that is   
   unifiable is represented as contradictory; consequently, while in the   
   first case both of the mutually opposing assertions were false, here on   
   the contrary the assertions, which are set in opposition to one another   
   through mere misunderstanding, can both be true.   
      
   Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes the   
   homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of magnitude), but   
   dynamical connection does not require this at all. If it is a question   
   of the magnitude of something extended, all parts must be homogeneous   
   among themselves and with the whole; in contrast, in the connection of   
   cause and effect homogeneity can indeed be found, but is not necessary;   
   for the concept of causality (whereby through one thing, something   
   completely different from it is posited) at least does not require it.   
      
   If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in   
   themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of things in   
   themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In the same way, if the   
   subject of freedom were represented, like the other objects, as a mere   
   appearance, contradiction could again not be avoided, for the same thing   
   would be simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same object in the   
   same sense. But if natural necessity is referred only to appearances and   
   freedom only to things in themselves, then no contradiction arises if   
   both kinds of causality are assumed or conceded equally, however   
   difficult or impossible it may be to make causality of the latter kind   
   conceivable.   
      
   Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that happens   
   in time; the effect must, in accordance with the universal law of   
   nature, be preceded by a determination of the causality of its cause (a   
   state of the cause), from which the effect follows in accordance with a   
   constant law. But this determination of the cause to causality must also   
   be something that occurs or takes place; the cause must have begun to   
   act, for otherwise no sequence in time could be thought between it and   
   the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the effect and the causality of the cause   
   would have always existed. Therefore the determination of the cause to   
   act must also have arisen among the appearances, and so it must, like   
   its effect, be an event, which again must have its cause, and so on, and   
   hence natural necessity must be the condition in accordance with which   
   efficient causes are determined. Should, by contrast, freedom be a   
   property of certain causes of appearances, then that freedom must, in   
   relation to the appearances as events, be a faculty of starting those   
   events from itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without the causality   
   of the cause itself having to begin, and hence without need for any   
   other ground to determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to its   
   causality, would not have to be subject to temporal determinations of   
   its state, i.e., would not have to be appearance at all, i.e., would   
   have to be taken for a thing in itself, and only the effects would have   
   to be taken for appearances.   
      
   NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation of the   
   *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the appearance, as   
   effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon matter, in consideration   
   of the unceasing activity by which it fills its space, even though this   
   activity occurs through an inner principle. We can just as little find   
   any concept of freedom to fit a purely intelligible being, e.g., God,   
   insofar as his action is immanent. For his action, although independent   
   of causes determining it from outside, nevertheless is determined in his   
   eternal reason, hence in the divine nature. Only if something should   
   begin through an action, hence the effect be found in the time series,   
   and so in the sensible world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does   
   the question arise of whether the causality of the cause must itself   
   also have a beginning, or whether the cause can originate an effect   
   without its causality itself having a beginning. In the first case the   
   concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity, in the   
   second of freedom. From this the reader will see that, since I have   
   explained freedom as the faculty to begin an event by oneself, I have   
   exactly hit that concept which is the problem of metaphysics.   
      
   If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances can be   
   thought without contradiction, then natural necessity will indeed attach   
   to every connection of cause and effect in the sensible world, and yet   
   that cause which is itself not an appearance (though it underlies   
   appearance) will still be entitled to freedom, and therefore nature and   
   freedom will be attributable without contradiction to the very same   
   thing, but in different respects, in the one case as appearance, in the   
   other as a thing in itself. We have in us a faculty that not only stands   
   in connection with its subjectively determining grounds, which are the   
   natural causes of its [IDEA #345] actions – and thus far is the faculty   
   of a being which itself belongs to appearances – but that also is   
   related to objective grounds that are mere ideas, insofar as these ideas   
   can determine this faculty, a connection that is expressed by ought.   
      
   This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are considering a being   
   (the human being) solely as regards this objectively determinable   
   reason, this being cannot be considered as a being of the senses;   
   rather, the aforesaid property is the property of a thing in itself, and   
   the possibility of that property – namely, how the ought, which has   
   never yet happened, can determine the activity of this being and can be   
   the cause of actions whose effect is an appearance in the sensible world   
   – we cannot comprehend at all. Yet the causality of reason with respect   
   to effects in the sensible world would nonetheless be freedom, insofar   
   as objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, are taken to be   
   determining with respect to that causality. For the action of that   
   causality would in that case not depend on any subjective, hence also   
   not on any temporal conditions, and would therefore also not depend on   
   the natural law that serves to determine those conditions, because   
   grounds of reason provide the rule for actions universally, from   
   principles, without influence from the circumstances of time or place.   
      
   What I adduce here counts only as an example, for intelligibility, and   
   does not belong necessarily to our question, which must be decided from   
   mere concepts independently of properties that we find in the actual world.   
      
   I can now say without contradiction: all actions of rational beings,   
      
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   --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05   
    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)