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   >> causes of appearances, then that freedom must, in relation to the   
   >> appearances as events, be a faculty of starting those events from   
   >> itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of the   
   >> cause itself having to begin, and hence without need for any other   
   >> ground to determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to its   
   >> causality, would not have to be subject to temporal determinations of   
   >> its state, i.e., would not have to be appearance at all, i.e., would   
   >> have to be taken for a thing in itself, and only the effects would   
   >> have to be taken for appearances.   
   >>   
   >> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation of the   
   >> *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the appearance, as   
   >> effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon matter, in   
   >> consideration of the unceasing activity by which it fills its space,   
   >> even though this activity occurs through an inner principle. We can   
   >> just as little find any concept of freedom to fit a purely   
   >> intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar as his action is immanent. For   
   >> his action, although independent of causes determining it from   
   >> outside, nevertheless is determined in his eternal reason, hence in   
   >> the divine nature. Only if something should begin through an action,   
   >> hence the effect be found in the time series, and so in the sensible   
   >> world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does the question arise of   
   >> whether the causality of the cause must itself also have a beginning,   
   >> or whether the cause can originate an effect without its causality   
   >> itself having a beginning. In the first case the concept of this   
   >> causality is a concept of natural necessity, in the second of freedom.   
   >> From this the reader will see that, since I have explained freedom as   
   >> the faculty to begin an event by oneself, I have exactly hit that   
   >> concept which is the problem of metaphysics.   
   >>   
   >> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances can be   
   >> thought without contradiction, then natural necessity will indeed   
   >> attach to every connection of cause and effect in the sensible world,   
   >> and yet that cause which is itself not an appearance (though it   
   >> underlies appearance) will still be entitled to freedom, and therefore   
   >> nature and freedom will be attributable without contradiction to the   
   >> very same thing, but in different respects, in the one case as   
   >> appearance, in the other as a thing in itself. We have in us a faculty   
   >> that not only stands in connection with its subjectively determining   
   >> grounds, which are the natural causes of its [IDEA #345] actions – and   
   >> thus far is the faculty of a being which itself belongs to appearances   
   >> – but that also is related to objective grounds that are mere ideas,   
   >> insofar as these ideas can determine this faculty, a connection that   
   >> is expressed by ought.   
   >>   
   >> This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are considering a   
   >> being (the human being) solely as regards this objectively   
   >> determinable reason, this being cannot be considered as a being of the   
   >> senses; rather, the aforesaid property is the property of a thing in   
   >> itself, and the possibility of that property – namely, how the ought,   
   >> which has never yet happened, can determine the activity of this being   
   >> and can be the cause of actions whose effect is an appearance in the   
   >> sensible world – we cannot comprehend at all. Yet the causality of   
   >> reason with respect to effects in the sensible world would nonetheless   
   >> be freedom, insofar as objective grounds, which are themselves ideas,   
   >> are taken to be determining with respect to that causality. For the   
   >> action of that causality would in that case not depend on any   
   >> subjective, hence also not on any temporal conditions, and would   
   >> therefore also not depend on the natural law that serves to determine   
   >> those conditions, because grounds of reason provide the rule for   
   >> actions universally, from principles, without influence from the   
   >> circumstances of time or place.   
   >>   
   >> What I adduce here counts only as an example, for intelligibility, and   
   >> does not belong necessarily to our question, which must be decided   
   >> from mere concepts independently of properties that we find in the   
   >> actual world.   
   >>   
   >> I can now say without contradiction: all actions of rational beings,   
   >> insofar as they are appearances (are encountered in some experience or   
   >> other), are subject to natural necessity; but the very same actions,   
   >> with respect only to the rational subject and its faculty of acting in   
   >> accordance with bare reason, are free. What, then, is required for   
   >> natural necessity? Nothing more than the determinability of every   
   >> event in the sensible world according to constant laws, and therefore   
   >> a relation to a cause within appearance; whereby the underlying thing   
   >> in itself and its causality remain unknown. But I say: the law of   
   >> nature remains, whether the rational being be a cause of effects in   
   >> the sensible world through reason and hence through freedom, or   
   >> whether that being does not determine such effects through rational   
   >> grounds. For if the first is the case, the action takes place   
   >> according to maxims whose effect within appearance will always conform   
   >> to constant laws; if the second is the case, and the action does not   
   >> take [IDEA #346] place according to principles of reason, then it is   
   >> subject to the empirical laws of sensibility, and in both cases the   
   >> effects are connected according to constant laws; but we require   
   >> nothing more for natural necessity, and indeed know nothing more of   
   >> it. In the first case, however, reason is the cause of these natural   
   >> laws and is therefore free, in the second case the effects flow   
   >> according to mere natural laws of sensibility, because reason   
   >> exercises no influence on them; but, because of this, reason is not   
   >> itself determined by sensibility (which is impossible), and it is   
   >> therefore also free in this case. Therefore freedom does not impede   
   >> the natural law of appearances, any more than this law interferes with   
   >> the freedom of the practical use of reason, a use that stands in   
   >> connection with things in themselves as determining grounds." [pages   
   >> 93-97]   
   >>   
   >> DOLF: "How is the notion of a civil society related to the inherent   
   >> human disposition of animus / anima and does such dynamic suggest   
   >> there is an ontic #22 - jié (çµ�): *FORMATIONAL* (circumscribed as   
   >> bounding) #135 - níng (å‡�): *CONGEALING* / [#56, #79] concept of   
   >> facilitated arbitration as #174 - CYBERNETIC SYSTEMIC /   
   >> ANTHROPOMORPHIC PRINCIPLE which when disordered possesses an   
   >> attenuated #152 / #174 - yí (ç–‘): *DEFICIENCY* / [#29, #61, #62, #22]   
   >> that may in a chronic ontological state be regarded as either   
   >> delinquency or reprobation?"   
   >>   
   >> CAN REFUSAL OF COMMUNION BY IRISH CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP PELL ON BOER WAR   
   >> MEMORIAL DAY / PENTECOST SUNDAY 31 MAY 1998 BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE   
   >> INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?   
   >>   
   >> Instances of the most serious international crimes, such as war   
   >> crimes, crimes of aggression, genocide and crime against humanity (eg:   
   >> RECLAIM THE #1827 - EUCHARIST / PENTECOST FROM å   
   � - SWASTIKA   
   >> OBSTRUCTION), can be brought before the International Criminal Court,   
   >> a permanent international tribunal. It was established by the ROME   
   >> STATUTE in 2002.   
   >>   
   >>    
   >>   
      
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