[continued from previous message]   
      
   >>>> - SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 - INNER   
   >>>> (內)) is also a vEVENT grounding relative to temporality which is   
   >>>> requisite for consciousness--appreciate I am making quite the   
   >>>> statement as postulate for further informal research.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> #67 #54 #47   
   >>>> #70 #68 #48   
   >>>> #03 #05 #07   
   >>>>   
   >>>> #1092 = [#364 - ENQUIRY, #312 - CONTRADICTION, #416 (#405 + #9 -   
   >>>> BRANCHING OUT) - ORTHOLOGY: #143 - ONTIC GROUNDING + #273 -   
   >>>> SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 - INNER (內))]   
   >>>>   
   >>>> IMMANUEL KANT PROLEGOMENA (1783) COMMENTARY ON SECTION #53 -   
   >>>> INCREASING EVIDENCE, GAINING INSIGHT; I-CHING: H13 - FELLOWSHIP,   
   >>>> COMPANIONSHIP, CONCORDING PEOPLE, FELLOWSHIP WITH MEN, GATHERING   
   >>>> MEN; TETRA: 53 - ETERNITY (YUNG) AS MARGIN IDEA #343 = #207 - rèn   
   >>>> (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* + #136 - zhāo (昭): *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S*   
   >>>> *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first (mathematical) class of antinomy, the   
   >>>> falsity of the presupposition consisted in the following: that   
   >>>> something self- contradictory (namely, appearance as a thing in   
   >>>> itself) (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207   
   >>>> - qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would be   
   >>>> represented as being unifiable in a concept. But regarding the   
   >>>> second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the falsity of the   
   >>>> presupposition consists in this: that something that is unifiable is   
   >>>> represented as contradictory; consequently, while in the first case   
   >>>> both of the mutually opposing assertions were false, here on the   
   >>>> contrary the assertions, which are set in opposition to one another   
   >>>> through mere misunderstanding, can both be true.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes the   
   >>>> homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of magnitude),   
   >>>> but dynamical connection does not require this at all. If it is a   
   >>>> question of the magnitude of something extended, all parts must be   
   >>>> homogeneous among themselves and with the whole; in contrast, in the   
   >>>> connection of cause and effect homogeneity can indeed be found, but   
   >>>> is not necessary; for the concept of causality (whereby through one   
   >>>> thing, something completely different from it is posited) at least   
   >>>> does not require it.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in   
   >>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of   
   >>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In the same   
   >>>> way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like the other   
   >>>> objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could again not be   
   >>>> avoided, for the same thing would be simultaneously affirmed and   
   >>>> denied of the same object in the same sense. But if natural   
   >>>> necessity is referred only to appearances and freedom only to things   
   >>>> in themselves, then no contradiction arises if both kinds of   
   >>>> causality are assumed or conceded equally, however difficult or   
   >>>> impossible it may be to make causality of the latter kind conceivable.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that   
   >>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the universal   
   >>>> law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the causality of   
   >>>> its cause (a state of the cause), from which the effect follows in   
   >>>> accordance with a constant law. But this determination of the cause   
   >>>> to causality must also be something that occurs or takes place; the   
   >>>> cause must have begun to act, for otherwise no sequence in time   
   >>>> could be thought between it and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the   
   >>>> effect and the causality of the cause would have always existed.   
   >>>> Therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have   
   >>>> arisen among the appearances, and so it must, like its effect, be an   
   >>>> event, which again must have its cause, and so on, and hence natural   
   >>>> necessity must be the condition in accordance with which efficient   
   >>>> causes are determined. Should, by contrast, freedom be a property of   
   >>>> certain causes of appearances, then that freedom must, in relation   
   >>>> to the appearances as events, be a faculty of starting those events   
   >>>> from itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of   
   >>>> the cause itself having to begin, and hence without need for any   
   >>>> other ground to determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to   
   >>>> its causality, would not have to be subject to temporal   
   >>>> determinations of its state, i.e., would not have to be appearance   
   >>>> at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a thing in itself, and only   
   >>>> the effects would have to be taken for appearances.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation of   
   >>>> the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the   
   >>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon   
   >>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it fills   
   >>>> its space, even though this activity occurs through an inner   
   >>>> principle. We can just as little find any concept of freedom to fit   
   >>>> a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar as his action is   
   >>>> immanent. For his action, although independent of causes determining   
   >>>> it from outside, nevertheless is determined in his eternal reason,   
   >>>> hence in the divine nature. Only if something should begin through   
   >>>> an action, hence the effect be found in the time series, and so in   
   >>>> the sensible world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does the   
   >>>> question arise of whether the causality of the cause must itself   
   >>>> also have a beginning, or whether the cause can originate an effect   
   >>>> without its causality itself having a beginning. In the first case   
   >>>> the concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity, in   
   >>>> the second of freedom. From this the reader will see that, since I   
   >>>> have explained freedom as the faculty to begin an event by oneself,   
   >>>> I have exactly hit that concept which is the problem of metaphysics.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances can   
   >>>> be thought without contradiction, then natural necessity will indeed   
   >>>> attach to every connection of cause and effect in the sensible   
   >>>> world, and yet that cause which is itself not an appearance (though   
   >>>> it underlies appearance) will still be entitled to freedom, and   
   >>>> therefore nature and freedom will be attributable without   
   >>>> contradiction to the very same thing, but in different respects, in   
   >>>> the one case as appearance, in the other as a thing in itself. We   
   >>>> have in us a faculty that not only stands in connection with its   
   >>>> subjectively determining grounds, which are the natural causes of   
   >>>> its [IDEA #345] actions – and thus far is the faculty of a being   
   >>>> which itself belongs to appearances – but that also is related to   
   >>>> objective grounds that are mere ideas, insofar as these ideas can   
   >>>> determine this faculty, a connection that is expressed by ought.   
   >>>>   
   >>>> This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are considering a   
   >>>> being (the human being) solely as regards this objectively   
   >>>> determinable reason, this being cannot be considered as a being of   
   >>>> the senses; rather, the aforesaid property is the property of a   
      
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