[continued from previous message]   
      
   >>>>> (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* + #136 - zhāo (昭): *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S*   
   >>>>> *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first (mathematical) class of antinomy, the   
   >>>>> falsity of the presupposition consisted in the following: that   
   >>>>> something self- contradictory (namely, appearance as a thing in   
   >>>>> itself) (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207   
   >>>>> - qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would be   
   >>>>> represented as being unifiable in a concept. But regarding the   
   >>>>> second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the falsity of the   
   >>>>> presupposition consists in this: that something that is unifiable   
   >>>>> is represented as contradictory; consequently, while in the first   
   >>>>> case both of the mutually opposing assertions were false, here on   
   >>>>> the contrary the assertions, which are set in opposition to one   
   >>>>> another through mere misunderstanding, can both be true.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes the   
   >>>>> homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of magnitude),   
   >>>>> but dynamical connection does not require this at all. If it is a   
   >>>>> question of the magnitude of something extended, all parts must be   
   >>>>> homogeneous among themselves and with the whole; in contrast, in   
   >>>>> the connection of cause and effect homogeneity can indeed be found,   
   >>>>> but is not necessary; for the concept of causality (whereby through   
   >>>>> one thing, something completely different from it is posited) at   
   >>>>> least does not require it.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in   
   >>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of   
   >>>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In the   
   >>>>> same way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like the   
   >>>>> other objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could again not   
   >>>>> be avoided, for the same thing would be simultaneously affirmed and   
   >>>>> denied of the same object in the same sense. But if natural   
   >>>>> necessity is referred only to appearances and freedom only to   
   >>>>> things in themselves, then no contradiction arises if both kinds of   
   >>>>> causality are assumed or conceded equally, however difficult or   
   >>>>> impossible it may be to make causality of the latter kind conceivable.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that   
   >>>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the universal   
   >>>>> law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the causality of   
   >>>>> its cause (a state of the cause), from which the effect follows in   
   >>>>> accordance with a constant law. But this determination of the cause   
   >>>>> to causality must also be something that occurs or takes place; the   
   >>>>> cause must have begun to act, for otherwise no sequence in time   
   >>>>> could be thought between it and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the   
   >>>>> effect and the causality of the cause would have always existed.   
   >>>>> Therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have   
   >>>>> arisen among the appearances, and so it must, like its effect, be   
   >>>>> an event, which again must have its cause, and so on, and hence   
   >>>>> natural necessity must be the condition in accordance with which   
   >>>>> efficient causes are determined. Should, by contrast, freedom be a   
   >>>>> property of certain causes of appearances, then that freedom must,   
   >>>>> in relation to the appearances as events, be a faculty of starting   
   >>>>> those events from itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without the   
   >>>>> causality of the cause itself having to begin, and hence without   
   >>>>> need for any other ground to determine its beginning. But then the   
   >>>>> cause, as to its causality, would not have to be subject to   
   >>>>> temporal determinations of its state, i.e., would not have to be   
   >>>>> appearance at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a thing in   
   >>>>> itself, and only the effects would have to be taken for appearances.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation of   
   >>>>> the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the   
   >>>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon   
   >>>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it   
   >>>>> fills its space, even though this activity occurs through an inner   
   >>>>> principle. We can just as little find any concept of freedom to fit   
   >>>>> a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar as his action is   
   >>>>> immanent. For his action, although independent of causes   
   >>>>> determining it from outside, nevertheless is determined in his   
   >>>>> eternal reason, hence in the divine nature. Only if something   
   >>>>> should begin through an action, hence the effect be found in the   
   >>>>> time series, and so in the sensible world (e.g., the beginning of   
   >>>>> the world), does the question arise of whether the causality of the   
   >>>>> cause must itself also have a beginning, or whether the cause can   
   >>>>> originate an effect without its causality itself having a   
   >>>>> beginning. In the first case the concept of this causality is a   
   >>>>> concept of natural necessity, in the second of freedom. From this   
   >>>>> the reader will see that, since I have explained freedom as the   
   >>>>> faculty to begin an event by oneself, I have exactly hit that   
   >>>>> concept which is the problem of metaphysics.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances can   
   >>>>> be thought without contradiction, then natural necessity will   
   >>>>> indeed attach to every connection of cause and effect in the   
   >>>>> sensible world, and yet that cause which is itself not an   
   >>>>> appearance (though it underlies appearance) will still be entitled   
   >>>>> to freedom, and therefore nature and freedom will be attributable   
   >>>>> without contradiction to the very same thing, but in different   
   >>>>> respects, in the one case as appearance, in the other as a thing in   
   >>>>> itself. We have in us a faculty that not only stands in connection   
   >>>>> with its subjectively determining grounds, which are the natural   
   >>>>> causes of its [IDEA #345] actions – and thus far is the faculty of   
   >>>>> a being which itself belongs to appearances – but that also is   
   >>>>> related to objective grounds that are mere ideas, insofar as these   
   >>>>> ideas can determine this faculty, a connection that is expressed by   
   >>>>> ought.   
   >>>>>   
   >>>>> This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are considering a   
   >>>>> being (the human being) solely as regards this objectively   
   >>>>> determinable reason, this being cannot be considered as a being of   
   >>>>> the senses; rather, the aforesaid property is the property of a   
   >>>>> thing in itself, and the possibility of that property – namely, how   
   >>>>> the ought, which has never yet happened, can determine the activity   
   >>>>> of this being and can be the cause of actions whose effect is an   
   >>>>> appearance in the sensible world – we cannot comprehend at all. Yet   
   >>>>> the causality of reason with respect to effects in the sensible   
   >>>>> world would nonetheless be freedom, insofar as objective grounds,   
   >>>>> which are themselves ideas, are taken to be determining with   
   >>>>> respect to that causality. For the action of that causality would   
   >>>>> in that case not depend on any subjective, hence also not on any   
   >>>>> temporal conditions, and would therefore also not depend on the   
      
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