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   >>>>>>> male:549&feme:396&ontic:177&deme:177&idea:549&run:Heuris   
   ic&grapple:77,78,79,7,16,15,14,5,6>   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> The TETRA #68 - DIMMING (瞢) as being contra jiàn zhēn (貞鑒)   
   >>>>>>> TRUE MIRROR which is herewith the autonomous delimiter could in   
   >>>>>>> my view operate as the LIMINAL  yin / yang (animus / anima)   
   >>>>>>> modulator of the hypotenuse #65 - DUAL PAIRING / {@2 - NATURE   
   >>>>>>> REJOICES IN ITS NATURE: #65 - NATURE REJOICES IN ITS NATURE} (ie.   
   >>>>>>> within the WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION is the #65 - SOLDIER /   
   >>>>>>> DODECAHEDRON).   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> By conveying the DUALISTIC GENDERED AND FLUID ASPECT OF AUTONOMY   
   >>>>>>> with our #174 - COEFFICIENT (median) PARADIGM we are challenging   
   >>>>>>> entrenched dogmatic assumptions.   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> Thus this DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM FUSION STASIS as #174 - CYBERNETIC   
   >>>>>>> SYSTEM / ANTHROPOMORPHIC PRINCIPLE which is the self focus of   
   >>>>>>> #273 - SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 -   
   >>>>>>> INNER (內)) is also a vEVENT grounding relative to temporality   
   >>>>>>> which is requisite for consciousness--appreciate I am making   
   >>>>>>> quite the statement as postulate for further informal research.   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> #67 #54 #47   
   >>>>>>> #70 #68 #48   
   >>>>>>> #03 #05 #07   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> #1092 = [#364 - ENQUIRY, #312 - CONTRADICTION, #416 (#405 + #9 -   
   >>>>>>> BRANCHING OUT) - ORTHOLOGY: #143 - ONTIC GROUNDING + #273 -   
   >>>>>>> SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 - INNER   
   >>>>>>> (內))]   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> IMMANUEL KANT PROLEGOMENA (1783) COMMENTARY ON SECTION #53 -   
   >>>>>>> INCREASING EVIDENCE, GAINING INSIGHT; I-CHING: H13 - FELLOWSHIP,   
   >>>>>>> COMPANIONSHIP, CONCORDING PEOPLE, FELLOWSHIP WITH MEN, GATHERING   
   >>>>>>> MEN; TETRA: 53 - ETERNITY (YUNG) AS MARGIN IDEA #343 = #207 - rèn   
   >>>>>>> (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* + #136 - zhāo (昭): *DISPLAY CLEARLY* /   
   >>>>>>> *SUN'S* *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first (mathematical) class of   
   >>>>>>> antinomy, the falsity of the presupposition consisted in the   
   >>>>>>> following: that something self- contradictory (namely, appearance   
   >>>>>>> as a thing in itself) (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE /   
   >>>>>>> [#60, #76] | #207 - qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45,   
   >>>>>>> #65, #66]) would be represented as being unifiable in a concept.   
   >>>>>>> But regarding the second, namely the dynamical, class of   
   >>>>>>> antinomy, the falsity of the presupposition consists in this:   
   >>>>>>> that something that is unifiable is represented as contradictory;   
   >>>>>>> consequently, while in the first case both of the mutually   
   >>>>>>> opposing assertions were false, here on the contrary the   
   >>>>>>> assertions, which are set in opposition to one another through   
   >>>>>>> mere misunderstanding, can both be true.   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes   
   >>>>>>> the homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of   
   >>>>>>> magnitude), but dynamical connection does not require this at   
   >>>>>>> all. If it is a question of the magnitude of something extended,   
   >>>>>>> all parts must be homogeneous among themselves and with the   
   >>>>>>> whole; in contrast, in the connection of cause and effect   
   >>>>>>> homogeneity can indeed be found, but is not necessary; for the   
   >>>>>>> concept of causality (whereby through one thing, something   
   >>>>>>> completely different from it is posited) at least does not   
   >>>>>>> require it.   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in   
   >>>>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of   
   >>>>>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In the   
   >>>>>>> same way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like the   
   >>>>>>> other objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could again   
   >>>>>>> not be avoided, for the same thing would be simultaneously   
   >>>>>>> affirmed and denied of the same object in the same sense. But if   
   >>>>>>> natural necessity is referred only to appearances and freedom   
   >>>>>>> only to things in themselves, then no contradiction arises if   
   >>>>>>> both kinds of causality are assumed or conceded equally, however   
   >>>>>>> difficult or impossible it may be to make causality of the latter   
   >>>>>>> kind conceivable.   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that   
   >>>>>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the   
   >>>>>>> universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the   
   >>>>>>> causality of its cause (a state of the cause), from which the   
   >>>>>>> effect follows in accordance with a constant law. But this   
   >>>>>>> determination of the cause to causality must also be something   
   >>>>>>> that occurs or takes place; the cause must have begun to act, for   
   >>>>>>> otherwise no sequence in time could be thought between it and the   
   >>>>>>> effect. [IDEA #344] Both the effect and the causality of the   
   >>>>>>> cause would have always existed. Therefore the determination of   
   >>>>>>> the cause to act must also have arisen among the appearances, and   
   >>>>>>> so it must, like its effect, be an event, which again must have   
   >>>>>>> its cause, and so on, and hence natural necessity must be the   
   >>>>>>> condition in accordance with which efficient causes are   
   >>>>>>> determined. Should, by contrast, freedom be a property of certain   
   >>>>>>> causes of appearances, then that freedom must, in relation to the   
   >>>>>>> appearances as events, be a faculty of starting those events from   
   >>>>>>> itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of the   
   >>>>>>> cause itself having to begin, and hence without need for any   
   >>>>>>> other ground to determine its beginning. But then the cause, as   
   >>>>>>> to its causality, would not have to be subject to temporal   
   >>>>>>> determinations of its state, i.e., would not have to be   
   >>>>>>> appearance at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a thing in   
   >>>>>>> itself, and only the effects would have to be taken for appearances.   
   >>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation of   
   >>>>>>> the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the   
   >>>>>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon   
   >>>>>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it   
   >>>>>>> fills its space, even though this activity occurs through an   
   >>>>>>> inner principle. We can just as little find any concept of   
   >>>>>>> freedom to fit a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar as   
   >>>>>>> his action is immanent. For his action, although independent of   
   >>>>>>> causes determining it from outside, nevertheless is determined in   
   >>>>>>> his eternal reason, hence in the divine nature. Only if something   
   >>>>>>> should begin through an action, hence the effect be found in the   
   >>>>>>> time series, and so in the sensible world (e.g., the beginning of   
   >>>>>>> the world), does the question arise of whether the causality of   
   >>>>>>> the cause must itself also have a beginning, or whether the cause   
   >>>>>>> can originate an effect without its causality itself having a   
   >>>>>>> beginning. In the first case the concept of this causality is a   
   >>>>>>> concept of natural necessity, in the second of freedom. From this   
   >>>>>>> the reader will see that, since I have explained freedom as the   
   >>>>>>> faculty to begin an event by oneself, I have exactly hit that   
   >>>>>>> concept which is the problem of metaphysics.   
   >>>>>>>   
      
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