[continued from previous message]   
      
   >>>>>>>>> *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S* *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first   
   >>>>>>>>> (mathematical) class of antinomy, the falsity of the   
   >>>>>>>>> presupposition consisted in the following: that something self-   
   >>>>>>>>> contradictory (namely, appearance as a thing in itself) (eg:   
   >>>>>>>>> #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207 - qù   
   >>>>>>>>> (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would be   
   >>>>>>>>> represented as being unifiable in a concept. But regarding the   
   >>>>>>>>> second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the falsity of   
   >>>>>>>>> the presupposition consists in this: that something that is   
   >>>>>>>>> unifiable is represented as contradictory; consequently, while   
   >>>>>>>>> in the first case both of the mutually opposing assertions were   
   >>>>>>>>> false, here on the contrary the assertions, which are set in   
   >>>>>>>>> opposition to one another through mere misunderstanding, can   
   >>>>>>>>> both be true.   
   >>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes   
   >>>>>>>>> the homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of   
   >>>>>>>>> magnitude), but dynamical connection does not require this at   
   >>>>>>>>> all. If it is a question of the magnitude of something   
   >>>>>>>>> extended, all parts must be homogeneous among themselves and   
   >>>>>>>>> with the whole; in contrast, in the connection of cause and   
   >>>>>>>>> effect homogeneity can indeed be found, but is not necessary;   
   >>>>>>>>> for the concept of causality (whereby through one thing,   
   >>>>>>>>> something completely different from it is posited) at least   
   >>>>>>>>> does not require it.   
   >>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in   
   >>>>>>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of   
   >>>>>>>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In the   
   >>>>>>>>> same way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like the   
   >>>>>>>>> other objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could again   
   >>>>>>>>> not be avoided, for the same thing would be simultaneously   
   >>>>>>>>> affirmed and denied of the same object in the same sense. But   
   >>>>>>>>> if natural necessity is referred only to appearances and   
   >>>>>>>>> freedom only to things in themselves, then no contradiction   
   >>>>>>>>> arises if both kinds of causality are assumed or conceded   
   >>>>>>>>> equally, however difficult or impossible it may be to make   
   >>>>>>>>> causality of the latter kind conceivable.   
   >>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that   
   >>>>>>>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the   
   >>>>>>>>> universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the   
   >>>>>>>>> causality of its cause (a state of the cause), from which the   
   >>>>>>>>> effect follows in accordance with a constant law. But this   
   >>>>>>>>> determination of the cause to causality must also be something   
   >>>>>>>>> that occurs or takes place; the cause must have begun to act,   
   >>>>>>>>> for otherwise no sequence in time could be thought between it   
   >>>>>>>>> and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the effect and the causality   
   >>>>>>>>> of the cause would have always existed. Therefore the   
   >>>>>>>>> determination of the cause to act must also have arisen among   
   >>>>>>>>> the appearances, and so it must, like its effect, be an event,   
   >>>>>>>>> which again must have its cause, and so on, and hence natural   
   >>>>>>>>> necessity must be the condition in accordance with which   
   >>>>>>>>> efficient causes are determined. Should, by contrast, freedom   
   >>>>>>>>> be a property of certain causes of appearances, then that   
   >>>>>>>>> freedom must, in relation to the appearances as events, be a   
   >>>>>>>>> faculty of starting those events from itself (sponte -   
   >>>>>>>>> spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of the cause itself   
   >>>>>>>>> having to begin, and hence without need for any other ground to   
   >>>>>>>>> determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to its   
   >>>>>>>>> causality, would not have to be subject to temporal   
   >>>>>>>>> determinations of its state, i.e., would not have to be   
   >>>>>>>>> appearance at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a thing in   
   >>>>>>>>> itself, and only the effects would have to be taken for   
   >>>>>>>>> appearances.   
   >>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation   
   >>>>>>>>> of the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the   
   >>>>>>>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon   
   >>>>>>>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it   
   >>>>>>>>> fills its space, even though this activity occurs through an   
   >>>>>>>>> inner principle. We can just as little find any concept of   
   >>>>>>>>> freedom to fit a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar   
   >>>>>>>>> as his action is immanent. For his action, although independent   
   >>>>>>>>> of causes determining it from outside, nevertheless is   
   >>>>>>>>> determined in his eternal reason, hence in the divine nature.   
   >>>>>>>>> Only if something should begin through an action, hence the   
   >>>>>>>>> effect be found in the time series, and so in the sensible   
   >>>>>>>>> world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does the question   
   >>>>>>>>> arise of whether the causality of the cause must itself also   
   >>>>>>>>> have a beginning, or whether the cause can originate an effect   
   >>>>>>>>> without its causality itself having a beginning. In the first   
   >>>>>>>>> case the concept of this causality is a concept of natural   
   >>>>>>>>> necessity, in the second of freedom. From this the reader will   
   >>>>>>>>> see that, since I have explained freedom as the faculty to   
   >>>>>>>>> begin an event by oneself, I have exactly hit that concept   
   >>>>>>>>> which is the problem of metaphysics.   
   >>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances   
   >>>>>>>>> can be thought without contradiction, then natural necessity   
   >>>>>>>>> will indeed attach to every connection of cause and effect in   
   >>>>>>>>> the sensible world, and yet that cause which is itself not an   
   >>>>>>>>> appearance (though it underlies appearance) will still be   
   >>>>>>>>> entitled to freedom, and therefore nature and freedom will be   
   >>>>>>>>> attributable without contradiction to the very same thing, but   
   >>>>>>>>> in different respects, in the one case as appearance, in the   
   >>>>>>>>> other as a thing in itself. We have in us a faculty that not   
   >>>>>>>>> only stands in connection with its subjectively determining   
   >>>>>>>>> grounds, which are the natural causes of its [IDEA #345]   
   >>>>>>>>> actions – and thus far is the faculty of a being which itself   
   >>>>>>>>> belongs to appearances – but that also is related to objective   
   >>>>>>>>> grounds that are mere ideas, insofar as these ideas can   
   >>>>>>>>> determine this faculty, a connection that is expressed by ought.   
   >>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>> This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are   
   >>>>>>>>> considering a being (the human being) solely as regards this   
   >>>>>>>>> objectively determinable reason, this being cannot be   
   >>>>>>>>> considered as a being of the senses; rather, the aforesaid   
   >>>>>>>>> property is the property of a thing in itself, and the   
   >>>>>>>>> possibility of that property – namely, how the ought, which has   
   >>>>>>>>> never yet happened, can determine the activity of this being   
   >>>>>>>>> and can be the cause of actions whose effect is an appearance   
      
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    * Origin: you cannot sedate... all the things you hate (1:229/2)