[continued from previous message]   
      
   >>>>>>>> #273 - SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 -   
   >>>>>>>> INNER (內)) is also a vEVENT grounding relative to temporality   
   >>>>>>>> which is requisite for consciousness--appreciate I am making   
   >>>>>>>> quite the statement as postulate for further informal research.   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> #67 #54 #47   
   >>>>>>>> #70 #68 #48   
   >>>>>>>> #03 #05 #07   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> #1092 = [#364 - ENQUIRY, #312 - CONTRADICTION, #416 (#405 + #9 -   
   >>>>>>>> BRANCHING OUT) - ORTHOLOGY: #143 - ONTIC GROUNDING + #273 -   
   >>>>>>>> SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 - INNER   
   >>>>>>>> (內))]   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> IMMANUEL KANT PROLEGOMENA (1783) COMMENTARY ON SECTION #53 -   
   >>>>>>>> INCREASING EVIDENCE, GAINING INSIGHT; I-CHING: H13 - FELLOWSHIP,   
   >>>>>>>> COMPANIONSHIP, CONCORDING PEOPLE, FELLOWSHIP WITH MEN, GATHERING   
   >>>>>>>> MEN; TETRA: 53 - ETERNITY (YUNG) AS MARGIN IDEA #343 = #207 -   
   >>>>>>>> rèn (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* + #136 - zhāo (昭): *DISPLAY CLEARLY* /   
   >>>>>>>> *SUN'S* *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first (mathematical) class of   
   >>>>>>>> antinomy, the falsity of the presupposition consisted in the   
   >>>>>>>> following: that something self- contradictory (namely,   
   >>>>>>>> appearance as a thing in itself) (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL   
   >>>>>>>> APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207 - qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE   
   >>>>>>>> UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would be represented as being   
   >>>>>>>> unifiable in a concept. But regarding the second, namely the   
   >>>>>>>> dynamical, class of antinomy, the falsity of the presupposition   
   >>>>>>>> consists in this: that something that is unifiable is   
   >>>>>>>> represented as contradictory; consequently, while in the first   
   >>>>>>>> case both of the mutually opposing assertions were false, here   
   >>>>>>>> on the contrary the assertions, which are set in opposition to   
   >>>>>>>> one another through mere misunderstanding, can both be true.   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes   
   >>>>>>>> the homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of   
   >>>>>>>> magnitude), but dynamical connection does not require this at   
   >>>>>>>> all. If it is a question of the magnitude of something extended,   
   >>>>>>>> all parts must be homogeneous among themselves and with the   
   >>>>>>>> whole; in contrast, in the connection of cause and effect   
   >>>>>>>> homogeneity can indeed be found, but is not necessary; for the   
   >>>>>>>> concept of causality (whereby through one thing, something   
   >>>>>>>> completely different from it is posited) at least does not   
   >>>>>>>> require it.   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in   
   >>>>>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of   
   >>>>>>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In the   
   >>>>>>>> same way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like the   
   >>>>>>>> other objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could again   
   >>>>>>>> not be avoided, for the same thing would be simultaneously   
   >>>>>>>> affirmed and denied of the same object in the same sense. But if   
   >>>>>>>> natural necessity is referred only to appearances and freedom   
   >>>>>>>> only to things in themselves, then no contradiction arises if   
   >>>>>>>> both kinds of causality are assumed or conceded equally, however   
   >>>>>>>> difficult or impossible it may be to make causality of the   
   >>>>>>>> latter kind conceivable.   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that   
   >>>>>>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the   
   >>>>>>>> universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the   
   >>>>>>>> causality of its cause (a state of the cause), from which the   
   >>>>>>>> effect follows in accordance with a constant law. But this   
   >>>>>>>> determination of the cause to causality must also be something   
   >>>>>>>> that occurs or takes place; the cause must have begun to act,   
   >>>>>>>> for otherwise no sequence in time could be thought between it   
   >>>>>>>> and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the effect and the causality of   
   >>>>>>>> the cause would have always existed. Therefore the determination   
   >>>>>>>> of the cause to act must also have arisen among the appearances,   
   >>>>>>>> and so it must, like its effect, be an event, which again must   
   >>>>>>>> have its cause, and so on, and hence natural necessity must be   
   >>>>>>>> the condition in accordance with which efficient causes are   
   >>>>>>>> determined. Should, by contrast, freedom be a property of   
   >>>>>>>> certain causes of appearances, then that freedom must, in   
   >>>>>>>> relation to the appearances as events, be a faculty of starting   
   >>>>>>>> those events from itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without   
   >>>>>>>> the causality of the cause itself having to begin, and hence   
   >>>>>>>> without need for any other ground to determine its beginning.   
   >>>>>>>> But then the cause, as to its causality, would not have to be   
   >>>>>>>> subject to temporal determinations of its state, i.e., would not   
   >>>>>>>> have to be appearance at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a   
   >>>>>>>> thing in itself, and only the effects would have to be taken for   
   >>>>>>>> appearances.   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation   
   >>>>>>>> of the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the   
   >>>>>>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon   
   >>>>>>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it   
   >>>>>>>> fills its space, even though this activity occurs through an   
   >>>>>>>> inner principle. We can just as little find any concept of   
   >>>>>>>> freedom to fit a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar   
   >>>>>>>> as his action is immanent. For his action, although independent   
   >>>>>>>> of causes determining it from outside, nevertheless is   
   >>>>>>>> determined in his eternal reason, hence in the divine nature.   
   >>>>>>>> Only if something should begin through an action, hence the   
   >>>>>>>> effect be found in the time series, and so in the sensible world   
   >>>>>>>> (e.g., the beginning of the world), does the question arise of   
   >>>>>>>> whether the causality of the cause must itself also have a   
   >>>>>>>> beginning, or whether the cause can originate an effect without   
   >>>>>>>> its causality itself having a beginning. In the first case the   
   >>>>>>>> concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity, in   
   >>>>>>>> the second of freedom. From this the reader will see that, since   
   >>>>>>>> I have explained freedom as the faculty to begin an event by   
   >>>>>>>> oneself, I have exactly hit that concept which is the problem of   
   >>>>>>>> metaphysics.   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on appearances   
   >>>>>>>> can be thought without contradiction, then natural necessity   
   >>>>>>>> will indeed attach to every connection of cause and effect in   
   >>>>>>>> the sensible world, and yet that cause which is itself not an   
   >>>>>>>> appearance (though it underlies appearance) will still be   
   >>>>>>>> entitled to freedom, and therefore nature and freedom will be   
   >>>>>>>> attributable without contradiction to the very same thing, but   
   >>>>>>>> in different respects, in the one case as appearance, in the   
   >>>>>>>> other as a thing in itself. We have in us a faculty that not   
   >>>>>>>> only stands in connection with its subjectively determining   
   >>>>>>>> grounds, which are the natural causes of its [IDEA #345] actions   
      
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