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   >>>>>>>>>> relative to temporality which is requisite for consciousness--   
   >>>>>>>>>> appreciate I am making quite the statement as postulate for   
   >>>>>>>>>> further informal research.   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> #67 #54 #47   
   >>>>>>>>>> #70 #68 #48   
   >>>>>>>>>> #03 #05 #07   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> #1092 = [#364 - ENQUIRY, #312 - CONTRADICTION, #416 (#405 + #9   
   >>>>>>>>>> - BRANCHING OUT) - ORTHOLOGY: #143 - ONTIC GROUNDING + #273 -   
   >>>>>>>>>> SYNCRETIC PROGRESSION (#208 - EVALUATE / EXPRESS + #65 - INNER   
   >>>>>>>>>> (內))]   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> IMMANUEL KANT PROLEGOMENA (1783) COMMENTARY ON SECTION #53 -   
   >>>>>>>>>> INCREASING EVIDENCE, GAINING INSIGHT; I-CHING: H13 -   
   >>>>>>>>>> FELLOWSHIP, COMPANIONSHIP, CONCORDING PEOPLE, FELLOWSHIP WITH   
   >>>>>>>>>> MEN, GATHERING MEN; TETRA: 53 - ETERNITY (YUNG) AS MARGIN IDEA   
   >>>>>>>>>> #343 = #207 - rèn (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* + #136 - zhāo (昭):   
   >>>>>>>>>> *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S* *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first   
   >>>>>>>>>> (mathematical) class of antinomy, the falsity of the   
   >>>>>>>>>> presupposition consisted in the following: that something   
   >>>>>>>>>> self- contradictory (namely, appearance as a thing in itself)   
   >>>>>>>>>> (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207 -   
   >>>>>>>>>> qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would   
   >>>>>>>>>> be represented as being unifiable in a concept. But regarding   
   >>>>>>>>>> the second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the   
   >>>>>>>>>> falsity of the presupposition consists in this: that something   
   >>>>>>>>>> that is unifiable is represented as contradictory;   
   >>>>>>>>>> consequently, while in the first case both of the mutually   
   >>>>>>>>>> opposing assertions were false, here on the contrary the   
   >>>>>>>>>> assertions, which are set in opposition to one another through   
   >>>>>>>>>> mere misunderstanding, can both be true.   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily presupposes   
   >>>>>>>>>> the homogeneity of the things combined (in the concept of   
   >>>>>>>>>> magnitude), but dynamical connection does not require this at   
   >>>>>>>>>> all. If it is a question of the magnitude of something   
   >>>>>>>>>> extended, all parts must be homogeneous among themselves and   
   >>>>>>>>>> with the whole; in contrast, in the connection of cause and   
   >>>>>>>>>> effect homogeneity can indeed be found, but is not necessary;   
   >>>>>>>>>> for the concept of causality (whereby through one thing,   
   >>>>>>>>>> something completely different from it is posited) at least   
   >>>>>>>>>> does not require it.   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in   
   >>>>>>>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws of   
   >>>>>>>>>> things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable. In   
   >>>>>>>>>> the same way, if the subject of freedom were represented, like   
   >>>>>>>>>> the other objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction could   
   >>>>>>>>>> again not be avoided, for the same thing would be   
   >>>>>>>>>> simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same object in the   
   >>>>>>>>>> same sense. But if natural necessity is referred only to   
   >>>>>>>>>> appearances and freedom only to things in themselves, then no   
   >>>>>>>>>> contradiction arises if both kinds of causality are assumed or   
   >>>>>>>>>> conceded equally, however difficult or impossible it may be to   
   >>>>>>>>>> make causality of the latter kind conceivable.   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something that   
   >>>>>>>>>> happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the   
   >>>>>>>>>> universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the   
   >>>>>>>>>> causality of its cause (a state of the cause), from which the   
   >>>>>>>>>> effect follows in accordance with a constant law. But this   
   >>>>>>>>>> determination of the cause to causality must also be something   
   >>>>>>>>>> that occurs or takes place; the cause must have begun to act,   
   >>>>>>>>>> for otherwise no sequence in time could be thought between it   
   >>>>>>>>>> and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the effect and the causality   
   >>>>>>>>>> of the cause would have always existed. Therefore the   
   >>>>>>>>>> determination of the cause to act must also have arisen among   
   >>>>>>>>>> the appearances, and so it must, like its effect, be an event,   
   >>>>>>>>>> which again must have its cause, and so on, and hence natural   
   >>>>>>>>>> necessity must be the condition in accordance with which   
   >>>>>>>>>> efficient causes are determined. Should, by contrast, freedom   
   >>>>>>>>>> be a property of certain causes of appearances, then that   
   >>>>>>>>>> freedom must, in relation to the appearances as events, be a   
   >>>>>>>>>> faculty of starting those events from itself (sponte -   
   >>>>>>>>>> spontaneous), i.e., without the causality of the cause itself   
   >>>>>>>>>> having to begin, and hence without need for any other ground   
   >>>>>>>>>> to determine its beginning. But then the cause, as to its   
   >>>>>>>>>> causality, would not have to be subject to temporal   
   >>>>>>>>>> determinations of its state, i.e., would not have to be   
   >>>>>>>>>> appearance at all, i.e., would have to be taken for a thing in   
   >>>>>>>>>> itself, and only the effects would have to be taken for   
   >>>>>>>>>> appearances.   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the relation   
   >>>>>>>>>> of the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as cause, to the   
   >>>>>>>>>> appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot bestow freedom upon   
   >>>>>>>>>> matter, in consideration of the unceasing activity by which it   
   >>>>>>>>>> fills its space, even though this activity occurs through an   
   >>>>>>>>>> inner principle. We can just as little find any concept of   
   >>>>>>>>>> freedom to fit a purely intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar   
   >>>>>>>>>> as his action is immanent. For his action, although   
   >>>>>>>>>> independent of causes determining it from outside,   
   >>>>>>>>>> nevertheless is determined in his eternal reason, hence in the   
   >>>>>>>>>> divine nature. Only if something should begin through an   
   >>>>>>>>>> action, hence the effect be found in the time series, and so   
   >>>>>>>>>> in the sensible world (e.g., the beginning of the world), does   
   >>>>>>>>>> the question arise of whether the causality of the cause must   
   >>>>>>>>>> itself also have a beginning, or whether the cause can   
   >>>>>>>>>> originate an effect without its causality itself having a   
   >>>>>>>>>> beginning. In the first case the concept of this causality is   
   >>>>>>>>>> a concept of natural necessity, in the second of freedom. From   
   >>>>>>>>>> this the reader will see that, since I have explained freedom   
   >>>>>>>>>> as the faculty to begin an event by oneself, I have exactly   
   >>>>>>>>>> hit that concept which is the problem of metaphysics.   
   >>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on   
   >>>>>>>>>> appearances can be thought without contradiction, then natural   
   >>>>>>>>>> necessity will indeed attach to every connection of cause and   
   >>>>>>>>>> effect in the sensible world, and yet that cause which is   
   >>>>>>>>>> itself not an appearance (though it underlies appearance) will   
   >>>>>>>>>> still be entitled to freedom, and therefore nature and freedom   
   >>>>>>>>>> will be attributable without contradiction to the very same   
   >>>>>>>>>> thing, but in different respects, in the one case as   
   >>>>>>>>>> appearance, in the other as a thing in itself. We have in us a   
   >>>>>>>>>> faculty that not only stands in connection with its   
      
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