[continued from previous message]   
      
   >>>>>>>>>>> MEN, GATHERING MEN; TETRA: 53 - ETERNITY (YUNG) AS MARGIN   
   >>>>>>>>>>> IDEA #343 = #207 - rèn (軔): *TO* *BRAKE* + #136 - zhāo (昭):   
   >>>>>>>>>>> *DISPLAY CLEARLY* / *SUN'S* *BRIGHTNESS*: "In the first   
   >>>>>>>>>>> (mathematical) class of antinomy, the falsity of the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> presupposition consisted in the following: that something   
   >>>>>>>>>>> self- contradictory (namely, appearance as a thing in itself)   
   >>>>>>>>>>> (eg: #136 - yán (顔): FACIAL APPEARANCE / [#60, #76] | #207 -   
   >>>>>>>>>>> qù (去): TO ABANDON; TO GIVE UP / [#31, #45, #65, #66]) would   
   >>>>>>>>>>> be represented as being unifiable in a concept. But regarding   
   >>>>>>>>>>> the second, namely the dynamical, class of antinomy, the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> falsity of the presupposition consists in this: that   
   >>>>>>>>>>> something that is unifiable is represented as contradictory;   
   >>>>>>>>>>> consequently, while in the first case both of the mutually   
   >>>>>>>>>>> opposing assertions were false, here on the contrary the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> assertions, which are set in opposition to one another   
   >>>>>>>>>>> through mere misunderstanding, can both be true.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> Specifically, mathematical combination necessarily   
   >>>>>>>>>>> presupposes the homogeneity of the things combined (in the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> concept of magnitude), but dynamical connection does not   
   >>>>>>>>>>> require this at all. If it is a question of the magnitude of   
   >>>>>>>>>>> something extended, all parts must be homogeneous among   
   >>>>>>>>>>> themselves and with the whole; in contrast, in the connection   
   >>>>>>>>>>> of cause and effect homogeneity can indeed be found, but is   
   >>>>>>>>>>> not necessary; for the concept of causality (whereby through   
   >>>>>>>>>>> one thing, something completely different from it is posited)   
   >>>>>>>>>>> at least does not require it.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> If the objects of the sensible world were taken for things in   
   >>>>>>>>>>> themselves, and the previously stated natural laws for laws   
   >>>>>>>>>>> of things in themselves, contradiction would be inevitable.   
   >>>>>>>>>>> In the same way, if the subject of freedom were represented,   
   >>>>>>>>>>> like the other objects, as a mere appearance, contradiction   
   >>>>>>>>>>> could again not be avoided, for the same thing would be   
   >>>>>>>>>>> simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same object in the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> same sense. But if natural necessity is referred only to   
   >>>>>>>>>>> appearances and freedom only to things in themselves, then no   
   >>>>>>>>>>> contradiction arises if both kinds of causality are assumed   
   >>>>>>>>>>> or conceded equally, however difficult or impossible it may   
   >>>>>>>>>>> be to make causality of the latter kind conceivable.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> Within appearance, every effect is an event, or something   
   >>>>>>>>>>> that happens in time; the effect must, in accordance with the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of   
   >>>>>>>>>>> the causality of its cause (a state of the cause), from which   
   >>>>>>>>>>> the effect follows in accordance with a constant law. But   
   >>>>>>>>>>> this determination of the cause to causality must also be   
   >>>>>>>>>>> something that occurs or takes place; the cause must have   
   >>>>>>>>>>> begun to act, for otherwise no sequence in time could be   
   >>>>>>>>>>> thought between it and the effect. [IDEA #344] Both the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> effect and the causality of the cause would have always   
   >>>>>>>>>>> existed. Therefore the determination of the cause to act must   
   >>>>>>>>>>> also have arisen among the appearances, and so it must, like   
   >>>>>>>>>>> its effect, be an event, which again must have its cause, and   
   >>>>>>>>>>> so on, and hence natural necessity must be the condition in   
   >>>>>>>>>>> accordance with which efficient causes are determined.   
   >>>>>>>>>>> Should, by contrast, freedom be a property of certain causes   
   >>>>>>>>>>> of appearances, then that freedom must, in relation to the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> appearances as events, be a faculty of starting those events   
   >>>>>>>>>>> from itself (sponte - spontaneous), i.e., without the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> causality of the cause itself having to begin, and hence   
   >>>>>>>>>>> without need for any other ground to determine its beginning.   
   >>>>>>>>>>> But then the cause, as to its causality, would not have to be   
   >>>>>>>>>>> subject to temporal determinations of its state, i.e., would   
   >>>>>>>>>>> not have to be appearance at all, i.e., would have to be   
   >>>>>>>>>>> taken for a thing in itself, and only the effects would have   
   >>>>>>>>>>> to be taken for appearances.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> NOTE: The idea of freedom has its place solely in the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> relation of the *INTELLECTUAL* (des Intellektuellen), as   
   >>>>>>>>>>> cause, to the appearance, as effect. Therefore we cannot   
   >>>>>>>>>>> bestow freedom upon matter, in consideration of the unceasing   
   >>>>>>>>>>> activity by which it fills its space, even though this   
   >>>>>>>>>>> activity occurs through an inner principle. We can just as   
   >>>>>>>>>>> little find any concept of freedom to fit a purely   
   >>>>>>>>>>> intelligible being, e.g., God, insofar as his action is   
   >>>>>>>>>>> immanent. For his action, although independent of causes   
   >>>>>>>>>>> determining it from outside, nevertheless is determined in   
   >>>>>>>>>>> his eternal reason, hence in the divine nature. Only if   
   >>>>>>>>>>> something should begin through an action, hence the effect be   
   >>>>>>>>>>> found in the time series, and so in the sensible world (e.g.,   
   >>>>>>>>>>> the beginning of the world), does the question arise of   
   >>>>>>>>>>> whether the causality of the cause must itself also have a   
   >>>>>>>>>>> beginning, or whether the cause can originate an effect   
   >>>>>>>>>>> without its causality itself having a beginning. In the first   
   >>>>>>>>>>> case the concept of this causality is a concept of natural   
   >>>>>>>>>>> necessity, in the second of freedom. From this the reader   
   >>>>>>>>>>> will see that, since I have explained freedom as the faculty   
   >>>>>>>>>>> to begin an event by oneself, I have exactly hit that concept   
   >>>>>>>>>>> which is the problem of metaphysics.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on   
   >>>>>>>>>>> appearances can be thought without contradiction, then   
   >>>>>>>>>>> natural necessity will indeed attach to every connection of   
   >>>>>>>>>>> cause and effect in the sensible world, and yet that cause   
   >>>>>>>>>>> which is itself not an appearance (though it underlies   
   >>>>>>>>>>> appearance) will still be entitled to freedom, and therefore   
   >>>>>>>>>>> nature and freedom will be attributable without contradiction   
   >>>>>>>>>>> to the very same thing, but in different respects, in the one   
   >>>>>>>>>>> case as appearance, in the other as a thing in itself. We   
   >>>>>>>>>>> have in us a faculty that not only stands in connection with   
   >>>>>>>>>>> its subjectively determining grounds, which are the natural   
   >>>>>>>>>>> causes of its [IDEA #345] actions – and thus far is the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> faculty of a being which itself belongs to appearances – but   
   >>>>>>>>>>> that also is related to objective grounds that are mere   
   >>>>>>>>>>> ideas, insofar as these ideas can determine this faculty, a   
   >>>>>>>>>>> connection that is expressed by ought.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are   
   >>>>>>>>>>> considering a being (the human being) solely as regards this   
   >>>>>>>>>>> objectively determinable reason, this being cannot be   
      
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