[continued from previous message]   
      
   >>>>>>>>>>> whether the causality of the cause must itself also have a   
   >>>>>>>>>>> beginning, or whether the cause can originate an effect   
   >>>>>>>>>>> without its causality itself having a beginning. In the first   
   >>>>>>>>>>> case the concept of this causality is a concept of natural   
   >>>>>>>>>>> necessity, in the second of freedom. From this the reader   
   >>>>>>>>>>> will see that, since I have explained freedom as the faculty   
   >>>>>>>>>>> to begin an event by oneself, I have exactly hit that concept   
   >>>>>>>>>>> which is the problem of metaphysics.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> If this sort of influence of intelligible beings on   
   >>>>>>>>>>> appearances can be thought without contradiction, then   
   >>>>>>>>>>> natural necessity will indeed attach to every connection of   
   >>>>>>>>>>> cause and effect in the sensible world, and yet that cause   
   >>>>>>>>>>> which is itself not an appearance (though it underlies   
   >>>>>>>>>>> appearance) will still be entitled to freedom, and therefore   
   >>>>>>>>>>> nature and freedom will be attributable without contradiction   
   >>>>>>>>>>> to the very same thing, but in different respects, in the one   
   >>>>>>>>>>> case as appearance, in the other as a thing in itself. We   
   >>>>>>>>>>> have in us a faculty that not only stands in connection with   
   >>>>>>>>>>> its subjectively determining grounds, which are the natural   
   >>>>>>>>>>> causes of its [IDEA #345] actions – and thus far is the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> faculty of a being which itself belongs to appearances – but   
   >>>>>>>>>>> that also is related to objective grounds that are mere   
   >>>>>>>>>>> ideas, insofar as these ideas can determine this faculty, a   
   >>>>>>>>>>> connection that is expressed by ought.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> This faculty is called reason, and insofar as we are   
   >>>>>>>>>>> considering a being (the human being) solely as regards this   
   >>>>>>>>>>> objectively determinable reason, this being cannot be   
   >>>>>>>>>>> considered as a being of the senses; rather, the aforesaid   
   >>>>>>>>>>> property is the property of a thing in itself, and the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> possibility of that property – namely, how the ought, which   
   >>>>>>>>>>> has never yet happened, can determine the activity of this   
   >>>>>>>>>>> being and can be the cause of actions whose effect is an   
   >>>>>>>>>>> appearance in the sensible world – we cannot comprehend at   
   >>>>>>>>>>> all. Yet the causality of reason with respect to effects in   
   >>>>>>>>>>> the sensible world would nonetheless be freedom, insofar as   
   >>>>>>>>>>> objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, are taken to   
   >>>>>>>>>>> be determining with respect to that causality. For the action   
   >>>>>>>>>>> of that causality would in that case not depend on any   
   >>>>>>>>>>> subjective, hence also not on any temporal conditions, and   
   >>>>>>>>>>> would therefore also not depend on the natural law that   
   >>>>>>>>>>> serves to determine those conditions, because grounds of   
   >>>>>>>>>>> reason provide the rule for actions universally, from   
   >>>>>>>>>>> principles, without influence from the circumstances of time   
   >>>>>>>>>>> or place.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> What I adduce here counts only as an example, for   
   >>>>>>>>>>> intelligibility, and does not belong necessarily to our   
   >>>>>>>>>>> question, which must be decided from mere concepts   
   >>>>>>>>>>> independently of properties that we find in the actual world.   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> I can now say without contradiction: all actions of rational   
   >>>>>>>>>>> beings, insofar as they are appearances (are encountered in   
   >>>>>>>>>>> some experience or other), are subject to natural necessity;   
   >>>>>>>>>>> but the very same actions, with respect only to the rational   
   >>>>>>>>>>> subject and its faculty of acting in accordance with bare   
   >>>>>>>>>>> reason, are free. What, then, is required for natural   
   >>>>>>>>>>> necessity? Nothing more than the determinability of every   
   >>>>>>>>>>> event in the sensible world according to constant laws, and   
   >>>>>>>>>>> therefore a relation to a cause within appearance; whereby   
   >>>>>>>>>>> the underlying thing in itself and its causality remain   
   >>>>>>>>>>> unknown. But I say: the law of nature remains, whether the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> rational being be a cause of effects in the sensible world   
   >>>>>>>>>>> through reason and hence through freedom, or whether that   
   >>>>>>>>>>> being does not determine such effects through rational   
   >>>>>>>>>>> grounds. For if the first is the case, the action takes place   
   >>>>>>>>>>> according to maxims whose effect within appearance will   
   >>>>>>>>>>> always conform to constant laws; if the second is the case,   
   >>>>>>>>>>> and the action does not take [IDEA #346] place according to   
   >>>>>>>>>>> principles of reason, then it is subject to the empirical   
   >>>>>>>>>>> laws of sensibility, and in both cases the effects are   
   >>>>>>>>>>> connected according to constant laws; but we require nothing   
   >>>>>>>>>>> more for natural necessity, and indeed know nothing more of   
   >>>>>>>>>>> it. In the first case, however, reason is the cause of these   
   >>>>>>>>>>> natural laws and is therefore free, in the second case the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> effects flow according to mere natural laws of sensibility,   
   >>>>>>>>>>> because reason exercises no influence on them; but, because   
   >>>>>>>>>>> of this, reason is not itself determined by sensibility   
   >>>>>>>>>>> (which is impossible), and it is therefore also free in this   
   >>>>>>>>>>> case. Therefore freedom does not impede the natural law of   
   >>>>>>>>>>> appearances, any more than this law interferes with the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> freedom of the practical use of reason, a use that stands in   
   >>>>>>>>>>> connection with things in themselves as determining   
   >>>>>>>>>>> grounds." [pages 93-97]   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>>>> DOLF: "How is the notion of a civil society related to the   
   >>>>>>>>>>> inherent human disposition of animus / anima and does such   
   >>>>>>>>>>> dynamic suggest there is an ontic #22 - jié (çµ�):   
   >>>>>>>>>>> *FORMATIONAL* (circumscribed as bounding) #135 - níng (å‡�):   
   >>>>>>>>>>> *CONGEALING* / [#56, #79] concept of facilitated arbitration   
   >>>>>>>>>>> as #174 - CYBERNETIC SYSTEMIC / ANTHROPOMORPHIC PRINCIPLE   
   >>>>>>>>>>> which when disordered possesses an attenuated #152 / #174 -   
   >>>>>>>>>>> yí (ç–‘): *DEFICIENCY* / [#29, #61, #62, #22] that may in a   
   >>>>>>>>>>> chronic ontological state be regarded as either delinquency   
   >>>>>>>>>>> or reprobation?"   
   >>>>>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> CAN REFUSAL OF COMMUNION BY IRISH CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP PELL ON   
   >>>>>>>> BOER WAR MEMORIAL DAY / PENTECOST SUNDAY 31 MAY 1998 BE BROUGHT   
   >>>>>>>> BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?   
   >>>>>>>>   
   >>>>>>>> Instances of the most serious international crimes, such as war   
   >>>>>>>> crimes, crimes of aggression, genocide and crime against   
   >>>>>>>> humanity (eg: RECLAIM THE #1827 - EUCHARIST / PENTECOST FROM å   
   �   
   >>>>>>>> - SWASTIKA OBSTRUCTION / BABYLONIAN [#314 - mágos (G3097):   
   >>>>>>>> *WISE* *MEN* / #335 - Kasday (H3779): CHALDEAN / #87 -   
   >>>>>>>> BABYLONIAN KING (circa 721 BC) as [#2 - FULL CIRCLE (周), #30 -   
   >>>>>>>> BOLD RESOLUTION (毅), #1 - CENTRE (中), #4 - BARRIER (é–‘), #50 -   
   >>>>>>>> VASTNESS / WASTING (å”�)] being ANTI- STATISM ARTIFICE as   
   >>>>>>>> UNCONSTITUTIONAL: SECTION II: UNALIENABLE RIGHTS TRANSFERENCE   
   >>>>>>>> PROTOCOL ] PERSECUTION OF JEWISH - CHRISTIANS AS SUBSTANTIATED   
   >>>>>>>> CLAIM TO BELIEF #100 + 40 AM as 3860 BCE + 20 x (293 x 365.2423   
   >>>>>>>> TROPICAL YEARS | 294 x 364 | 6J) + 1 (NO 0 CE)  = 2001 CE (NEW   
      
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